

CURRENT HISTORY

A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

MAY, 1985

North Africa

United States Relations with North Africa— <i>John Damis</i>	193
Assessing Libya's Qaddafi— <i>Lisa Anderson</i>	197
The Politics of Reassurance in Algeria— <i>Robert A. Mortimer</i>	201
The Sudan's Islamization— <i>Scott H. Jacobs</i>	205
Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Chad— <i>Alex Rundos</i>	209
Morocco and the Western Sahara— <i>William H. Lewis</i>	213
Tunisia at the Crossroads— <i>Mark Tessler</i>	217
Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia— <i>Peter Schwab</i>	221

Book Reviews— <i>On Africa</i>	224
The Month in Review— <i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	235
Maps— <i>Chad</i>	211
— <i>North Africa</i> —	Inside Back Cover

Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MAY, 1985
VOLUME 84 NUMBER 502

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Managing Editor:

WILLIAM W. FINAN JR.

Consulting Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

University of South Dakota

O. EDMUND CLUBB

U.S. Foreign Service Officer (retired)

DAVID B. H. DENOON

New York University

JOHN ERICKSON

University of Edinburgh

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Case Western Reserve University

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

CARL G. JACOBSEN

University of Miami

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame, Emeritus

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

RAJAN MENON

Vanderbilt University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

JAN S. PRYBYLA

Pennsylvania State University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford, Emeritus

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

AARON SEGAL

University of Texas

VACLAV SMIL

University of Manitoba

RICHARD F. STAAR

Hoover Institution

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College, Emeritus

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Coming in September

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1985

September, 1985

Property of
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIBRARY
Big Sandy, Texas

How radically will China change its economic orientation? What are the political factors behind the modernization program? The September issue discusses these questions and the following topics:

United States-China Relations: An American View

by TOM ROBINSON, Georgetown University

United States-China Relations: A Chinese View

by JIA-LIN ZHANG, Shanghai Institute for
International Studies, Shanghai

Politics in China

by WILLIAM JOSEPHS, Wellesley College

China's Economic Reforms

by CHRISTINE WONG, Mt. Holyoke College

China and Hong Kong

by WILLIAM OVERHOLT, Bankers Trust Co.,
New York

Chinese Society


by STAN ROSEN, University of Southern California

Agriculture

by VACLAV SMIL, University of Manitoba

China's Legal Reforms

by HUNGDA CHIU, University of Maryland,
School of Law



\$2.95 a copy • \$21.00 a year

Canada \$23.00 a year • Foreign \$23.00 a year

Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

Current History (ISSN-0011-3530) is published monthly (except June, July and August) for \$21.00 per year by Current History, Inc. Publication Office, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127; Editorial Office, 3740 Creamery Rd., Furlong, Pa. 18925. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: send address changes to *Current History*, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, *The Abridged Reader's Guide*, *ABC Polsci*, *PAIS*, *SSCI* and *America: History and Life*. Indexed on-line by DIALOG, BRS and Information Access Magazine Index. Microfilm: University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright © 1985 by Current History

Current History

MAY, 1985

VOL. 84, NO. 502

In this issue, eight specialists examine the problems faced by the various governments of the North African nations as well as United States policies in that area. As our introductory article points out, "Strategic and political interests are most important to Washington in its relations with the Arab states of North Africa because the Reagan administration gives a very high priority to the global-strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union."

United States Relations with North Africa

BY JOHN DAMIS

Professor of Political Science, Portland State University

WITH the occasional exception of Libya, the area of North Africa does not command front-page attention in the United States. There is even some confusion about the true identity of the region: Is it part of Africa? Or, by dint of its cultural orientation—predominantly Arab and Muslim—does it belong to the Middle East?

For many years after World War II, American relations with North Africa were handled within the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs. When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a trip to the Arab world and Israel shortly after the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war, he visited Morocco and Tunisia as well as the confrontation states of the Middle East. Kissinger expressed consternation that this trip required the presence of not one but two assistant secretaries of state. This consternation reportedly led to an administrative reorganization in which responsibility for relations with the North African countries was transferred to the State Department's Bureau for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. In the eyes of a senior American diplomat, North Africa ceased to be the crown jewel of the African Bureau and became instead the backwater of the Near East-South Asian Bureau.

To be sure, the countries of the western Arab world (known collectively as the Maghreb) have important links to both Africa and the Middle East. The regional conflicts of this area—the Western Sahara and Chad—are on the agenda, first and foremost, of an African grouping, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). At the same time, the region's strong religious, linguistic and political ties are with the Arab East.

For the United States, the Maghreb has greater strategic importance than west, central, east or even

southern Africa. For obvious reasons, North Africa has considerably less importance for American interests than the Middle East—thus the "backwater" image. In North Africa, the United States has important and close relations with Morocco, important but not so close relations with Algeria, close but not so important relations with Tunisia, and severely strained relations with Libya. Finally, the United States has an interest in Chad that derives primarily from American relations with neighboring Libya, Egypt, and Sudan.

MOROCCO

The United States, beginning in the late 1960's when Moroccan relations with France were badly strained, has built up a close political relationship with Morocco. Because of Morocco's strategic position commanding the southern access to the Mediterranean, Washington has a vested interest in a friendly government in Rabat. Washington and the moderate government of King Hassan II share much the same assessment of the destabilizing potential of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa. King Hassan helped arrange and initially supported Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace efforts with Israel before falling in line with the general Arab condemnation of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In January, 1984, at a summit meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization held in Casablanca, the King played a key role in the decision to allow Egypt to return to the conference. Hassan dispatched troops in 1977 and 1978 to help repel invasions of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province by Angola-based rebels. Until 1978, the United States maintained a naval training facility at Kenitra and two navy communications installations northeast of Rabat that served as important relay stations for facilities

in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Moroccan ports are generally open to visits by ships of the American Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, and in December, 1984, a large Marine Corps tank carrier, the U.S.S. *Newport*, made a six-day visit to the port of Casablanca.

In contrast, American–Moroccan commercial relations are modest. The United States accounts for only 4 to 6 percent of Morocco's foreign trade. Because of the importance of the French language in Morocco's commercial life, the country's imports have long centered on French products. In addition, there is very little complementarity between the American and Moroccan economies. Morocco's major export is agricultural produce and the kingdom is the world's largest exporter of phosphates, whereas the United States is the world's largest agricultural exporter and the largest producer of phosphates.

The United States also has an important military supply relationship with Morocco, although France remains the kingdom's primary source of arms. During the past decade, Morocco has signed agreements to purchase more than \$800-million worth of arms from the United States under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, plus nearly \$100-million worth of commercial arms. The FMS deliveries have included M-48 and M-60 tanks and F-5 jet fighters. In addition, Rabat signed a three-year, \$220-million contract with Westinghouse in 1977 to provide a system of air defense radar installations, a supporting communications system, and a control tower.

During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the arms supply relationship became strained when Washington and Rabat had serious policy disagreements over the proper use of American-supplied weapons. The problem centered on the Western Sahara, which Rabat considers to be part of Morocco. Since the United States did not recognize Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara, the Carter administration took the position that Morocco could not use American-supplied arms intended for internal security and legitimate self-defense in the disputed territory. In 1978, the Carter administration imposed arms sales restrictions on Morocco. King Hassan made it clear to Washington at that time that continued American military aid was the price of Moroccan friendship.¹

The strain in relations ended in 1979 when the Polisario—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, the two sections of the Western Sahara—began to launch attacks inside Morocco. The Carter administration concluded that Morocco, a trusted and supportive ally, faced a threat to its internal security, and it approved a \$235-million arms package eagerly sought by Rabat. In defending this arms package in Congress in January, 1980, the Carter administration

identified the avoidance of a Moroccan military defeat in the Sahara as a major United States interest. Congressional critics of the sale made the completion of the arms transfers conditional on Morocco's good-faith efforts to reach a negotiated political solution in the Western Sahara.

When it came to power in 1981, the administration of President Ronald Reagan removed the limitation on arms sales to Morocco and greatly expanded bilateral military and security cooperation. Only one day after coming into office, the Reagan administration approved Morocco's pending request for 180 M-60A3 main battle tanks—a request the Carter administration had shelved in November, 1980, to avoid offending Algeria, which had begun to play its crucial intermediary role in the hostage crisis with Iran. In late 1981, when Morocco requested additional military assistance from the United States to counter Soviet-made SA-6 missile systems introduced into battle by the Polisario, the United States agreed to provide Morocco with various measures to counter the SA-6 missiles, including training in evasive flying tactics and electronic countermeasures equipment.

American–Moroccan military and security cooperation reached a new level in 1982 with the establishment of a joint military commission in February and the signing of a facilities access agreement in May, following King Hassan's official state visit to Washington. The renewable six-year agreement allows United States military planes to use two Moroccan air bases during emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. These transit rights, which would allow American planes to land and refuel, were sought for use by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) then being planned for the Middle East. Morocco reportedly retained a veto over the transit of United States forces if they were to be used against an Arab country friendly to Morocco. Because of Moroccan sensitivity on the subject, the agreement was not made public.

Heightened military cooperation has been accompanied by higher levels of American financial assistance. The joint military commission and the facilities access agreement brought in their wake an increase in military sales credits for Morocco from \$30 million in fiscal year 1982 to \$100 million in fiscal year 1983. American military assistance to Morocco in all categories totaled over \$150 million for fiscal year 1984. When \$244 million of agricultural credits, a \$150-million investment for expanding Voice of America facilities in Tangier, and \$40 million to upgrade the two airports involved in the facilities access agreement are included, total American financial assistance for Morocco in fiscal year 1984 approached \$600 million.

United States relations with Morocco were jolted last summer when Hassan and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi suddenly signed an agreement establishing an "Arab-African Union" in which each state retains its sovereignty. The treaty calls for close economic, social and political cooperation. In the United States, vocal

¹Richard B. Parker, *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 177. Parker was the American ambassador to Morocco in 1978–1979.

members of Congress and the media, and especially strong supporters of Israel, sharply criticized Rabat's surprise move as a betrayal and a failure of American diplomacy. To allay United States concern, King Hassan dispatched Ahmed Reda Guedira, his top adviser, to Washington, where he met in early September with Vice President George Bush. Later that month, State Department troubleshooter General Vernon Walters (who was appointed in February to replace Jeane Kirkpatrick as permanent representative to the United Nations) met with King Hassan in Fez. In Washington and in Fez, Morocco tried to convince the United States that it could exercise a restraining influence on Qaddafi.

Within a couple of months, the furor in Washington over Morocco's unity agreement with Libya had all but disappeared. The Reagan administration chose to take a wait-and-see position; instead of lashing out against Morocco, it merely warned Rabat not to trust Qaddafi. With the exception of Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, no voices were raised in Congress against the unity agreement at any point in the deliberations over foreign military and economic assistance, and Morocco received full funding of its FMS and economic requests for fiscal year 1985.

United States relations with Morocco have apparently not changed in any significant way as a result of the unexpected unity pact. Judging from Libya's previous failures at unity attempts with other Arab states, the Moroccan-Libyan union will probably not be implemented fully. In particular, it is highly unlikely that Libya will ever control American military equipment supplied to Morocco. Libya already has more Soviet and French weaponry than it needs, and Libyans lack the training necessary to use American arms. In addition, Rabat will be very wary of jeopardizing its arms supply relationship with Washington by transferring American weapons to Libya. And to the extent that Rabat is able to moderate Qaddafi's extremist tendencies, Morocco's unity agreement with Libya could support United States national security interests.

It is the Western Sahara dispute that will weigh heavily on United States relations with Morocco. Washington has tried to avoid any direct involvement in the Sahara conflict, which it views as a regional issue requiring a regional solution. The Reagan administration has been responsive to Rabat's legitimate needs for national defense; it has given Morocco enough support to defend itself and to encourage negotiations but not enough to overrun the Polisario. The United States has no interests in the Western Sahara and it has no preferred solution for the conflict; at the same time, the United States is anxious to avoid a Moroccan defeat that could threaten the stability of the monarchy.

ALGERIA

United States relations with Algeria are the reverse of those with Morocco. Because of its successful anti-

colonial revolution, Algeria is highly respected in the third world and is, among North African countries, by far the most influential in the international arena. It is a strong supporter of national liberation movements in general and the Polisario in particular. Its economic orientation is socialist, and it was an architect in 1974 of the New International Economic Order. From Algiers, the United States is seen as the most powerful capitalist country in the world and the leader of the "haves" on North-South issues. More often than not, the United States and Algeria are diametrically opposed on international political and economic issues. Political relations between the two countries, therefore, are correct but not close.

But because Algerians do not mix politics and economics, large-scale commercial relations have developed between the United States and Algeria during the past decade. In 1977, the United States replaced France as Algeria's principal trading partner and absorbed nearly half of Algeria's exports, including 56 percent of Algeria's crude oil and 28 percent of its liquefied natural gas. The value of Algerian imports to the United States reached a high of \$6.6 billion in 1980 and oil imports peaked at 500,000 barrels a day in January, 1981. There have been no imports of Algerian crude oil since February, 1982, but large amounts of condensate, or natural gasoline, have been imported.

Algerian natural gas also has made important inroads in the American market, although deliveries under a major contract were halted in 1980 because of a price disagreement. Algeria insists that the price of its gas be tied to that of crude oil; this makes Algerian gas considerably more expensive than gas imported from Canada. (The United States Department of Energy refuses to approve contracts at the higher price, and shipments under a second major contract were suspended in December, 1983.) Completing this commercial relationship, since the mid-1970's American firms have signed contracts worth between \$6 billion and \$8 billion with Algerian state-owned companies to provide technology and construction for Algeria's extensive development efforts.

United States relations with Algeria have improved since the more moderate regime of Chedli Benjedid took office in early 1979. These relations have benefited from Algeria's displeasure with the massive Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and brutalization of a Muslim country encouraged Algiers to distance itself somewhat from Moscow and to seek better relations and alternate sources of military supplies from both the United States and France. This factor partly explains Algeria's willingness in 1980-1981 to play an effective mediating role in ending the hostage crisis between the United States and Iran. The first American naval visit to an Algerian port in 17 years took place in 1980, a year that brought the first invitation to Algerian military officers to visit the United States.

Nonetheless, the improvement in American-Algerian

relations has been slow and uneven. At the time of the hostage crisis, Algerian leaders expressed their desire for better and closer relations with the United States. They were resentful, however, when the Reagan administration approved a major tank sale to Morocco as one of its first foreign policy moves. Since that time, the Reagan administration has tried to be more responsive and sensitive to Algeria's continuing evolution from revolutionary policies to relative international maturity. Between 1981 and 1984, Washington allowed the sale to Algeria of a total of 17 Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport planes worth about \$300 million. In addition, between 1981 and 1983, the Algerian military purchased 4,000 heavy-duty trucks from American Motors. Nevertheless, the United States maintains a policy of not selling lethal military equipment to Algeria, a policy that dates from the late 1960's when the more radical regime of Houari Boumedienne granted safe haven for airplane hijackers and terrorists.

One impediment to improved relations is the lingering perception—more prevalent in Congress than in the executive branch—that Algeria is a Soviet client. This perception derives from the former strident tone of Algeria's anti-imperialist rhetoric, the frequent identity of Algerian and Soviet positions on international issues, and the fact that Moscow has supplied about 90 percent of Algeria's military equipment. The notion that Algiers is in the Soviet camp has been a factor in the disagreement over gas prices, since there is some American concern about the reliability of Algeria as a long-term supplier of a vital energy source.

But the image of Algeria as a Soviet client state is a gross misperception. Algeria is a fiercely independent country that categorically refuses to be beholden to any outside power; it has not permitted Soviet bases on its territory, although Soviet vessels are allowed to make port calls. The Benjedid regime complained bitterly in private when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Though Algiers has abstained on the annual United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, it voted in December, 1984, in favor of a resolution by the Organization of Islamic Conference condemning the Soviet Union and calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The improvement in American-Algerian relations has been most noticeable in the past two years. Algeria was made eligible in April, 1983, to purchase defense services—that is, training—from the United States. Though nothing concrete has yet materialized, the Algerians are interested in purchasing defense services and agreements between the two governments will probably be reached in 1985. Algeria would like to be eligible for FMS, which requires a presidential determination. The Algerians do not need the credits involved in the FMS program, but their inclusion on the FMS list would constitute an American mark of approval.

In September, 1983, Vice President Bush became the highest ranking American official ever to visit Algiers. Despite the disagreement over natural gas prices, Algiers would like to expand economic contacts with the United States in other areas. Secretary of Agriculture John Block visited Algeria in February, 1984, to sign the first agricultural aid agreement between the two countries. In November, Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel (who has since become secretary of the interior) attended the thirtieth anniversary celebrations of the launching of the Algerian Revolution. Hodel extended an invitation for a state visit to President Benjedid, and in February the White House announced that the Algerian President would make a one-week visit to the United States in April. Except for a quick side trip from the United Nations by President Boumedienne in 1974, the Benjedid visit marks the first time an Algerian leader has come to Washington since Algerian independence in 1962.

These developments reflect a perception by the Reagan administration that the Benjedid regime has adopted more reserved and responsible positions on Middle East issues; that it is no longer an active member of the radical Arab "Steadfastness Front"; and that it has made active efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. Communications between the governments have improved and American officials have friendly access to Algerian officials.

TUNISIA

United States relations with Tunisia have always been friendly. A small country with modest resources surrounded by larger and more powerful neighbors, Tunisia necessarily seeks to avoid disputes. The pragmatic government of President Habib Bourguiba, who has been firmly in power since independence in 1956, has looked to the United States (and France) for development assistance and occasional shows of force against neighboring Libya. Though Washington has no economic stake in Tunisia, it wants to assist the most moderate and stable country in the Arab world. At the geostrategic level, a strong Tunisia helps to maintain stability along the coast of North Africa to protect the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Before 1980, the United States mainly provided Tunisia with economic assistance since Bourguiba kept his country's military down to a very modest size. Total United States economic aid to Tunisia since 1956 is over \$1 billion; American officials have often cited Tunisia as a model of successful aid-assisted economic development.

Bourguiba's sensible approach to internal development was overtaken by national security concerns in 1980

(Continued on page 232)

John Damis is the author of many articles on North Africa and *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). He formerly served as the Department of State's foreign affairs analyst for North Africa.

"[Qaddafi] will continue to be a source of instability on the international scene. His opposition to the international status quo is an article of faith, not a response to domestic or international pressure. . . . Because Qaddafi acts on principle rather than in response to pressure, the international community [will be] hard pressed to find a way to change or control his activity effectively."

Assessing Libya's Qaddafi

BY LISA ANDERSON

Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University

DURING 1984, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi continued to make international headlines. On the diplomatic front, the British expelled Libyan diplomats in May after gunfire from the Libyan People's Bureau (or embassy) in London, killed a British policewoman on duty at a peaceful anti-Qaddafi demonstration. And during the fall, Qaddafi was castigated for failing to honor an agreement with France for mutual withdrawal of forces from Chad.

On the domestic scene, opposition to his rule seemed to be growing. The regime uncovered a plot to attack Qaddafi's barracks in May and, in November, the Egyptian government publicly embarrassed the Qaddafi government in foiling a regime-sponsored attempt to assassinate a prominent Libyan dissident in Cairo. Yet despite widespread denunciation in the West, condemnation by many Arab leaders, and the active opposition of Libyans in exile, Qaddafi could nonetheless point to some satisfactions in 1984. In August he concluded a "unity agreement" with King Hassan of Morocco that was widely viewed as a diplomatic triumph for Libya. And the celebrations of Qaddafi's fifteenth year in power (which made him one of the longest-reigning political leaders in the Arab world) were held with the usual pomp in early September.

This checkered record, which is not unrepresentative of the recent fortunes of the regime, provoke larger questions about Qaddafi and his government. Is the Libyan leader, as he has so often been portrayed in the West, "the most dangerous man in the world" or, as the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat once put it, "one hundred percent sick and possessed by the Devil?"¹ Or is he, as he prefers to portray himself, the beleaguered but unbowed champion of oppressed and exploited peoples throughout the world? What are his goals, his sources of support, his prospects? Answers to these questions are to be sought in the background and personality of Qaddafi himself, the history of the country he rules, the evolving nature of his regime, and the international system in which he operates.

Qaddafi was born of a humble nomadic family in the

¹See, for example, the cover story, "Qaddafi: The Most Dangerous Man in the World?" *Newsweek*, July 20, 1981.

Sirte, the border region between Libya's two major provinces, about a decade before Libya became independent in 1951. His political aspirations developed early, and he was expelled from secondary school in the southern province of the Fezzan after an altercation with a scion of the region's most prominent family. By the time he completed secondary school, he had decided to enter the Military Academy in order to gain army support for that political change he had already concluded would not come through the civilian arena. A number of the Free Officers who eventually launched the successful military coup—including Abd al-Salam Jallud, his perennial second in command—were Qaddafi's childhood friends and collaborators. By Libyan standards if not by international norms, Qaddafi was fairly well educated: university enrollment when he came to power in 1969 was little more than 3,000 students.

Although he had been a devoted follower of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qaddafi's political ambitions soon outstripped Nasserist formulations of non-alignment, Arab unity, and social justice. His wide if unsystematic reading in utopian, anarchist, and socialist Western thought—from Rousseau to Marx—as well as the egalitarian ethos of Libyan tribal life were evident in his ideology, which was set forth in the three slim volumes of the *Green Book* that were published in the second half of the 1970's. This ideology, or third international theory, so called to distinguish it from both capitalism and communism, was simple and, in implementation, radical. All forms of representative rule were portrayed as perversions of true, presumably direct, democracy, and all forms of profit were said to be inherently exploitative.

These were Qaddafi's firmly held principles and, although he has demonstrated tactical flexibility throughout his years in power, Qaddafi has never compromised his principles in response to domestic or international pressure. Indeed, he apparently believes that, like a modern Robin Hood, his status as a virtual international outlaw confirms the righteousness of his cause as an opponent of what he sees as injustice and exploitation at home and abroad. From his point of view, domestic opposition, rather than suggesting that his policies are in any way inappropriate to Libya, merely demonstrates the

continued influence of perverse and reactionary elements in the population, while foreign condemnation is only to be expected in a world dominated by imperialist powers.

Although there has been widespread and growing disaffection in recent years both at home and abroad, Qaddafi's early emphasis on nonaligned anti-imperialism in foreign policy and egalitarian distribution of the country's substantial oil revenues at home was at first widely appreciated. His vision of the world struck a responsive chord among many Libyans, partly because of Libya's encounter with the West in the twentieth century.

LIBYA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Even by third world standards, Libya's experience of Western imperialism was unusually damaging. An Ottoman province, Libya was invaded by the Italians in 1911. By the time the Fascists came to power in Rome in 1922, the Libyans—aided by Ottoman and Arab supporters throughout the Middle East and North Africa—were fiercely resisting Italian rule, and the Italians were forced to undertake a brutal war of conquest. It was another decade before the resistance was finally extinguished, and the Italians enjoyed only ten years of peaceful occupation before the destructive North Africa campaigns of World War II ousted them from the territory, which was thereafter administered by Great Britain and France as occupied enemy territory.

The decades of almost continuous war destroyed the Libyan economy and cost the country half its population, including most of the educated elite. When it became independent in 1951, Libya was the poorest country in the world: per capita income was estimated at \$25 a year; the major export was scrap metal from the World War II military campaigns; and among the million inhabitants, 90 percent were illiterate and no more than 14 were college graduates.

Moreover, many Libyans were embittered by what they knew of Western influence. Perhaps they were unduly impressed with the power of Western technology (especially in military affairs, where it had been used to advantage by the Italians and the World War II combatants); but they were also cynical about the intentions of the Western powers. By contrast, the support they received from the rest of the Arab world in their resistance to Italian colonialism led many Libyans to sympathize with pan-Arab causes.

The independence government was led by King Idris, the leader of the religious brotherhood the Sanusiyyah, which had spearheaded the resistance to the Italians in the eastern part of the country. During most of the years of Italian occupation, Idris (who died in Egypt in 1983 at the age of 90) had lived in exile in Cairo, where he developed cordial relations with the British authorities who then ruled Egypt. The British supported his accession to power as the head of independent Libya and in the early years of independence they—and the United States—provided critical aid to Libya in the form of

grants to the operating budget and rents for military bases. The domestic administration—a federal structure that delegated a great deal of authority to the provincial governments—was unusually elaborate for so poor a country, reflecting both the importance of government as the major “industry” in Libya and the regional tensions that were reflected and exacerbated by Idris's preference for his home province. Because of the lack of trained bureaucrats and Idris's mistrust of political parties, which were banned at independence, much of the administration was delegated to locally powerful families, and patronage became the most important characteristic of Libyan politics.

In a very poor country this system might have proved adequate, but Libya shortly experienced still another upheaval: oil was discovered in 1959. Within a decade, per capita income had risen to \$1,500 a year, and the patronage system of government had led to widespread corruption. Moreover, Idris refused to loosen his political ties with Britain and the United States when the military bases were no longer justified by revenue needs. And at the same time, Egyptian President Nasser was broadcasting his call for Arab unity and nonalignment over the airwaves. Corruption plus the regime's pro-Western foreign policy further alienated much of the youth. By the end of the 1960's, the demise of the monarchy was widely predicted, as demands for popular participation in politics grew louder.

THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION

Qaddafi and his Free Officer colleagues launched their coup on September 1, 1969. Although the Revolutionary Command Council, as the new regime called itself, came out of a secret military organization and therefore had little organized support in the civilian arena, its appearance was initially greeted with as much relief as apprehension, and its early policies were designed to make it genuinely popular. The regime's members were young—Qaddafi was said to be 27 years old—and enthusiastic; they were committed to ending corruption, to ensuring equitable distribution of the oil revenues, and to reorienting Libyan foreign policy toward a nonaligned, anti-imperialist, Arab nationalist posture that more clearly reflected popular sentiment.

By the mid-1970's, Qaddafi's regime had made good on many of its early promises to provide free housing, medical care, education and transportation to any needy Libyan. In education, for example, university enrollment rose to 22,000 students by 1979—a sevenfold increase in ten years. The government could also point to foreign policy achievements: Qaddafi's hard-line stance in negotiations with the oil companies in the early days of the regime produced substantially higher prices and won Qaddafi a reputation as a shrewd bargainer. The British and American military bases were evacuated within months and, in order to guarantee its nonalignment, Libya diversified its arms suppliers, looking particularly

to France at the outset. Arabic was restored as the official language of government business and other symbolic and substantive moves were undertaken to demonstrate Libya's commitment to Arab nationalist nonalignment.

Nonetheless, it was clear well before the mid-1970's that the regime was encountering frustrations. Nasser, who had been enthusiastic about the new government in Libya, died in 1970 and his successor, Anwar Sadat, was less committed to Arab unity schemes, dragging his feet in negotiations over the proposed unification of Egypt and Libya and focusing his attention instead on improving Egypt's relations with the West. At home, various experiments in political organization, including the creation of a single political party modeled on the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union (ASU), also proved inadequate and unpopular.

In April, 1973, Qaddafi launched the so-called popular revolution. In a speech introducing the new system, he called for "an administrative revolution [that would] eliminate all forms of bourgeoisie and bureaucracy," and for the "weeding out of . . . perverts and deviationists" from the society by the taking of "appropriate measures."² The ASU was soon moribund; instead, Qaddafi instructed the people to "seize power" and establish popular committees to supervise the operations of work places and localities. As is often the case with major political reorganizations, this revolution created considerable instability and uncertainty, but the introduction of new and younger aspirants into positions of political authority and the emphasis on popular participation were widely viewed as positive developments.

In 1975, however, there was an important split in the regime when a temporary decline in oil revenues led to a dispute over government spending and an attempted coup within the Revolutionary Command Council.³ The ministers of foreign affairs and planning, who had wanted to cut expenditures on foreign and military affairs in favor of domestic development, fled into exile after the failure of the coup, and Qaddafi's preference for a high-profile and expensive foreign policy prevailed. Soon the ruling circles were composed exclusively of Qaddafi loyalists, some genuinely committed to his revolution, some merely sycophants, but few willing or able to stand up to the regime's principal figure. Thus the regime—once noted for its leader's predilection for walking the streets of Tripoli, the capital city, to talk to ordinary citizens—grew more isolated from popular sentiment and was increasingly committed to strict implementation of the dictates of the third international theory.

²Quoted in Nathan Alexander, "Libya: The Continuous Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 17 (April 2, 1981). On the background and developments of the Qaddafi regime, also see John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

³Raymond Hinnebusch, "Libya: Personalistic Leadership of a Populist Revolution," in I. W. Zartman et al., *Political Elites in Arab North Africa* (New York: Longman, 1982).

By 1978, Libya had become what Qaddafi called the first *jamahiriyyah*, a term invented by the Libyan leader and meaning, loosely, a state without a government, or "peopledom"; the system of popular committees first announced in 1973 and elaborated in the *Green Book* was set firmly in place. To provide for universal popular participation in the country's administration, popular committees were established in each locality to deliberate and administer policy and to send delegates to the annual meeting of the countrywide General People's Congress. Through this system, the Libyan people were supposed to be ruling themselves, without government intervention. Qaddafi himself resigned from his government positions in early 1979 to become what he called the "Leader of the Revolution"; his new function was merely to guide the popular revolution in Libya and ensure that it was not sidetracked or subverted.

In practice, Qaddafi became an increasingly intolerant absolute ruler. The economic dictates of the *Green Book* were easily as radical as the political principles and were considerably more difficult for the average family to accommodate. Nonetheless, through the early 1980's their implementation proceeded in the face of ample evidence of their unpopularity. Expressions of dissent were regarded not as an indication of problems in the theory or practice of economic radicalism but as the work of reactionary opponents of the regime. Qaddafi's commitment to egalitarian values was unshakable. Thus, in order to ensure that no Libyan profited at the expense of another, private enterprises were turned over to employees in workers' committees; rental properties were seized; retail trade was abolished; and, to guarantee that all Libyans had equal assets, bank accounts were frozen. Simultaneously, military conscription and training were extended into the primary schools in an effort to "arm the people" in a popular militia (as Qaddafi put it), and to make the conventional military establishment obsolete. This last was a reflection of Qaddafi's abhorrence of bureaucratic institutions, whether civilian or military, and his growing distrust of the military itself.

By the early 1980's, the military, like the civilian population, was apparently increasingly unhappy with the regime's policies, and reports of military uprisings and assassination attempts against Qaddafi reached the international media. Qaddafi's domestic political and economic measures had deeply divided the population, because radical egalitarianism proved to cut two ways. Those who had no property, including many of the youth, continued to benefit from the generous welfare policies of the regime; but property owners found themselves deprived of their shops, their real estate and their savings. As government revenues declined in the early 1980's, falling from \$22 billion in 1981 to \$10 billion in 1984 because of the slack world market for oil, the government undertook austerity measures that further undermined popular confidence. Many Libyans attributed the limitations on consumer imports and the imposition of extraor-

dinary taxes to government mismanagement, since the per capita income was still a healthy \$8,000 a year. By that time, between 50,000 and 100,000 Libyans had left the country, some to join the six or seven major opposition groups operating in exile.

In the early days of the regime, Qaddafi's reaction to opposition to his policies was remarkable for its gentleness; he had come to power in a bloodless coup, and for some years thereafter his regime was relatively indulgent about dissent. By 1977, however, there were public executions of civilians, and the regime's patience was apparently wearing thin. By that time, Qaddafi had an extensive and technologically sophisticated domestic intelligence service, established and run by East German advisers, who also provided Qaddafi's personal bodyguards. Qaddafi soon created what he called revolutionary committees and delegated to them the role of ensuring popular enthusiasm for the revolution. These committees became an elite corps of between 3,000 and 4,000 young people who were responsible for spying on Libyans at home and "liquidating" the regime's opponents overseas, a practice that contributed to Libya's reputation for terrorism.

Qaddafi is not without supporters at home: many Libyans have better housing and health care and more educational opportunities than they dreamed about 15 years earlier. Moreover, since half the population—now about two and a half million—is less than 15 years old, a substantial proportion of the people have known no other government. Nonetheless, as the regime's policies wreak havoc with the economy, inhibiting both national and household planning, what popular support the government enjoys is increasingly bought at the cost of a widespread black market in consumer goods unavailable in the poorly stocked government-owned supermarkets—the only legal retail establishments—and growing corruption in the administration.

Like his domestic revolution, Qaddafi's foreign policy is based on radical political ideology. Although he came to power a devoted Nasserist, his foreign policy ambitions broadened as the third international theory took shape. Qaddafi has come to see his revolution at home and his opposition to the status quo abroad as inseparable; as he has repeatedly emphasized, the Libyan "revolution is based on an international ideology, not a national movement."⁴ Thus although the regime has remained attached to its original Nasserist principles, which Qaddafi interprets to include implacable hostility to Israel and to any states or policies that contribute to Israel's continued existence, a more general opposition to the international system as reactionary, inequitable, and unjust has become increasingly important.

⁴See, for example, Qaddafi's interview with Strobe Talbott, *Time*, April 9, 1979.

⁵For discussions of what is known of Qaddafi's foreign involvements, see John Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1982), and the United States Department of State, "The Libyan Problem," Special Report No. 111 (October, 1983).

What makes Qaddafi's revolutionary doctrine so striking is not its success. Indeed, a review of the foreign policy of the regime in its 15 years in power points to few genuine accomplishments, even by Qaddafi's own standards. Instead of promoting Arab unity, Qaddafi has been meddling and unhelpful to Arab causes (from the Arab point of view). He failed to block the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1978; he was the first political leader to be denied the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity in 1982; and he has proved unable seriously to threaten the interests of the "imperialist" Western powers. Nonetheless, he continues to draw attention and even occasionally, if temporarily, allies—like Morocco's King Hassan.

Qaddafi's staying power results from his virtually unlimited financial resources. Although the country's \$9 billion in financial reserves were drawn down to \$4.5 billion in 1984 when the world oil glut depressed revenues, until recently there have been no real financial constraints on Qaddafi's foreign spending. It is not possible to estimate what proportion of Libya's oil revenues has been spent on export and defense of the revolution—that is, on foreign and military policy. But it is safe to say that Qaddafi has spent what he liked, and that over the course of 15 years that has amounted to billions of dollars. By the early 1980's, for example, he had spent over \$12 billion on military equipment from the Soviet Union, which replaced France as Libya's principal military supplier in the mid-1970's, and although most of this equipment remained on Libyan soil, some was made available to foreign groups and states.

Qaddafi's support of radical movements abroad has been notoriously erratic, a fact that has contributed to the decline of his reputation in radical circles and has made concrete estimates of the Libyan role in promoting instability impossible. Cash aid has been provided to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's opposition to the Shah in Iran, to various Palestinian and Lebanese groups, to opposition movements in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan, and to Muslim opposition in the Philippines and various countries in West Africa. The Libyan government has also arranged arms transfers to the Polisario in the Western Sahara, the Irish Republican Army, and various left-wing groups in Latin America, and has paid bills for Soviet weaponry delivered to Syria and Ethiopia. Military camps within Libya, said to be staffed by Cuban, Syrian and Palestinian advisers, also provide training in guerrilla and terrorist tactics to individuals and groups across the world.⁵

Libyan "volunteers" saw action in Lebanon and the

(Continued on page 226)

Lisa Anderson teaches Middle Eastern and North African politics at Harvard University, where she is director of the Moroccan Studies Program at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. She is currently completing a book entitled *The Modern History of Libya*.

Islamic fundamentalism, economic modernization and regional tensions have accompanied Algeria's development policies. "Aware of the social strains that have emerged, [President Chadli] Benjedid has practiced a policy of reassurance plus reform, dismantling some of the statist structures that have proved inefficient. . . ."

The Politics of Reassurance in Algeria

BY ROBERT A. MORTIMER
Professor of Political Science, Haverford College

ALGERIA is the centerpiece of the Maghreb, the obvious core state of a North African regional ensemble. It was said of Houari Boumedienne, President of Algeria from 1965 to 1978, that he thought of his country as potentially the "Prussia of the Maghreb," the federator of the western Arab world. The leadership style of the Bismarckian Colonel Boumedienne lent itself to such assertions; in practice he was a state-builder rather than an empire-builder. Yet his thesis of a "Maghreb of the peoples" (instead of autonomous states) articulated in his regime's 1976 National Charter implied larger ambitions.

His successor, Chadli Benjedid, does not inspire Prussian analogies. Although he is firmly in control, Benjedid's public posture is one of reassurance and moderation toward Algeria's regional neighbors and toward the Algerian people themselves. On the regional level, he has expressed this approach through a notion of a "Greater Maghreb" that has little in common with the more radical "Maghreb of the peoples." Domestically, his policy is well illustrated by the themes surrounding the most recent convention of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) party: hard work and national confidence in the future.

Why has Chadli Benjedid adopted this policy of regional and national reassurance? Does it signify a radical break with the legacy of the 1970's, or is it more a pragmatic adjustment to deal with new problems? After six years in power, Benjedid has certainly put his own stamp on contemporary Algeria.¹

The "Greater Maghreb" theme is best understood as a response to a turbulent external environment. Algeria faces a variety of problems created by uncertainties and unresolved issues in the region, especially the unending war over Western Sahara. More than anything else, the rehabilitation of the Greater Maghreb idea represents a tactic to encourage a diplomatic settlement of this conflict. At the same time, it is designed to address the

situation to the east, where Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi's Chadian adventure and inclination toward rapidly shifting alliances has perplexed the Algerians. Beyond these two specific regional concerns, however, lies the more generalized phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism.

The cultural resurgence of Islam has marked the entire Muslim world, and Arab Algeria is no exception, although the movement has thus far been relatively fragmented in Algeria. Benjedid has adopted a set of policies designed to keep the religious upsurge securely under the control of state authority. Indirectly, his Greater Maghreb policy is related to this objective on the premise that a stable regional entente can help to insulate Algeria from currents abroad.

This is not to imply that the Islamic revival is solely a foreign import. While it has been influenced by events in the Middle East, the phenomenon also reflects home-grown sentiment. Algeria has gone through an era of profound change; oil money, high technology and rapid industrialization have transformed an essentially rural society. The technocratic elite that has taken control of the state has brought in foreign cultural influences. The gap between the military-technical managers and the Muslim man in the street is a source of disenchantment and vague dissent. Jean-Claude Vatin has suggested that the reassertion of Algeria's Muslim personality "derives from the desire of a bewildered people to find some form of Islam that will protect them from the uncertainties of development."² The emphasis on confidence in the future, expressed in the official daily *El Moudjahid* on the eve of the December, 1983, *congrès*, reflected the regime's desire to reassure the population that the country was on the right track.

The population also needed economic reassurance. Among developing states, Algeria has ranked high in economic success. Nonetheless, the model of high-technology industrialization adopted under Boumedienne has not adequately addressed immediate consumer needs. Moreover, the heavily statist structures that Boumedienne favored have prompted popular criticism of bureaucratic bottlenecks and inefficiency. Benjedid has largely accepted this criticism and has gradually been dismantling some of these statist economic structures in

¹For an assessment of the early Benjedid years, see *Current History*, December, 1981.

²Jean-Claude Vatin, "Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism: Islam in Algeria," in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 105.

favor of more private enterprise. Likewise, the most recent five year plan adopted in 1984 introduces some new economic priorities. Without repudiating the National Charter commitment to socialism, Benjedid has encouraged the middle class to invest in light industry, agriculture and commerce. These gestures to reduce the economic role of the state are designed to head off stiffer challenges to the basic modernist option of the regime.

The years 1982–1984 were an obligatory period for national stocktaking, because they included the twentieth anniversary of independence and the thirtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Algerian war. Ironically, these commemorations served mostly as a reminder that a new generation has come of age. Algeria had a population of 10.5 million at independence in 1962. In early 1985, the figure passed 21 million—more than half the population, in other words, was born after the war. Benjedid's Algeria is demographically different from Boumedienne's, and the legacy of the heroic era is a diminishing asset. Many younger Algerians are attracted to an Islamic cultural model that offers a promise of security to a society that has been brusquely shaken in the past three decades. Benjedid stands at the juncture between competing societal models.

SOCIETY AND POLITICS

The government's concern with the rise of a fundamentalist movement became evident at the end of 1982. Throughout the year, disruptive incidents accumulated: commando operations were carried out against tourist hotels; there were attacks against young Algerian women wearing Western dress; there were confrontations between Muslim militants and Marxist students on the university grounds; and tracts circulated calling for the proclamation of an "Algerian Islamic Republic" for which the Koran would serve as a constitution. (Such tracts were likely to denounce the agrarian revolution and the "Marxist ideology pursued by the State.") In November, 1982, a particularly bloody demonstration at the Cité Universitaire claimed the life of one person and injured ten others. Ten days later, several thousand fundamentalists demonstrated peacefully in downtown Algiers. The government then began to round up individuals accused of sponsoring subversive acts, and in December it announced that 23 fundamentalist leaders would stand trial.

Benjedid deemed the situation sufficiently alarming to issue a public warning that he would not tolerate challenges to the basic orientation of the regime. The fundamentalists, he charged, were seeking to throw up barriers "between our nation and progress." Brandishing slogans in contradiction with the principles and aspirations of the majority, they sought, according to Benjedid, "to incite our people to close in upon themselves and drown themselves in false problems." Benjedid singled

out the issue of the status of women: he castigated those

calling for a total paralysis of society in their desire to cloister the woman. I wonder what those women militants who fought beside the men and who participate today . . . in national construction think of this attitude.³

In evoking the revolutionary period, the President was using his most potent weapon to delegitimize the traditionalist movement. He was also appealing to half the population to uphold a modernist vision of society in which women would hold an equal role. Benjedid insists that nationalist Algeria is a country that "needs lessons from no one" on the proper respect for its Islamic heritage. The byword of the government has long been that the Algerian experience constitutes a nationalist revolution, Islamic in its spirit, socialist in its method, and Arab in its expression. To be sure, this formulation leaves room for considerable debate about the "spirit" of Islam. Benjedid's objective is to assure that the state will be the one to interpret the meaning of Islam for contemporary Algeria.

State control of the mosque has been regime policy since independence: the government has had some kind of Ministry of Religious Affairs ever since Sheik Tewfik el-Madani took a place in the first Ahmed Ben Bella government. Madani represented the *ulema*, the religious component of the original nationalist coalition. Currently this ministry is held by Sheik Abderrahmane Chibane, a professor of Arabic who joined the FLN during the war. Another important cultural voice is Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the son of a revered leader of the nationalist generation of *ulema*. Taleb Ibrahimi is a spokesman for a modernist version of Islamic culture. The ministers of finance and of justice, on the other hand, are considered sympathetic to the fundamentalists.

Through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the government has tried to create what one observer calls "official Islam" in distinction to popular Islam. Official Islam is reformist and modernist; popular Islam is puritanical. Official Islam has been constructing mosques and training imams. Under this policy, the number of mosques has grown greatly and a class of bureaucratic clerics has been produced. But the puritanical element is dissatisfied with the official imams. Alongside the state, "wildcat mosques" (*mosquées sauvages*) have appeared in garages, apartments, factories, warehouses—wherever there is room for a call to prayer. The sermons preached in these quarters are not what the government wants the people to hear.

As the correspondent for *Le Monde* has characterized these meetings:

Anyone who wants may speak, a merchant unhappy about his taxes, a worker on strike, temporal issues being mixed with spiritual ones with rhetorical flourish. Statements on "corruption," or "the arrogance of the new rich" have become increasingly inflammatory, uttered to an audience largely composed of young people.⁴

³*Le Monde*, December 7, 1982.

⁴*Ibid.*, December 15, 1982.

The fact that these messages reach so many young people has been particularly distressing to the regime, and helps to explain the December, 1982, crackdown. So does the fact that the old leftist politicians, most notably former President Ahmed Ben Bella, have not been above exploiting Islamic sentiment. Ben Bella, released by Benjedid from house arrest, is now in Europe; he announced the formation of an opposition party in May, 1984.

Other militants were arrested for possession of explosives in February, 1983 (including an individual described as one of Ben Bella's bodyguards), but with most of the presumed organizers off the streets, the government did not hasten to bring them to trial. Estimates of the total number of persons being held ran to about 100, only a small fraction of whom have actually been tried.

About a year later, after the party convention and his reelection by plebiscite, Benjedid pardoned some of those under arrest. The government crackdown seems to have reduced overt incidents for the moment, but the tensions are still present. No clearer evidence could be asked than the crowd in April, 1984, at the funeral of Sheik Abdellatif Soltani, one of those arrested in 1982; 25,000 men turned out to pay their respects to the fundamentalist leader. The government is likely to continue its course of state reformism, seeking to channel Islam in a modernist direction, but the task will remain difficult. As one fundamentalist teacher put it,

the government indeed wants Islam, but an antiseptic controlled version of Islam compatible with its views. But Islam is a torrent. And it does not separate the temporal from the spiritual. . . . One does not play lightly with Islam.⁵

The battle over the Family Code was another manifestation of the modernist-traditionalist struggle. For years, the government has been trying to liberalize the legal status of women. Yet the traditionalists inside the Ministry of Justice produced a conservative draft bill that proved unacceptable to liberals in the National Popular Assembly when it was first submitted in January, 1982. Benjedid decided to withdraw the draft code for further review. It was finally returned to the Assembly in the spring of 1984 and was hotly debated for a month. Based essentially on Koranic law, as finally passed the code revealed the staying power of the conservatives. Although it specifies rights for women in child custody cases and requires their consent to marriage, it preserves polygamy and other male prerogatives.

Benjedid's broader strategy to cope with the dissatisfactions that fundamentalism exploits is to improve the government's economic performance. This was a central theme throughout 1983. The official slogan of the gathering of 5,000 delegates at the fifth grand convention of the FLM was "work and rigor to assure the future," and the resolutions emphasized by the press were socioeconomic: top priority for agriculture and food self-sufficiency; more efficient integration of the private and public sectors; reduction of the foreign debt; planning for the postpetro-

leum era; and policies to stem rapid population growth (the latter will not please the traditionalists).

A POLITICAL MILESTONE

The convention was most important, however, as a political milestone that marked the end of the first Benjedid term. It provided the occasion to rejuvenate the FLN Central Committee, whose membership was considerably overhauled. In all, 92 members were removed from the Central Committee; its size was reduced from 200 to 164 (with an additional 31 alternates). The new recruits were principally younger men without ties to the Boumedienne administration. The *congrès* also renominated Benjedid, who ran uncontested in the January, 1984, election.

After the election, the President made further political moves. First he reconfirmed the membership of the political bureau of the party, extending the terms of eight members and dropping one. In an innovation, five adjunct members ("*suppléants*") were also appointed. Three were military officers, including Mostefa Benloucif, who was shortly to be named Major General and chief of the general staff in a significant reorganization of the military command. Benloucif in turn was replaced as secretary general of the Ministry of Defense by Rachid Benyelles, another of the adjunct members. The military continued to be influential at the top of the party hierarchy; on the other hand, there was a move to modernize and professionalize the military establishment.

The other major figure to achieve adjunct status on the political bureau was Abdelhamid Brahimi, who represented the technocratic elite; and his star was promptly to rise even higher. Brahimi was named Prime Minister in the government announced on January 22, 1984; he is an economist who has served as an administrator, a university professor, and as the chief representative of the national oil company, Sonatrach, in the United States during the period of massive expansion of United States-Algerian trade in the late 1970's. In 1979, he joined the first Benjedid Cabinet as minister of planning. During the first term, he became head manager of the Algerian economy, known as Mr. Rigor for his insistence on efficiency, accountability, and pragmatic decentralization. His nomination as Prime Minister signified the political consolidation of the new technocratic class, for Brahimi is a manager first and foremost. Benjedid was clearly signaling his preference for managerial competence in elevating Brahimi while making Prime Minister Mohammed Abdelghani a minister of state (in retaining his military colleague on the political bureau, the President again practiced his style of moving people out gently).

Overall, the new Cabinet blended continuity and fresh blood. Twelve ministers held on to their old departments while eight members were shifted to new assignments (including Z'Hor Ounissi, the first woman named to the government). There were only six newcomers, even though nine members were dropped; but fourteen more

⁵Ibid., January 28, 1982.

people were designated vice ministers (including a second woman) and most of these (like the other newcomers) were essentially people with technical training in the mold of Brahimi. Compared with the first Benjedid government of 1979, however, only ten were holdovers; most revealing of all, only three members of the new government had been ministers under Boumedienne. Thus, in a series of small steps over five years, Benjedid has forged his own leadership group.

Still, the regime has sought to provide opportunities for political participation and expression at all levels. Elections were held at the end of 1984 for the communal and departmental (*wilaya*) assemblies under the system of two FLN candidates per seat. The voting rate was respectably high at 80 percent. With 1,500 communes and 48 wilayas (recently expanded from 31), these institutions provide considerable scope for local involvement in public policy. Members of the National Assembly (APN) were also up for reelection in 1982. The returns produced a major turnover in personnel; less than one-fourth of the incumbents were reelected, suggesting a popular desire for more active representation. The National Assembly demonstrated its intention to speak out on important national policy when it claimed and won the right to review and discuss the government-proposed five year plan for as long as necessary, not for the three days initially projected. These are healthy signs in a system that nevertheless is fairly tightly controlled by the military-bureaucratic elite.

ECONOMIC POLICY

Two economic trends stood out over the past few years: a gradual shift away from the predominantly statist and high-technology industrialization model of the 1970's, and a reorientation of foreign trade away from the United States and toward Europe. The former is well illustrated in the 1985–1989 economic plan. As submitted to the Assembly, the draft plan set agriculture and water resources as the highest national priorities. Although new industrial projects are included, they are much less prominent in the current than in previous plans. An important chunk of projected investment is allocated to social infrastructure, including housing, education, and job training.

The stress on agriculture is consistent with other policy innovations over the past three years. Once an agricultural exporter, today Algeria imports 60 percent of its food. For example, it has become the world's largest importer of eggs, no less than 900 million last year.⁶ (It takes a large number of barrels of oil to pay for 900 million eggs.) In order to encourage the rural sector to produce more, Benjedid has allowed farmers to bypass the state distribution circuit and has reopened trade across wilayas, permitting markets to function more freely. State farms have been broken into smaller units, and the flow of investment credits to the countryside has been expanded. Price in-

centives and higher rural wages are also part of the drive to decrease food dependence. In this effort, moreover, Algeria has looked to the United States; in 1984 it signed the first Algerian–American agricultural aid agreement. The accord provides United States assistance in developing arid zones and the dairy and livestock sectors.

On the energy front, however, trade has turned away from the United States. Between 1979 and 1983, the American share of Algerian oil and gas exports slipped from 50 percent to 17 percent, while Common Market purchases rose from 38 percent to 66 percent. A key turning point was the breakdown in natural gas negotiations with the United States shortly after President Ronald Reagan's administration took office. Negotiations with France were subsequently stepped up, leading to an extraordinary deal in February, 1982. France agreed to buy Saharan natural gas for about \$5.20 per million BTU's, well above the American offer of \$3.70. Prime Minister François Mitterrand's government, seeking a major improvement in Franco-Algerian relations, acceded to the Algerian argument that natural gas and petroleum prices should be roughly at parity for equivalent heating capacity. Algeria, in turn, agreed to substantial increases in its purchases of equipment and services from France. In 1983, Algeria signed contracts with French companies totaling some 25 billion francs, compared with only 4 billion francs in 1981.

Algeria has sought to hold the line on oil prices, refusing to ratify the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) decision for a modest decrease in December, 1984. Despite adverse pressure on oil revenues, gas sales have sustained Algerian energy earnings reasonably well. Export receipts have hovered around \$13 billion annually since 1980. Indeed, Algeria is one of the rare third world states to have reduced its external debt these past years. The real challenge that Prime Minister Brahimi is expected to meet is the readjustment necessary to place more food and consumer goods on the shelves. If this means a larger role for the private sector, Brahimi and Benjedid are willing to go that route. The adoption of national private investment legislation in 1982, which narrowed the definition of "exploitive property," and the creation in 1983 of a National Board to guide and coordinate private sector initiatives were both steps in the gradual shift away from the heavily statist strategy of the 1970's.

THE GREATER MAGHREB STRATEGY

In February, 1982, Algeria succeeded in a diplomatic coup—the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic
(Continued on page 228)

Robert A. Mortimer is the author of *The Third World Coalition in International Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984). His work on North Africa has appeared in *African Studies Review*, *The Middle East Annual*, and other journals.

⁶Francis Ghiles, "Chadli's Pragmatic Economics," *Africa Report*, November–December, 1984, p. 12.

After this article went to press, President Gafaar Nimeiry was overthrown in a bloodless coup by the commander in chief of the armed forces, General Siwar el-Dahab. Written before the coup, this article nonetheless explains why Nimeiry "lost his capacity to survive."

The Sudan's Islamization

BY SCOTT H. JACOBS

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

IN the Sudan, a trio of recent crises—the renewed and powerful southern insurgency, the polarization of the region, and the sharp deterioration of the economy—have eroded the country's stability and reversed many of the gains of previous years. At the center of the storm stands President Gafaar Nimeiry, a determined African dictator whose campaign to Islamize his country in the face of national fragmentation has fueled speculation that he has lost his capacity to survive.

In the Sudan, the lively interaction of two cultures—the Middle Eastern and the African—shapes a hybrid culture that reflects the increasing instability of the two worlds.

Increasing instability in the Sudan itself has dashed the cautious hopes of the late 1970's that an era of reconciliation and recovery was emerging after several years of turmoil. Nimeiry has established himself as a determined, skillful politician, who has survived at least 15 coup attempts by continually reshuffling and reorganizing, reconciling and purging his government in order to prevent the formation of power blocs or the emergence of rivals.¹ Since his small group of left-wing officers overthrew a civilian government in 1969, his style has been marked by bold initiatives that have kept opponents off balance and by sudden decisions taken without debate or advice. In 1970, for example, he smashed the rebellious Ansar, the followers of the family of the Mahdi who had freed the Sudan from Turco-Egyptian rule in 1885 to set up a short-lived Islamic state. The following year, when a Communist-backed coup succeeded in taking Khartoum, Sudan's capital, Nimeiry acted at once.

With the assistance of Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi (who had overthrown the Libyan monarchy just four months after Nimeiry's coup in the Sudan) and of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Nimeiry toppled the new regime three days later, executed its leaders, and purged the Communists from his government. The signing of the Addis Ababa Accords in 1972 ended 17 years of civil war between north and south by establishing a

semiautonomous southern region. This settlement won Nimeiry international acclaim.

Nimeiry took an even larger step toward political stability with the "national reconciliation" of 1977. After declaring a general amnesty for his political opponents, he took many former enemies into his government, including Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Ansar leader who had been sentenced *in absentia* to death for plotting a coup in 1976, and Hassan al-Turabi, a leader of the Muslim Brothers. Increasing emphasis was placed on a policy of decentralization, of devolving political power to regional governments, in order to allow diversity within a national framework. By the late 1970's, despite continuing political ferment, there was a feeling of cautious optimism about the country's future, which promised "new opportunities for a remarkable degree of national unity."²

Yet the deep conflicts that had brought the Sudan 16 years of civil war and two military takeovers since independence were not far submerged. If the turning point, delicately balanced in 1980, was to become genuine recovery, the regime required a period of calm in order to consolidate support from a sullen constituency.

Unfortunately, time ran out. Exasperated by the inability of the southern regional government to overcome tribal quarrels, Nimeiry dissolved it late in 1981 and partitioned the south into three regions. Renewed fears of Arab control of the south led to a 1982 mutiny of southern troops who were to be "rotated" to Khartoum; fighting broke out as soldiers fled into the bush. Exploitation of the south's large oil reserves, which promises much-needed relief for the economy after exports began in 1986, led to further southern hostility. Nimeiry subsequently announced plans for a \$380-million pipeline to take the crude from the wells to the Red Sea and tried to redraw regional boundaries so that the oil fields would not be on southern territory. But the oil, many southerners felt, was "theirs," and oil revenues should stay in the south.

Nimeiry faced his most serious threat in January, 1982, as riots erupted in response to International Monetary Fund (IMF)-inspired increases in the price of bread and sugar. A confrontation between dissatisfied military officers and Nimeiry ended with the dismissal of the army's commander in chief and 22 senior officers. Nimeiry scrambled to retain military support by establishing a Military Economic Board, which provided officers with

¹Joseph Smaldone, *Democratic Republic of the Sudan*, unpublished manuscript, p. 8, as cited in Peter K. Bechtold, "The Contemporary Sudan," *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 6 (Fall, 1983), p. 101.

²John O. Voll, "Reconciliation in the Sudan," *Current History*, vol. 80, no. 470 (December, 1981).

highly paid desk jobs in military-owned industries. An escalation of the Libyan conflict in Chad and Libyan support for Sudanese dissidents increased the belief in Khartoum that Nimeiry had begun to lose control.

ISLAMIC LAW

The question asked by analysts since the institution of the Islamic penal code (*Shariah Islamia*) in 1983 is "why?" Why did Nimeiry adopt a program that contradicted his earlier efforts to build a consensus? In retrospect, it is clear that a combination of factors led to the launching of an Islamic program: the evolution of Sudanese Islam; the reemergence of fundamentalist elements; and Nimeiry's personal convictions.

From the days of the Mahdi, who won the Sudan's independence from foreign rule, Sudanese nationalism has been tied to the notion of the Islamic state. The political parties that emerged in 1936 in response to British rebuffs of efforts to move toward independence were supported by powerful families who drew their authority from religious leaders respected for wisdom and piety; subsequent coalition politics in the two periods of parliamentary government swirled around the personalities of these Islamic figures. Even more telling, Sudan's civilian governments were never able to adopt a national constitution, in part because of the "great debate" over whether it should be Islamic or secular.³ The 1973 constitution promulgated by Nimeiry was indeed secular, but contained an ambiguous clause providing that future legislation would be based on Islamic principles.

While the nation debated the Sudan's Islamic status, however, modernization may have silently prepared the way for Nimeiry's 1983 decree. In the 1970's and 1980's, political participation was extended beyond the original core of Westernized elites to more traditional, conservative populations.⁴ The politicization of these Sudanese from "the old Islamic substratum," in which village-level Islam was simple and holistic, may have subtly changed the political environment.

Another reason for Nimeiry's new fundamentalism was the continuing opposition of the judiciary to Nimeiry's arbitrary exercise of power. One of the few official bodies not under Nimeiry's direct control, the judiciary had long prided itself on its status as an independent, professional elite charged with safeguarding the

constitution. In May, 1983, at the inauguration of a provincial court of appeal, Nimeiry accused public magistrates of drunkenness and corruption and pledged that he would "clean up" the judiciary. Early in June, he fired 44 judges, including several who had in earlier decisions "refused to succumb" to government pressure.⁵ For the next three months, the country's legal system was paralyzed; other judges resigned in protest, strongly supported by professional groups made up of doctors, lawyers and teachers. Refusing to back down, Nimeiry accepted their resignations and declared a "comprehensive revolution that will uproot corruption and actions against people in our public and private lives."⁶

Nimeiry followed this theme in his September 8 decree of the new penal code, which "completed" the judicial revolution by linking it "organically and spiritually with Islamic law." As a short-term political expedient, Nimeiry's Islamization of the judicial system, which struck at the identity of an institution that had been based on the British legal system since 1899, was a strategic move to destroy the autonomy of a Westernized elite he did not trust.

From a wider perspective, Nimeiry's decree may also have been an attempt to seize the initiative from fundamentalist groups, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been growing in power since the reconciliation of 1977. Although Nimeiry's left-wing revolution smashed the power of sectarian political parties in 1970 and 1971, the appointment of their leaders to government posts in 1977 (Brotherhood leader al-Turabi, for example, went directly from jail to the post of attorney general) allowed them to regain their influence.

The expanding influence of fundamental Islam was particularly noticeable in the universities, which have played a pivotal role in Sudanese politics ever since students led the protests that forced the military regime to resign in 1964. Beginning in 1977, an umbrella "Islamic Direction" (ID) movement, which included students along the spectrum of political and religious fundamentalism, began to control the student unions in each of the four northern universities. At the core of the Islamic Direction were groups of young radical fundamentalists who were funded by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Faisal Islamic Bank, established in Khartoum in 1977.

By 1980, the ID had gained control of every university student union in the Sudan (except at Juba University). In the large pro-Shariah demonstration of mid-September, 1983, bands of students equipped with banners and loudspeakers led about 15,000 demonstrators to a Khartoum city square where Muslim Brothers called on Nimeiry to adopt Islamization, while trucks full of riot police sat nearby.

Nimeiry's increasingly intimate ties with fundamentalist leaders like al-Turabi alarmed many Sudanese, particularly the southerners. Some of the most vocal critics of this trend were the Republican Brothers, a moderate Islamic sect headed by Mahmoud Mohammed Taha.

³Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, *Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Politics* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), p. 181.

⁴John O. Voll, *The Political Impact of Islam in the Sudan: Numeiry's Islamization Program*, research study prepared for the United States Department of State (Washington, D.C.: September, 1984), pp. 38-40.

⁵"Statement of Judges of Sudan's Provincial and District Courts in Response to President Nimeiry's Dismissal of 44 Judges," June 11, 1983. Reprinted in *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 26, pp. 79-81.

⁶United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa*, September 7, 1983, p.04.

Taha was a former firebrand nationalist who had been imprisoned by the British in the Sudan's struggle for independence. He had subsequently become one of Nimeiry's strongest supporters and had warned since 1981 that "religious fanaticism" was creeping into the Sudan from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In May, 1983, the Republicans called on Nimeiry to sack First Vice President (and head of state security) Omer Muhammed el-Tayyeb, because he had allowed a radical Egyptian Imam to speak at a Khartoum mosque. State security immediately banned Republican discussion groups. And when the Republicans charged that the drive against them was a preliminary in the establishment of a "Khomeini-type" government, over 50 Republican leaders were arrested. Although they were never charged, many are still imprisoned. Taha, 76 years old, was hanged in Kobar Prison in January, 1985, after Republican pamphlets appeared in Khartoum criticizing Nimeiry's attempt to create an Islamic state.

Another reason for Nimeiry's decision (the one most discussed but the least documented) is his personal commitment to Islam. Observers in Khartoum point to his close ties with one or two Sufi teachers who, in the months preceding Shariah, apparently became Nimeiry's mentors. Nimeiry, a believer, may be a middle-aged convert.

The timing and the subsequent pattern of Islamization probably followed the interaction of several factors. Nimeiry may have instigated the judicial crisis in order to prepare the way for an Islamic penal code; but the evidence suggests that his confrontation with the judiciary led Nimeiry to the establishment of the Islamic penal code, which became part of a comprehensive Islamic program when it became clear that Islamization would proceed under its own momentum with or without him. Subsequently, Nimeiry became more fundamental than the fundamentalists as a way to reassert his authority. The events of 1984 can thus be viewed as part of Nimeiry's efforts to maintain control of a society that was fragmenting.

ISLAMIZATION DEEPENS

The days following the September 8 decree were both jubilant and confused. Beyond the initial announcement prohibiting alcohol and establishing Islamic penalties for theft, armed robbery and adultery, no comprehensive penal code was distributed to the nation's courts for several weeks. As rumors reached Khartoum that local courts were imposing their own brands of Islamic justice, Nimeiry moved quickly to maintain control over the process he legitimately called the "Islamic revolution."

That process developed in three progressively radical phases: the judicial, the legislative and the fully Islamic revolutions. Although Nimeiry declared that changes in the penal code were simply associated with changes in the

structure of the judiciary, by the middle of October he was claiming that "the Islamic avenue is the paramount pillar of the comprehensive political program." In his address to the People's Assembly on November 7, Nimeiry further extended his commitment to Islamization, declaring that he had been planning to establish Islamic law since 1977 as the first political achievement of his third term as President, a term that had begun the previous May.⁷

While the "judicial revolution" stirred the country, Nimeiry moved to recast his role as an Islamic revolutionary. Mid-September saw the reassignment of al-Turabi from the post of attorney general to that of presidential adviser for foreign affairs. Late in September, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great grandson of the Mahdi and Prime Minister in 1966, delivered a sermon at Mahdi's tomb in which he criticized the penal code as "a partial measure" that was not comprehensive; he was arrested "for his own protection" and Nimeiry threw his support behind Sadiq's uncle as the true leader of the Ansar.

At the same time, the Palace issued a series of dramatic decrees. All alcohol in the national capital was confiscated; on September 24, in a kind of counterdemonstration to the Muslim Brotherhood rally a week earlier, Nimeiry personally presided over the destruction of \$11-million worth of alcoholic spirits. A riotous celebration followed as soldiers smashed bottles and beer cans in the streets and poured liquor into the Nile. Late in September, 13,000 prisoners in Sudanese jails were released by presidential decree in order to "give them a second chance" under Islamic law. Although the actual numbers were never documented, the release apparently left between 300 and 500 political prisoners in jail; many of them could not be pardoned because they had never been charged with crimes.

The event that captured the attention of the nation and the world, however, was the first public hand-severing on December 10. Before a cheering crowd of 3,000, two young Muslims convicted of auto theft were strapped into chairs in the courtyard of British-built Kobar Prison and their right hands were severed, then displayed, by prison guards. More than any other event, these mutilations, only the first of 58 through the following year, dispelled the notion that Islamization was only another political tactic; thereafter, many Sudanese awakened to the painful reality of fundamentalism.

The second phase of the Islamization of the Sudan was the "legislative revolution," which expanded the scope of the Islamic society from the penal code to economic and social institutions. After August, 1983, a spate of new laws, many obviously hastily patched together from Islamic legislation in other Muslim countries, were enacted by presidential decree. The Civil Transactions Act of 1984, for example, which took effect on February 14, is by itself "all-encompassing." Its 819 sections deal with contract and tort law, sales, gifts, companies, loans, rents, insurance and real estate, and call into question such

⁷He had indeed created a committee in 1977 to Islamize laws, but he had not supported any of its proposals.

basic assumptions of the modern economy as limited corporate liability and the charging of interest.

The Zakat Tax Act of 1984 repealed no fewer than 17 separate tax acts, establishing in their place a tax and alms system based on Islamic principles. Poorly drafted, confusing and sometimes contradictory, the laws undermine the legal business environment and provide further evidence that Nimeiry's "program" of Islamization has been hastily assembled in expanding segments.

The third and most radical phase of Sudan's Islamization began on April 29, 1984, when Nimeiry imposed a state of national emergency in the face of "alien conspiracies," "attempts to undermine the application of Islamic law," and "hostile designs against the government." Certainly, the crisis was real. A month earlier, a Soviet-built aircraft, apparently Libyan, had flown unchallenged over Omdurman and dropped five bombs. Charges of impending attack by Libya or Ethiopia filled local media. In addition, the conflict in the south was going badly for the army, which had been driven out of large areas. Over 2,000 government doctors had gone on strike to protest appalling conditions in the public hospitals, and further strikes by engineers and other professionals were imminent. Accusing it of plotting to overthrow him, Nimeiry dissolved the doctors' association and warned strike organizers that they faced the death penalty. The state of emergency, which suspended constitutional rights and enormously expanded the military's powers of search and arrest, gave Nimeiry tighter control over a dangerous environment. Three days later, he cleaned out his Cabinet once again, charging the six fired members with "corruption, slackness and inefficiency."

Following the decree of emergency, Nimeiry set up nine emergency criminal, or "decisive justice," courts, which began at once to adjudicate cases with a curious and often horrifying mixture of Islamic and emergency justice.⁸ The capriciousness and brutality of these courts shocked many Sudanese. Until the courts' suspension in September, thousands of arrests were made by zealous soldiers, often on ambiguous charges like "attempted adultery" or violation of price controls. Prison sentences and public floggings in the courtrooms followed. At least one adulterer was hanged; his pregnant lover was given 100 lashes.⁹ For the first two months, defendants were allowed neither appeals nor defense lawyers. Crowds gathered almost every Friday morning to view the week's mutilations.

Nimeiry also embarked on a campaign to transform himself into a religious-political figure. Under his orders, the army, trade unions, professional organizations, and university administrations swore *bay'eh*, or fealty, to him "as a Moslem leader guided by the holy book of the

Koran."¹⁰ More important, Nimeiry climaxed his flood of Islamic legislation with a series of constitutional amendments that, if ratified by the People's Assembly, would create an Islamic republic and greatly expand his powers. The amendments would not only change his term as President from six years to life, but would also give him the power to dissolve the People's Assembly. But at this juncture, in July, 1984, the dizzying Islamic plunge of the previous nine months slowed, as other crises loomed.

THE SOUTHERN INSURGENCY

Although conflict had broken out in the south well before the onset of Islamic law because of fears of Khartoum's political and economic domination, in September, 1983, the rebels had not yet formed coherent factions or goals. Islamic law added a third, far more unifying, threat: the cultural domination of the non-Muslim south by the Arab north. Although Nimeiry insisted that the rights of non-Muslims would be maintained under Islamic law, his statements on how the laws applied to non-Muslims were confusing and contradictory. The finer points of the law, however, were moot, given the outrage generated in the south when the right hands of several southerners were severed in Khartoum.

The largest and best organized rebel group—the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang, an American-educated Dinka—struck hard and fast. In November, 1983, it kidnapped several employees of a French company working on the Jonglei Canal and two Chevron employees, threatening to kill them if Islamic law were not abolished. The hostages were freed in a bloody raid by the army two days later. In February, 1984, the SPLA attacked a Chevron oil complex at Bentiu, killing three foreign workers, and a week later it kidnapped seven more workers at Jonglei. Both Chevron and the Jonglei project closed their operations until security could be restored, actions that angered Nimeiry, who insisted that the Sudanese army was "in complete control" of the area.

In reality, the army frequently found itself besieged in town garrisons while the rebels roamed the countryside with impunity, recruiting thousands of Dinka youths for training in camps in Ethiopia. The escalation of Islamization after the emergency decree destroyed Nimeiry's remaining credibility with his supporters in Equatoria, who had not at first supported what was essentially a Dinka insurgency. On July 4, the Equatorial regional assembly in Juba declared a "total and absolute rejection" of the Islamic constitutional amendments and of any attempt to

(Continued on page 230)

⁸Voll, *The Political Impact of Islam*, p. 12.

⁹*Sudan News Agency Daily Bulletin*, English edition, no. 4876 (May 30, 1984), p. 10.

¹⁰*Sudan News Agency Daily Bulletin*, English edition, no. 4864 (May 18, 1984), p. 1.

Scott H. Jacobs has worked as a program economist for the United States Agency for International Development (AID) in Khartoum in 1983–1984. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of the United States government.

"Since August, 1983 . . . there has been a nervous peace in Chad, punctuated by one brief attempt to bring the factions to the negotiating table in Brazzaville, Congo, and by attempts on both sides to realign their forces. . . . Meanwhile, the solution to Chad's crisis is as distant as ever."

Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Chad

BY ALEX RONDOS

Director, Commission on United States-African Relations, Center for Development Policy

SINCE independence from France in 1960, Chad has steadily disintegrated, with a rise in armed factionalism and foreign intervention. The notion of allegiance to a central government was always flimsy and is now threadbare in most of the country. This disintegration has provoked a rebellion by excluded northerners and has made it impossible for the rebel forces to unite and consolidate their military success. In Chad today, the main protagonists are Goukhouni Oueddei and Hissen Habre, members of different clans of the Toubou ethnic group in northern Chad and former leaders of the rebel movement, Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Tchad (Frolinat). Personality and tactical differences apart, the fissures that they and the other armed barons of Chad represent mirror faithfully the ethnic and political diversity of pre-colonial Chad. No government of independent Chad has overcome these differences.¹

But the consequences go further. Factional leaders are aware that their own war has acquired an international significance, and they are able to play on the strategic weaknesses of potential foreign supporters. Thus Hissen Habre can summon the specter of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and be assured of a hearing in Washington. Goukhouni Oueddei or his allies can be assured of Libyan support—however unpredictable—as long as a Western-backed government prevails in N'Djamena. And most parties know that France can be summoned if only because French inaction in Chad would have a devastating effect on the strategic network of allies that France has nurtured among its former colonies in central and western Africa.

Underlying its political fragmentation is the physical and human diversity of Chad, a vast landlocked country twice the size of France, stretching through three climate zones and containing an astonishing variety of ethnic groups. There is a tropical region in the south in which cotton cultivation and subsistence farming are the major forms of economic activity and provide the primary source of revenue for the modern state of Chad. About

half of Chad's population is concentrated in the south. The dominant Sara population is black, largely Christianized and relatively homogeneous. The center of the country is Sahelian, made up of pastoralists and nomads who represent a variety of social structures derived from the pre-colonial sultanates of the region. Throughout this area and in the south there is a distinct Arab population, which is primarily occupied in commercial activity. Finally, in the northern provinces of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET), the dominant people are the Toubou, whose spirit of independence is almost legendary. They are divided into clans paying allegiance to a spiritual leader, the *Derdei*, whose son is Goukhouni Oueddei. Hissen Habre is also a Toubou, from the Anakaza clan in the plains near the strategic northern garrison of Faya-Largeau.

For the first 20 years of Chadian independence and civil war there was a split between a Sara government backed by France and a series of non-Sara, "northern" armies loosely coalesced into Frolinat, which had been created in 1966. The first two decades of government rule were marked by an obstinate refusal to include non-Saras in the political process in any substantive way and a parallel concentration of power in the hands of Ngarta Tombalbaye. The French had been invited to administer the BET until 1965 and, on their departure, Sara administrators replaced them, introducing heavy-handed and provocative policies. The imposition of taxes and attempts to interfere with Arab education sparked the first revolt in 1965, in Mangalmé in the eastern province of Ouaddai. This was followed by violence in the BET when the *Derdei* was submitted to humiliating restrictions. By 1968, the revolt was sufficiently widespread—Ibrahim Abatcha had created Frolinat in 1966—for the government to request French military intervention.

France's intervention was, in hindsight, a failure. It had been primarily a military holding operation designed to keep the revolt at bay while Tombalbaye introduced a series of reforms prescribed by French advisers. Tombalbaye's political contortions in the years until his assassination in 1975 ranged from neglect of French advice, to a temporary flirtation with Libya (which stemmed Libyan support for Frolinat for a brief period) and, finally, the introduction of a singularly inappropriate "authentic-

¹The most instructive analyses of the first 20 years of independence are to be found in Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Le Frolinat et les Revoltes Populaires du Tchad, 1965-1976* (The Hague, 1978), and René Lemarchand, "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," *Current History* December, 1981.

ity" policy requiring civil servants to undergo Sara initiation rites. By the time Tombalbaye was killed by his own officers the rebellion had acquired its own momentum. Tombalbaye's successor, Chief of Staff Felix Malloum, tried to come to terms with Frolinat but made little headway.

FACTIONALISM AND DISUNITY

There were many reasons for disunity in Chad. Given the variety of terrain and the distances involved, communications among rebel armies were limited. A group of well-armed warlords were prepared to move under the political umbrella of Abatcha's Frolinat, but vigorously contested the movement's leadership after Abatcha's death in 1968. Although the Frolinat program paid lip service to nationalism and socialist principles, it bore little relevance to the realities of political allegiance among the various factions.

Torn apart by challenges to Abatcha's successor, Abba Siddick—a former government minister and an ally of Habre's—there was little coherence in Frolinat activity until 1972. The northwest was dominated by the Second Liberation Army led by Goukhouni Oueddei and, later, by Hissen Habre, a former government official who switched loyalties in 1972. In the east and northeast, Mahamat Abba Said's First Liberation Army operated with relative independence, as it still does. And in the center there was the Volcan Army, an offshoot of which later became the Conseil Démocratique de la Revolution (CDR) and is now a key actor in the anti-government alliance nominally led by Goukhouni. These remain the three main factions of the Libyan-backed GUNT alliance, which governed from 1979 until its overthrow by Habre in June, 1982, and which is now ranged against Habre, with Libyan support.²

By the mid-1970's the character of the revolt had changed. Unity was still nominal. Habre had stamped his own vigorous and ruthlessly ambitious personality on the Second Army, which had changed its name to the Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armées du Nord (CCFAN), and tactical differences had emerged over how to deal with Libya. Beginning in 1972, Qaddafi had begun to infiltrate troops into the Aouzou Strip, a 100-kilometer-wide band of uranium-rich territory stretching

²When the Nigerian government convened a series of reconciliation meetings in 1979 that resulted in the creation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (known by its French acronym, GUNT), 11 factions were seated at the negotiating table, each claiming legitimacy through armed strength, regional representation or backing from a foreign interest.

³This contentious issue is summed up in Bernard Lanne, *Tchad-Libye: La Querelle des Frontières* (Paris, 1982).

⁴The Chadian story after 1979 merits a bibliographical note. Neither scholars nor journalists have been able to travel freely in Chad. This account is drawn from personal interviews, from wire agency dispatches, broadcast monitoring of the BBC and reporting in major daily newspapers in France, Britain and the United States; and from *West Africa* (London), *Jeune Afrique* (Paris) and *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* (Paris).

across northern Chad; he annexed it in 1973.³ The dramatic catalyst for the split in the revolt was the CCFAN kidnapping of three archeologists, among them a woman, Françoise Claustre. This was to become an international *cause célèbre*, with the French government held to ransom by rebels it had fought over the previous years. For the CCFAN it was a test of wills between Habre and Goukhouni. While Habre wished to prolong the affair, Goukhouni argued that it had outlived its usefulness; he was also under pressure from Libya to orchestrate Claustre's release. Moreover, Goukhouni argued that Libya should not be challenged over this issue or the Aouzou Strip as long as the priority in the struggle was the overthrow of the regime in N'Djamena. In 1976 Habre broke away from the CCFAN, taking a band of followers to eastern Chad. In 1978, he emerged to form a brief alliance with the Malloum government in N'Djamena, in which he was appointed Prime Minister.

By 1977, the central government was again under so much pressure that President Giscard d'Estaing of France ordered a French intervention. As was true of the 1968 mission, the French troops were only able to prevent Frolinat forces from descending on the capital. But when fighting broke out in February, 1979, between Habre's followers and government troops in N'Djamena, the French stepped aside and the Frolinat forces entered the capital. The French seemed to have abdicated any responsibility for the containment of the Chadian rebellion; and, at the instigation of Nigeria, the OAU moved into the fray to negotiate a political settlement.

FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Since 1979, much publicized but unsuccessful African multilateral efforts have been made to reconcile Chadian factions, always undermined by unilateral foreign support for specific factional alliances.⁴ At the same time, international attention has been focused on the strategic importance of Chad. The OAU has tried on at least two occasions to introduce peacekeeping forces to separate Chad's armed forces while a settlement could be negotiated. Libyan motives have proved as mercurial as Qaddafi's personality; Qaddafi has tried to consolidate historical links with Chad and to secure a government in N'Djamena that would accept the Libyan annexation of the Aouzou Strip and would keep Chad within Libya's strategic orbit. Finally, there is the strange and often contradictory involvement of France and the United States. The French have sought some overall settlement that would accommodate Libyan interests in Chad; for its part, the United States has viewed Chad as a potential launching pad for what it considers Qaddafi's plans to spread his influence into sub-Saharan Africa and to subvert the Sudan and Egypt, Washington's principal strategic allies in Africa.


With the creation of GUNT in 1979, Goukhouni Oueddei became President; Abdel Wadel Kamougue, commander of the remnants of the predominantly Sara

government army, became Vice President and Hissen Habre was appointed Defense Minister. A cease-fire was to be supervised by an OAU contingent—but only the Congolese contingent ever arrived and was confined to barracks for the brief duration of its stay—while the various factions were to be integrated into a national army. By March, 1980, the agreement had broken down; Habre's men were fighting with northern GUNT factions while Kamougue withdrew to his southern bastion outside the capital. Habre was dismissed from the GUNT and Goukhouni, under pressure from the OAU, requested the departure of the French troops, still present but apparently neutral in the fighting.

At this stage, Libya became a major factor, signing a treaty with the GUNT on June 15, 1980, that gave the GUNT the right to ask for Libyan support to protect its independence and its territorial integrity. Little noticed at the time, the agreement provided the legal sanction for a substantial contingent of Libyan troops, who arrived in N'Djamena at the end of 1980. Habre fled the capital in December, retreating again to the east, while Kamougue set about organizing the Sara prefectures independent of the central government. The Libyan presence and the signing on January 6, 1981, of a treaty of "unity" between the GUNT and Libya temporarily sealed the division of forces within and beyond Chad. Although the treaty was nebulous in its intentions and was subsequently described by the Libyans as not being an "organic unity between two states, still less an annexation," the international community moved rapidly into action. Leaders of west and central African states met in late December and January, 1981, to show a solid front against Libyan intervention and to encourage negotiation between the Chadian parties. But within a week of the signing of the merger agreement, 11 leaders, including Nigerian President Shahu Shagari, condemned the merger.

Diplomatic developments in Chad in 1981 decisively shaped the subsequent course of events. While the GUNT was maintaining a semblance of unity, undermined gradually by Chad's dissatisfaction with the extent of Libya's commitment to Chadian economic development, at least three ill-coordinated diplomatic initiatives emerged. The Nigerian government and the French government (now under a Socialist administration) were cooperating to an uncommon extent to allow Goukhouni to break with the Libyans. At his base in western Sudan, Habre was receiving clandestine assistance from the Sudan, Egypt and the United States. Finally, the OAU was preparing the ground for still another OAU intervention.

As the year progressed, Nigeria pressured for Libyan withdrawal from Chad. The French, meanwhile, were wooing Goukhouni with some effect. In eastern Chad, Habre had slipped into temporary obscurity. There were only occasional hints from Egyptian and American authorities that they would support those who opposed Libya. However, their concerns intensified with the assassi-



CHAD AND ITS NEIGHBORS

sination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and allegations of Libyan attacks on Sudanese villages near the Chadian frontier.

On the night of October 29, 1981, Goukhouni invited the Libyans to leave Chad. Within two weeks there was not a Libyan soldier south of the Aouzou Strip. Whatever pleasure was gained from this in Paris or Lagos was soon tempered by the knowledge that the GUNT had failed to integrate its own army; the OAU was completely unprepared to deal with the logistics, finances and mandate of a peacekeeping force; and Habre was moving westward with alarming speed. Within weeks of the Libyan departure it was apparent that Hissen Habre was a power to be reckoned with; he had been waiting like a coiled spring to return to N'Djamena with a fresh and well-armed band, while the GUNT forces were reeling from internal divisions and the belief that they would be protected by an OAU *cordon sanitaire*.

It was not until Christmas, 1981, that OAU forces assembled in Chad. Three contingents, from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, were divided between garrisons in Ati in central Chad and in N'Djamena. Equipment was short and the OAU mandate was not clear. Whereas Goukhouni sought an aggressive role for the OAU, the OAU argued that its purpose was simply to keep opposing forces apart. By mid-February, 1982, the OAU and Goukhouni were at loggerheads. In the world of diplo-

matic semantics, the OAU was calling for a "political" solution that meant negotiating with Habre and demoting Goukhouni to the role of a faction leader. Goukhouni would not budge from the GUNT position that a military solution, namely, the eradication of Habre, was the only way out.

Four months later, the political tables had been turned once again. Habre entered N'Djamena in mid-June, 1982, representing a strongly-pro-Western, American-supported faction that was considered the legitimate government of Chad. Demoralized, defeated and quarreling, the GUNT factions withdrew to the north, and the southerners remained cloistered in a state of de facto secession. For the next 18 months, Washington and Paris argued about their financial and potentially military responsibility for Hissen Habre. Meanwhile, Habre issued urgent appeals for Western support and pointed to the fact that the GUNT forces were regathering in the north with Libyan backing.

In May and June, 1983, GUNT forces began to advance southward. After Qaddafi failed to win the chairmanship of the OAU, he unleashed his full support for the GUNT in June, 1983. But any desire on his part to turn Chad into a base of Libyan operations had been mitigated considerably by the enormous cost of maintaining a satrap, as it were, in N'Djamena.

Franco-American misunderstandings over Chad reached a peak in late July, 1983. With Habre seriously threatened by the advancing GUNT forces, the United States sent urgent shipments of small arms, shoulder-borne Redeye anti-tank weapons and some advisers to Chad. This was decisive in turning the tide of the battle against the GUNT, which had logistical support from Libya. As the GUNT forces retreated, Libyan personnel began to play a more prominent role. Meanwhile, a war of words had developed between France and the United States, with the United States alleging that the French were trying to make a deal with Libya over Chad. President François Mitterrand, obviously piqued, responded that the situation would not have arisen had Washington not given covert assistance to the tune of \$10 million to Hissen Habre during 1981.

But the French did intervene eventually, dispatching 3,000 troops to Chad in mid-August, 1983. That force remained until late September, 1984, when it was withdrawn after an agreement with Libya over the simultaneous removal of French and Libyan troops. The French role was to create a protective line across central Chad that would prevent any further incursions by the Libyan-backed rebels.

Several factors had prompted the French intervention. Successful pressure was applied by Washington through some of France's most faithful and moderate allies in francophone Africa. President Abdou Diouf of Senegal and President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast persuaded Mitterrand that he had a far greater strategic interest in francophone Africa, despite French Socialist

dislike of military intervention in Chad. A coup in Upper Volta in the first week of August, which brought to power a radical young military leadership, played an important part in moving President Mitterrand to intervention. (In spite of its very minor military engagement in Chad, the major donor of economic assistance to Chad has become the United States.)

HABRE'S CHALLENGE

Since August, 1983, when the GUNT forces were beaten back, there has been a nervous peace in Chad, punctuated by one brief attempt to bring the factions to the negotiating table in Brazzaville, Congo, and by attempts on both sides to realign their forces. The GUNT has suffered considerable internal fluctuation provoked partly by Libyan machinations, and Goukhouni has been temporarily eclipsed. Meanwhile Habre has been trying with little apparent success to coopt southern leaders and any willing northerners into a new party, Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Revolution (UNIR).

Created during a conference in June, 1984, UNIR enjoys support from the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), which have followed Habre in recent years. Meanwhile, the new party is trying to accommodate the southern interests that are vital to Chad's longer term stability. At least two issues have impeded progress. A FAN campaign in southern Chad during late 1984 provoked an international outcry over human rights abuses. The southern leadership, which seemed at one stage ready to negotiate with Habre, backed off. From the FAN standpoint, southern insistence on more representation in the UNIR executive committee gives rise to concern. Clearly Habre's writ does not run across the south. At least six anti-Habre commando groups—all offshoots of the former government Forces Armées du Tchad (FAT) united in October, 1984, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Kotiga. They pay nominal allegiance to the GUNT, but there is little evidence of direct cooperation. This is not to suggest that the south is in any way a politically coherent unit in the Chadian jigsaw. Kotiga and his commandos represent a powerful anti-Habre unit, which can wreak havoc with banditry throughout the south. However, Kamougue, who retains the vice presidency of GUNT, is still considered a force in his own region near the southern capital of Sarh; and in the Mayo-Kebbi province, nearest N'Djamena, many former civil servants have rallied to Habre.

In the north, three traditional allies constitute the

(Continued on page 232)

Alex Rondos was on the staff of *West Africa* magazine between 1977 and 1982, has written extensively on francophone Africa in a variety of publications in Europe and the United States, and is a contributor to the *Africa Contemporary Record* (London). He is currently in Ethiopia as a consultant to Catholic Relief Services.

"From a military perspective, Morocco has been successful . . . and the Western Sahara has de facto been absorbed into the Kingdom of Morocco. . . . [But Morocco] has suffered a severe diplomatic setback" in the Organization of Africa Unity.

Morocco and the Western Sahara

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Director of Security Policy Studies, George Washington University

WHILE we wait for wiser days, we will bid you farewell." With these words, the representative of King Hassan II of Morocco, Ahmed Reda Guedira, announced Morocco's formal withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in November, 1984. Thus one of the founding members of Africa's premier regional organization ended two decades of association with the OAU.

The immediate cause for the Moroccan withdrawal was the November 12, 1984, decision taken by the majority of the organization's membership to seat a delegation claiming to represent an independent state in the former Spanish colonial territory of Western Sahara. The delegation purportedly was the embodiment of the Sahraoui population's unrelenting desire for independence. Morocco, which annexed the Western Sahara in 1975–1976, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The Organization of African Unity had arrived at a different view, challenging the Moroccan contention that it was the sole legitimate heir of Spanish colonial rule.

The question of Morocco's historic rights in the Western Sahara had deeply divided the OAU since 1981 and, on at least three occasions, had threatened its demise. Repeatedly, chiefs of state or their representatives had made official pilgrimages to the Moroccan capital of Rabat to petition royal support for a dialogue between King Hassan's government and representatives of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. On each occasion, the King had been unyielding, branding the Sahraouis as "terrorists" and "bandits." For the overwhelming majority of the OAU membership, the critical question was reduced to a Hobson's choice—to support the principle of self-determination (and thereby risk Moroccan defection) or to acquiesce in the Moroccan contention that it had a historic right to the disputed territory (and thereby to raise serious questions about African aspirations in southern Africa).

Morocco has enjoyed a special dispensation in African history. It is one of the few nations among the European-spawned entities that had sovereign status before it became a French protectorate. The ruling Alawite dynasty had been a fixture since the middle of the seventeenth century; it predicated its political legitimacy on professed descent from the prophet Mohammed (*sherifs*). As a re-

sult, the Alawites served as the spiritual proconsuls for Muslims in much of northwest Africa, laying claim to the title of "Commander of the Faithful."

It is the Moroccan contention that European colonialism arbitrarily detached territories and Muslim peoples from the Sherifien Empire, creating a "diaspora" that all future Moroccan rulers would find unacceptable. The Moroccan claim has considerable validity. The Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria, for example, was detached from Moroccan control and assigned to Algeria by French authorities in 1952. The French maneuver was provoked by two geostrategic considerations—the rise of Moroccan nationalism that threatened French protectorate rule, and the legal status of Algeria as French.

Moroccan independence, which came in March, 1956, was the prelude to the drive to recover lost territory. Equally important, the engine of the struggle for independence was the Moroccan throne. The monarch, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, had been defenestrated on August 20, 1953, as a result of machinations by French protectorate authorities. Together with his family, Mohammed V was trundled into exile at Madagascar. This feckless action united all segments of Moroccan society and produced a nationalist outpouring that led to the return of Mohammed V to the throne and the abandonment of French protectorate rule.

At independence, the monarchy was the unchallenged embodiment of national sovereignty. Political parties would fractionate and new formations would emerge; but the monarchy would remain the symbol and the source of national integrity. Royal authority was of critical importance for Morocco's subsequent claims to the Western Sahara and other "lost" territories, because the tribal communities located in the Saharan region had recognized the spiritual overlordship of Alawite monarchs before the imposition of European rule. The right to reclaim these tribes was based on the Moroccan ruler's unchallenged spiritual and temporal authority—together with the assertion that the process of decolonization, which was beginning to reach full tide in the early 1960's, could not be used to justify the "geographical absurdities" that the Europeans had inflicted on Africa.

The Moroccan claim was bolstered intellectually by Allal el-Fasi, a cofounder of the Istiqlal party, whose writings were popular in Morocco. In due course, armed

bands, designated as "armies of liberation," were organized under Moroccan auspices and were unleashed against the remaining Spanish enclaves in the Sahara. Their efforts led to the Spanish withdrawal from Tarfaya and Ifni.

But other lands and peoples remained to be reclaimed, including portions of Algeria and virtually all of present-day Mauritania. Algeria severed its French connections in 1962, and a brief but punishing border conflict erupted the next year. It ended inconclusively, to the chagrin of local commanders on both sides. In the case of Mauritania, the government of Morocco waged a vigorous diplomatic campaign to deny that nation international recognition when it, too, acquired independence. The effort ultimately failed, and King Hassan II (who had ascended the throne in 1961) reluctantly abandoned his efforts.

THE WESTERN SAHARA

The last remaining territory under Spanish control in the Sahara was a constellation with the quaint designations *Sequia el Hamra* and *Rio de Oro* (collectively the Spanish Sahara). In 1973, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania set aside their differences long enough to pledge a united effort to end Spanish rule. What was not clear from their tripartite declaration at Agadir (Morocco) in July, was their plan regarding final disposition of the territory. The summit meeting declared an "unshakeable attachment to the principle of self-determination," without specifying what each nation expected the local Sahraoui population to determine.

At approximately the same time, the government of Morocco began to provide material and diplomatic support to a small guerrilla force—the Polisario. (By contrast, the Algerians remained restrained in their endorsement of the Polisario.) To strengthen its position, Morocco submitted the question of precolonial sovereignty to the International Court of Justice (World Court) in September, 1974. The court's deliberations proved inconclusive—it determined that there were precolonial ties of "allegiance" but not of sovereignty. The court, therefore, recommended "self-determination" as the appropriate action. King Hassan, with growing impatience and tactical daring, decided to force the issue with Spain by organizing the "Green March" of October, 1975. In a remarkable tour de force that involved the movement of several hundred thousand civilians into the disputed territory, Hassan compelled Madrid to surrender control to Morocco and Mauritania. (Spain's General Francisco Franco was on the verge of death, and Madrid was not prepared to confront a crisis on a distant colonial battlefield.) In November, 1975, Moroccan and Mauritanian military formations entered the Western Sahara to seal its partition and annexation.

A new and more traumatic phase in the struggle for control began in 1976. While Morocco and Mauritania declared the colony "liberated" from Madrid, the liberation army itself was preparing to contest Rabat and

Nouakchott; it declared the Western Sahara to be an independent Sahraoui state and began preparations to form a government-in-exile, to be located at Tindouf in neighboring Algeria. Simultaneously, the Polisario was organizing an effort to evacuate the majority of the Sahraoui population to Tindouf.

Polisario resistance to the occupation was bolstered by the defection to its ranks of some 2,500 auxiliaries in the Spanish garrisons. The Polisario front could also count on the following assets: (1) soldiers who were well-trained in guerrilla tactics and familiar with the environment in which they would have to operate; (2) a safe haven at Tindouf from which they could secure recruits—the large Sahraoui refugee population would prove an excellent manpower pool from which to draw; and (3) a government under Algeria's President Houari Boumedienne (and his successor) that was prepared to provide weapons and diplomatic aid to support Polisario objectives.

Morocco, on the other hand, also enjoyed substantial advantages. A nation of 18 million, it was united in a popular desire to annex the Saharan territory; it could outnumber Polisario forces at a 10:1 ratio; and it could mobilize even larger numbers of recruits should circumstances require. Morocco's main deficiencies were in equipment and military leaders capable of fashioning strategies to neutralize the Polisario's "hit-and-run" tactics.

The weak link for Morocco was Mauritania, which confronted the widening war with limited resources. The government of Ould Daddah commanded only 1,800 troops whose potential was minimal; the national economy was dependent on exporting iron ore that the Polisario interdicted in due course; and national morale was low, a result of drought conditions that were spreading throughout the West African Sahel region. Polisario units launched successful attacks that reached the outskirts of Nouakchott. The collapse of the Mauritanian effort at annexation was inevitable. In 1978, Ould Daddah was overthrown and supplanted by a military regime. One year later, Mauritania concluded a peace agreement with the Polisario's political counterpart—the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)—at Algiers, and withdrew its forces. The royal army of Morocco was dispatched to the southern zone to fill the void left by the departing Mauriticians.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The defection of Mauritania was not the only blow inflicted on Morocco. In 1979, Moroccan forces suffered a stinging setback at Guelta Zemmour, when Polisario troops shot down five aircraft and inflicted heavy casualties among defending forces. Military morale was plummeting, and there were doubts about the efficacy of strategies that field commanders had embraced under the direction of the palace.

Moreover, the King's program calling for the settlement of large numbers of Moroccan nationals in the

Sahara, together with economic development and infrastructure projects (estimated at \$600 million) was placed at risk by the growing daring of the Polisario. Clearly, a new approach was imperative if Moroccan ambitions were to be realized.

The palace ultimately moved to a traditional military strategy based on the principle of "economy of force." At its core was the doctrine of static defense centered on three important areas—a geographic triangle embracing the provincial capital of el-Aiun, the religious center of Smara, and the phosphate mines located at Bu Craa. The protective screen would consist of a double sand wall approximately 12 feet in height, with sophisticated sensing devices interspersed at irregular intervals to detect Polisario efforts to breach the barriers. Small posts and mobile columns were placed at critical locations to deal with Polisario intrusions. Concomitantly, the capacity of the Moroccan forces to deal with intruders was enhanced by the acquisition of helicopters and mobile artillery, armored personnel carriers, and improved intelligence acquisition equipment.

With the adoption of this strategy, Moroccan forces have generally withstood most Polisario assaults, have acquitted themselves well in sporadic engagements, and have witnessed a substantial improvement in troop morale. The palace is currently experiencing little difficulty in securing volunteers for service in the Western Sahara, nor is there a dearth of civilians willing to take up residence in the area. An estimated 150,000 civilians are located in the strategic triangle today.

By comparison, the Polisario has fared badly. The number of recruits at its disposal has shrunk; and the length of the war and the indifferent results produced by various strategies have made long-term enlistment unattractive. Moreover, Polisario casualties have been heavy in recent encounters with mobile Moroccan forces. With the termination of Libyan financial and arms support—as a result of the act of "union" between Libya and Morocco in mid-1984—the Polisario finds itself in difficult military circumstances.

The military balance favors Morocco in all critical categories. The numerical weight of the military forces assigned to the Western Sahara and the quality of their equipment, training and leadership have all improved immeasurably over the past several years. While the Polisario has attempted to adjust to Moroccan strategy by increasing the number and range of artillery and surface-to-air missileery at its disposal, the Polisario lacks the logistical and human infrastructure essential for sustained assault against fixed Moroccan installations. Thus, from a military perspective, Hassan has been successful in neutralizing the Polisario's hit-and-run approach to warfare in the Western Sahara and the Western Sahara has de facto been absorbed into the Kingdom of Morocco.

By contrast, King Hassan has suffered a severe diplomatic setback. Until recently, Hassan has enjoyed near

superstar status in the international arena—largely the product of his recognized abilities as a conceptualizer and diplomatic tactician. His efforts in behalf of United States peace initiatives in the Middle East, as well as his support for moderate forces in sub-Saharan Africa, have added to his prestige as an international statesman.

Hence, his decision to withdraw Morocco from membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), because a Polisario delegation had been seated as the fifty-first member of the regional organization, was greeted as a tacit admission that Hassan's exertions to deny recognition to the Polisario had failed.

Morocco's difficulties with the OAU had begun to surface several years earlier, as a growing number of members extended diplomatic recognition to the Polisario's political arm, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). In an effort to turn the tide, Hassan launched a diplomatic initiative in 1980–1981 that involved an offer to insure a cease-fire and to conduct a referendum among the Sahraoui population to determine their wishes concerning a political affiliation. Despite the warm endorsement of the OAU, the effort foundered, because of several disagreements.

Hassan refused to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario, which he characterized as a "terrorist organization." And Algeria's Chedli Bendjedid refused to represent the Sahraouis in peace talks with Rabat. At the same time, the Polisario demanded that any cease-fire be followed by Moroccan troop withdrawals from the Western Sahara. Questions were also raised about what authority would administer the referendum—the OAU, the United Nations or a joint Moroccan–Polisario oversight group. Nor was agreement reached on the qualifications for participants in the proposed referendum—in particular, whether Moroccans residing in the Western Sahara should be accorded voting privileges.

Other vexing issues would arise in due course, the most nettlesome being the anatomy of the cease-fire: (1) which authority would supervise its implementation and deal with violations; (2) the composition of the referendum team; and (3) the capacity of the OAU to confirm the credentials of potential voters, especially in view of the large number of displaced persons in Tindouf camps, who were refugees from drought conditions in the Sahel and not the original Spanish-zone Sahraouis. Whatever the nature of the issues, veteran observers concluded that the odds against the successful resolution of differences were prohibitive at best.

The failure of reconciliation efforts by a collection of intermediaries, ranging from the OAU to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and France, ultimately worked to Rabat's disadvantage. On February 22, 1982, a Saharan Arab Democratic Republic representative was officially seated by the OAU Secretary General (without a formal vote by the full membership). This action provoked a walkout by the Moroccans and several of their supporters. Morocco and 21 other member states subsequently

boycotted other OAU conferences. Since they commanded what amounted to a blocking third, they were able to deny a quorum, as mandated by that regional organization's regulations, thus frustrating efforts to convene OAU meetings.

For a period in 1982–1983, it appeared that the OAU would collapse because of the ongoing stalemate over the admission of the SADR to membership. The turning point came at the nineteenth OAU summit meeting, in June, 1983, when, in an act of self-abnegation, the Sahraouis voluntarily withdrew, permitting the organization to avoid another debacle. As the meeting progressed, an Implementation Committee was formed to end the deadlock. The committee produced a nine-point plan that urged direct negotiations on King Hassan. Moreover, it declared that the referendum should take place by December, 1983. Shortly after the resolution's passage, visiting dignitaries urged the government of King Hassan to relent on the issue of direct negotiation with the Polisario, but to no avail. Hassan remained adamant. (The Polisario had unleashed a major military offensive against Moroccan forces in July, 1983).

There were several reasons for Hassan's opposition to direct negotiation. The first, and probably the most important, was his view that the military equation would ultimately favor Morocco and would produce a withering away of the Polisario. Second, the palace believed that direct negotiation was anathema to the Moroccan public and might well be viewed as a sign of royal weakness. Finally, the Moroccan regime maintains that the Polisario does not represent the views of the majority of the Sahraoui people. Rabat contends that the Sahraouis have ten distinct movements, all of which claim to represent Western Saharans, and that Morocco should not be compelled to deal directly with a minority faction that does not represent all the Western Saharans.

Whatever the merits of the Moroccan brief, the OAU majority ran out of patience. It was prepared to accept a Moroccan exodus rather than risk the persistent upheavals and dangers of fragmentation presented by the Western Sahara dispute. For the Polisario, its diplomatic achievement was a needed moral booster. Its foreign affairs representatives are now charting fresh initiatives that are intended to place maximum pressure on the Moroccan monarch in the United Nations, the Arab League, and other international forums. They hope to secure recognition and direct negotiations with Rabat, or, failing the latter, the isolation of Morocco in the community of nations.

MOROCCAN COUNTERSTRATEGY

Early in August, 1984, King Hassan startled his friends and allies by announcing that he was about to conclude an act of union with his once archrival, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. President François Mitterrand of France and United States General Vernon Walters visited Rabat shortly thereafter to discuss and to

evaluate the implications of Hassan's maneuver. For Washington, in particular, the sudden alteration in the balance of forces in North Africa was viewed as an unwelcome development. Qaddafi was regarded by the administration of President Ronald Reagan as a Soviet surrogate and Public Enemy Number 1 to Western interests. That Hassan, a staunch and trustworthy American ally in the Arab world, would willingly enter into a special relationship with Qaddafi was a stunning blow to Washington.

The terms of the new relationship between the former adversaries are instructive. The Treaty of Arab–African Union establishes a joint presidency, a rotating secretariat, and economic, cultural, political and defense councils. The treaty permits either party to enter into treaties with other nations without the prior approval of either Rabat or Tripoli. On the other hand, it stipulates that any act of aggression against one of the parties will be regarded as an act of "aggression against the other." Given Qaddafi's penchant for intervention in conflict situations as far afield as Central America and the Persian Gulf, the possibility of a military confrontation with the United States remains. Certainly, Hassan's alignment with an architect of state terrorism is bound to raise questions about the monarch's intentions.

From Hassan's perspective, the Treaty of Arab–African Union had tactical advantages. It ended Libyan support for the Polisario, thus adding to pressure on Algeria to offset the Libyan defection. Equally important, the union, even if it is only temporary, could serve as a counterpoise to a special relationship that is unfolding among Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania—a form of North African entente in which Hassan and Qaddafi find themselves the odd men out. Finally, Hassan's action might lead to financial help from Qaddafi, an important consideration for the Moroccan economy, which is undergoing a painful period of retrenchment.

Hassan also has been dismayed of late by the equivocations and failures of American policies in the Middle East. The collapse of President Reagan's peace initiative of September, 1982, the withdrawal of the United States Marines from Lebanon under ignominious circumstances, and the special security relationship between the United States and Israel may have convinced King Hassan that he should distance himself from the United States.

How solid and enduring is Morocco's union with Libya? Forged in the crucible of mutual need, the union will endure only as long as Hassan and Qaddafi feel the need for such a union. Built on Saharan sand, the union will not survive its first significant crisis. For neither of its architects possess the personal chemistry or the philosophical compatibility requisite for its survival. ■

William H. Lewis has served as a senior foreign service officer, United States State Department, with several postings in North Africa.

"In 1985, many Tunisians fear that their leaders are more interested in settling personal scores than in solving economic problems. . . . Nevertheless, the population will be patient if the government demonstrates a genuine commitment to the national welfare and, above all, a determination to share equitably whatever burdens cannot be avoided."

Tunisia at the Crossroads

BY MARK TESSLER

Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

LONG regarded as one of the most stable and progressive states in the Arab world, Tunisia has been an American ally since it gained its independence from France in 1956. But in 1985 the country is beset by serious troubles, including uncertainty about its political leadership and public discontent fueled by its economic and social problems.

Widespread rioting early in 1984 threw these difficulties into bold relief.¹ Disturbances began in some of Tunisia's poorest communities, the oases of the south. They were sparked by the government's announcement on December 29, 1983, of a rise in the price of semolina. On New Year's Day a rise in bread prices was announced, and this brought riots to larger southern towns. By January 3, rioting had spread to Tunis and other major cities. Order was not restored until January 5, by which time security forces had killed over 150 people. Finally, on January 6, President Habib Bourguiba announced that bread price increases would be rescinded.

The scope and intensity of the disturbances showed that public anger was based on more than the price of bread and semolina. Thousands of students, workers and unemployed slum dwellers roamed the streets, shouting anti-government slogans and attacking symbols of authority and wealth. Thousands more called encouragement from windows and rooftops. Protesters attacked cars and buses, tore up street signs, and looted and set fire to shops.

Anger at the consumption-oriented middle and upper classes was apparent in attacks on shops selling luxury goods and incursions into fashionable elite neighborhoods. The more affluent classes were perceived to be prospering at a time of economic difficulty, when the government was forcing the poor to tighten their belts even more.

Tunisia has been a crossroads of civilization for more than two millennia. It was the center of the Carthaginian Empire; later, it was an important province of the Roman Empire. Subsequent civilizations included the Byzantines and, beginning in the seventh century, the Arabs.

¹See "Tunisie: ce n'est pas finis," *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1202 (January 18, 1984), and Jim Paul, "States of Emergency: The Riots in Tunisia and Morocco," *MERIP Reports*, no. 127 (October, 1984).

The first Arab conquests brought extensive conversions to Islam. Later invasions, especially in the eleventh century, set in motion a process of linguistic and cultural assimilation that gradually Arabized the indigenous Berber population.

Other outside influences followed, adding a Mediterranean component to Tunisia's Arab and Islamic core. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries saw the arrival of Andalusian Muslims and Jews fleeing the reconquest of the Iberian peninsula. In the sixteenth century, Turkey gained control and for the next three centuries Tunisia was a province of the Ottoman Empire. France began 75 years of colonial rule in 1881. Thus, culture contact and change are traditions in Tunisia.

Second, the country has a tradition of unity. The geographic basis of modern Tunisia appeared in Roman times and, with few exceptions, the area has been governed as a single country ever since. Although ruling dynasties were often nominally subservient to a foreign authority, like the Ottoman Sultan, borders remained constant. Because there were no significant ethnic and cultural cleavages, the population enjoyed an unusual degree of homogeneity. There are far fewer tribal divisions in Tunisia than in other countries of the Maghreb. Virtually all Tunisians are Arabs and Sunni Muslims.

Third, Tunisia's concern for modernization dates from the mid-nineteenth century. Under Ahmed Bey (1837-1855), for example, the system of taxation was revised; slavery was abolished; military installations were established; and there were experiments in modern education. In the 1870's, the administration of justice was reformed; development projects were initiated; and modern education was expanded—all in a manner that would preserve Tunisia's Arab and Islamic personality.

Despite these reforms, Tunisia was not strong enough to repel a French invasion in 1881. Nevertheless, reforms continued, not only in the fields of education and justice but also in economic life, the status of women, and more.

Fourth, Tunisia's struggle for independence developed strong political institutions. The struggle was led by the Destour (Constitution) party in the 1920's. A national trade union was established in 1924. In 1934, the Neo-Destour party was formed by Habib Bourguiba, a young lawyer who had recently returned from his studies in

France. Bourguiba and others established local committees throughout the country and built a single-party political movement capable of organizing grass-roots opposition to the French.

AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Sweeping social and cultural reforms followed independence in 1956.² In 1956, a Personal Status Code replaced Koranic law in the areas of marriage, divorce and child care. Tunisia was the first Arab state to outlaw polygamy. In 1958, a new bilingual educational system was put in place. In 1960, Bourguiba began a campaign against the traditional observance of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month during which believers fast from sunrise to sunset. He argued that fasting decreased economic productivity.

In the decade following independence, literacy in Tunisia climbed from 15 percent to between 35 and 40 percent; the proportion of primary school-aged children attending class grew from 25 percent to between 60 and 70 percent; and the proportion of high school students rose from 3 percent to 30 percent. As a result, by 1960 Tunisia was third among Arab countries in the proportion of children attending school. By 1965, it had moved into second place, behind Lebanon. In addition, the proportion of girls in school rose steadily, climbing from less than 30 percent at independence to over 40 percent a decade later. There were also vocational programs for students who terminated their education without completing high school.

During this period, the Neo-Destour was an effective political organization. The party's 1,250 territorial and professional cells met to discuss national problems and raise public awareness. The party performed regulatory and distribution functions at the local level, helping citizens solve personal problems and dispensing patronage. These activities built loyalty to the political system, and by 1965 the party claimed to have 400,000 active members. Auxiliary organizations, like the National Union of Tunisian Women and the National Union of Tunisian Students, also mobilized and politicized the populace.

In 1964, Tunisia set a course toward socialism. The Neo-Destour party became the Destourian Socialist party (PSD), and the party congress of that year, meeting in Bizerte, approved a program of agricultural and commercial cooperatives. The architect of the program was Ahmed Ben Salah, minister of planning and finance and former head of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). Despite some opposition, the cooperative program was pushed vigorously. There were 270 *unités de production* by the end of 1964 and 1,044 by December,

1968. Cooperative retail outlets were also established.

Bourguiba and his supporters consolidated their position by removing rivals and undermining competing institutions. When the country became a republic in 1957, Tunisia's traditional monarch, the Bey, was deposed. Islamic officials exercising independent influence through religious courts, schools and landed trusts lost their power base as a result of legal and educational reforms. The autonomy of UGTT was broken and, in 1963, the Tunisian Communist party (PCT) was banned.

Despite this consolidation of power, Bourguiba's rule was not directed at personal gain. The regime was committed to progressive social engineering and thus it was popular, some abuses notwithstanding.

The government's principal failures during this period were economic. The average annual increase in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was 1.2 percent between 1960 and 1970. In the vital agricultural sector, it was .05 percent. The situation with respect to trade was similar. Exports increased every year but the balance of payments consistently worsened.

On balance, Tunisia's early record was mixed. The country was stable and progressive; capitalizing on historic assets, it made important gains in such fields as education, women's rights and legal reform. But it had not made substantial progress toward democracy. More important, it had not made sufficient economic progress to generate sustained growth.

The situation changed in the 1970's. After 1968, when Bourguiba became ill, a struggle for power developed among his lieutenants. The major competition was between Ahmed Ben Salah and supporters of the cooperative program, on the one hand, and liberal members of the PSD Central Committee, led by Ahmed Mestiri, on the other. When the President's health improved in 1969, he sided with the liberals. Ben Salah was expelled from the party and was later convicted of treason. He remained in prison until 1973, when he escaped and fled to Europe.

With Ben Salah gone, the liberals called for the creation of multiple political parties. They dominated the 1971 party congress held in Monastir. But Bourguiba subsequently regained his health and fought to reestablish his political authority, gradually replacing liberals with his own supporters. Mestiri was ousted from the party in 1972, and by the 1974 PSD congress Bourguiba's supporters were in control. That Congress declared Bourguiba President for Life.

The new regime was more conservative economically, and was less concerned about social reform and political mobilization. Bourguiba named Hedi Nour, the former director of the National Bank, Prime Minister. Bourguiba and Nour expanded the private sector, dismantled most of the nation's cooperatives and actively encouraged foreign investment, claiming that they were *évolutionnaires*, not revolutionaries.

The machinery of the PSD atrophied. Although politi-

²For details see Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 41ff, and Mark Tessler, William O'Barr and David Spain, *Tradition and Identity in Changing Africa* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 193-302.

cal freedom had been limited, the new regime was even less tolerant of dissent and more narrowly tied to a single ideology. Grass-roots political activity diminished, and the party lost its dynamism at the local level. Most PSD committees did little more than dispense patronage in order to retain the support of local notables.

In this environment, new politicians emerged. Ben Salah established the Mouvement d'Unité Populaire (MUP) from his European base, and accused Bourguiba of favoring the privileged and ceasing to work for the common good. The MUP was banned in Tunisia, however, and between 1974 and 1976 many leftists sympathetic to Ben Salah were arrested. In 1977, 33 MUP members were tried for threatening state security and defaming the President.

The liberals fared better, but their fate also reflected the regime's opposition to political pluralism. Mestiri and his supporters formed the Mouvement des Démocrates Sociaux (MDS), but their 1978 request for recognition was denied. However, they were permitted to publish newspapers, which were occasionally shut down for criticizing the government.

The General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), led by Habib Achour, challenged the government more seriously. Following strikes in 1976, the government and the UGTT negotiated a "social contract" in 1977, giving industrial workers pay raises linked to inflation. But labor unrest continued, and the government was especially disturbed by the presence of many unemployed young people at anti-government demonstrations. Some PSD officials argued that the disturbances were an understandable response to economic and social dislocations, but Nouira took a hard line and Bourguiba supported him. There was a major Cabinet reshuffle, and the government encouraged attacks on some UGTT offices.

The union's response came in January, 1978. Achour resigned his position on the PSD political bureau and the Central Committee and the UGTT called a general strike for January 26. Although violence was not encouraged by the UGTT, extensive rioting accompanied the strike, demonstrating the anger of the urban poor. At least 100 people were killed as the army struggled to restore order. Hundreds more were arrested, including Achour and 30 other labor leaders. January 26, 1978 became known subsequently as Black Thursday. Achour was sentenced to prison and, although Bourguiba pardoned him in 1979, he remained under house arrest until 1981. For its part, the UGTT moderated its opposition and appointed a new secretary general.

³See Abdelkader Zghal, "Le retour du sacré chez les jeunes Tunisiens," in *Le Maghreb Musulman en 1979* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Souhayr Belhassen, "L'Islam contestataire en Tunisie," *Jeune Afrique*, no. 951 (March, 1979); Mark Tessler, "Political Change and the Islamic Revival in Tunisia," *The Maghreb Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (January-February, 1980); Elbaki Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste," *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 103 (January-March, 1984).

Militant Islamic groups emerged in the 1970's, further complicating the picture. The Association for the Protection of the Koran was founded in 1970 and was granted legal status as a cultural group. More recently, the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), which is more explicitly political and has been denied legal status by the government, has been dominant. Most MTI leaders counsel against violence, but they have nonetheless forcefully condemned the regime and its policies.³ Concerned about popular support for anti-establishment Muslim groups, the government arrested many MTI leaders in the early 1980's.

TOWARD LIBERALIZATION

Nouira suffered a stroke early in 1980 and Bourguiba replaced him with Mohammed Mzali, a former minister of education. The new government moved haltingly in the direction of political liberalization. Indeed, such movement had begun in 1979, when the National Assembly amended the electoral code to permit two candidates to compete for each seat in Parliament. In 1980, Mzali released political prisoners. He also brought into his Cabinet a member of the MDS and several former ministers who had lost their positions in 1977 for opposing Nouira's hard line against labor. Early in 1981, amnesty was granted to all members of the MUP except Ben Salah, who remained in exile.

At a special PSD congress in April, 1981, Bourguiba declared that non-PSD candidates would be allowed to participate in parliamentary elections scheduled for November. Any group receiving five percent of the vote would be recognized as a political party. In July, the Tunisian Communist party (PCT) was recognized and exempted from the five percent rule. The PCT and the MDS both presented candidates, as did a Tunis-based faction of the MUP. Sometimes known as MUP-2, the new faction, headed by Mohammed Bel Hadj Amor, distanced itself from Ben Salah's group in Europe. In the elections, however, none of these factions won seats. The PSD, cooperating in an electoral front with UGTT, won 95 percent of the popular vote and all 136 seats.

Continuing the trend toward pluralism, the MDS and Amor's MUP faction were recognized by the government in 1983. Nevertheless, because of the weakness of groups outside the PSD and irregularities in the 1981 balloting, many critics doubted that Mzali was seriously interested in multiparty politics. He was believed to be pursuing a strategy designed to improve Tunisia's public image and, most important, to undermine rivals inside the PSD. Among his challengers were Driss Guiga, minister of the interior and an opponent of multiparty politics, and Mohammed Sayah, a former PSD secretary general who had supported Nouira's hard line in 1978. Some of Mzali's rivals were receiving behind-the-scenes support from Bourguiba's wife, Wassila.

The result of these developments was increased uncertainty and popular frustration. The PSD had lost its

dynamism but it was resisting any movement toward genuine power sharing. Inside the party, Mzali and others were absorbed in intraparty battles. Finally, although Bourguiba remained active, the President celebrated his eightieth birthday in 1983, and his advancing age added to concern about the country's future.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Tunisia's aggregate GDP increased about 7 percent annually between 1973 and 1976, and even more between 1977 and 1980. This was a welcome change. Some gave credit to the Nouira regime. Others argued that Tunisia was benefiting from earlier investments in education and reform. They pointed out that in the 1970's Tunisia also began to benefit from the sale of petroleum, which by 1980 accounted for over half its total exports. Growth rates declined after 1980. Nevertheless, with per capita income now exceeding \$1,000, Tunisia's economic position is far better than it was in the Ben Salah era.

Despite these gains, the economic picture is not rosy. Productivity is not high. This is evident both in the structure of exports and imports and in the distribution of gross domestic product. Except for textiles, which account for about 15 percent of sales abroad, Tunisia's major exports are raw materials. Phosphates and petroleum dominate. The price of phosphates has been depressed in recent years. More important, the price of petroleum is also declining.

Tourism and remittances from Tunisians working abroad are also significant sources of foreign currency. However, neither indicates productive capacity. Nor are they sufficient to keep the foreign debt from climbing. The balance of trade worsened at a rate of 14 percent during the first half of 1984.

As for the domestic economy, the position of manufacturing in GDP has increased only slightly, from 8 percent in 1961 to 14 percent in 1983. The large decline in the position of agriculture during this period, from 24 percent to 13 percent of GDP, is even more discouraging. The share of agriculture in merchandise exports has declined even more. As a result, Tunisia must spend increasingly large sums to import foodstuffs. Petroleum also accounts for a considerable share of imports, because the country exports high quality crude and purchases refined products of lesser quality.

Unfortunately aggregate gains are barely adequate to keep ahead of demographic pressure and rising expectations and, in some sectors, they are inadequate. With the population growth rate about 2.6 percent annually, 55 percent of all Tunisian citizens are under the age of 20 and the number of individuals entering the labor force increases every year. At the same time, rural poverty drives hundreds of thousands into urban slums, resulting in an annual growth rate among the urban population in excess of four percent. A rising demand for jobs and government services is also attributable to social reform, including gains in education and a movement aimed at

women's emancipation. High expectations are in part the price of success.

As a result, unemployment is about 20 percent, with an even higher rate among young people. Moreover, the situation is deteriorating; the government has been unable to expand employment opportunities. Other problems include an acute housing shortage, and poverty requiring subsidies for bread, cooking oil and other basic commodities.

The distribution of resources, further, is highly skewed. The gap between rich and poor, though smaller than it is in some developing countries, has increased appreciably. At present, the richest and poorest 20 percent of the population consume 50 percent and 5 percent of GDP respectively. Thus, on the one hand, visible signs of wealth and consumption are multiplying among the elite. On the other, poverty is growing, with a widening divide between the salaried workers protected by unions and legislation and those who work on an intermittent or seasonal basis in the informal sector, or perhaps not at all. The former received substantial pay raises between 1978 and 1982. The latter, whose material conditions are deteriorating, feel powerless, resentful and angry.

Unemployment and underemployment are rising among the young and the poorly educated, segments of the population who bear the brunt of Tunisia's economic troubles. Slums are spreading. In Tunis, for example, over 20 percent of the population now lives in shantytowns. Finally, there are important regional inequities. For example, over half the 86,000 new jobs created between 1973 and 1978 were located in Tunis; only five percent were located in the south.

The government is addressing some of these problems, but its success has been limited. The current development plan (1982-1986) increases investment in agriculture from 13 percent to 19 percent, to reduce food imports and to foster rural development. Partly because of weather conditions, the projected five percent annual growth in agricultural productivity has not been met. On the contrary, cereal imports have increased and agriculture's share of GDP continues to decline.

The current plan allocates more resources for manufacturing, especially mechanical and electrical industries, to increase exports and to create jobs. Indeed, more generally, the government proposes to double spending for job creation. But again, targets have not been met.

It is difficult to find funds to implement economic policies. Because of recent discoveries, Tunisia will become a net importer of oil in 1990, not 1985. Nevertheless, with petroleum still accounting for more than 40

(Continued on page 229)

Mark Tessler, a faculty associate, Universities Field Staff International, is the coauthor of *Tradition and Identity in Changing Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). He has been a student and a research associate at the University of Tunis and visits Tunisia frequently.

In Ethiopia, "famine and hunger will continue, at least until the land reform is sufficiently coordinated to insure effective distribution and production. When the political and economic processes become stabilized, Ethiopia will be able to redirect its efforts from the military to the agricultural sphere."

Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia

BY PETER SCHWAB

Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Purchase

IN celebration of the tenth anniversary of the revolution that saw the Dergue (the Provisional Military Administrative Committee, PMAC) take power in Ethiopia, a vanguard political party was established (in September, 1984) that will move the country more firmly into an orthodox Marxist-Leninist political framework. At about the same time, the Western world was made acutely aware of the worst drought and famine ever to hit Ethiopia. With 300,000 already dead and between 6 million and 7 million others hungry or starving, Ethiopia is facing one of the world's most extraordinary disasters.

The two events elicited international interest and support, the former from the Soviet Union and the latter from the United States, Great Britain, France and Western relief agencies. The two events, however, are interrelated. The Dergue's political and economic struggle to alter society radically and move it from feudalism to Marxism led to agricultural policies that compounded the effects of the drought. Although since 1974 alterations in the political process and the political economy have markedly benefited the peasants and rural workers, the radical land reform program of 1975—the centerpiece of the new political order—caused so much agricultural havoc that it was partly responsible for the famine of 1984. The radical nature of Ethiopia's revolutionary government and the policies and programs it has installed are linked to Ethiopia's present plight. To some degree, then, 1984 represents both the zenith and nadir of the Ethiopian revolution.

In September, 1974, the Dergue overthrew the government of Emperor Haile Selassie and began to direct Ethiopia toward socialism. Mengistu Haile Mariam, who took control of the government shortly after the revolution, maintained that the primary goal of revolutionary Ethiopia was the

elimination of feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism. . . to build a new people's Ethiopia. . . . To this end a People's Democratic Republic will be established . . . under the leadership of the proletariat in close collaboration with the farmers, the support of the petty bourgeois, anti-feudalist and anti-imperialist forces. . . .¹

¹*The Ethiopian Herald* (Addis Ababa), April 21, 1976.

²John Markakis and Nega Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia* (Nottingham, England: Spokesman, 1978), pp.132-133.

Innovative and drastic steps were taken to consolidate the revolution. On December 20, 1974, "Policy Guidelines on Ethiopian Socialism" were issued (*Ethiopia Tik-dem*). Pluralism, liberalism and capitalism were rejected. An attack on class, ethnic and tribal stratification was initiated. And, finally, the Dergue established itself as the primary political body that would interpret the needs of Ethiopia and steer it in a socialist direction.

In March, 1975, Ethiopia's feudal land system was ripped apart. The Nationalization of Rural Land proclamation established peasant associations throughout the country to organize collective farms, to distribute land to former tenant farmers and to landless persons, and to act as executive bodies, judicial bodies and security agencies to insure that all the land was distributed. To help coordinate this effort, the All-Ethiopian Peasant Association (AEPA) was created in 1977. By 1983, more than 14 million peasants had come under the authority of the AEPA.

The land reform program was the policy that led the peasants of Ethiopia to throw their support behind the Dergue, particularly in the south. Finally, after many centuries, Ethiopia's government was taking peasant needs into account:

The medieval era had come to an end . . . and the people of Addis Ababa and other towns staged the largest, most enthusiastic demonstrations the country had ever seen.²

The land-to-the-tiller program also produced the support the new government needed to survive the violence and the opposition of the urban students, the Eritrean secessionists, and the Somali invaders of the Ogaden in 1977-1978.

The government also nationalized all urban land and established urban dwellers associations (kebelles) to control urban neighborhoods politically and administratively and to incorporate the urban proletariat and petty bourgeoisie into the revolution. But it was the revolutionary land reform program that most influenced Ethiopians.

By 1977, land reform was radically changing rural life. In that year, also, Somalia invaded Ethiopia, and students in the cities, via the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party (EPRP), began to attack the Dergue, charging that it was not radical enough and that a true revolution

had to come from the people through a people's revolution. Thus 1977 was a key year for both politics and class warfare. The Dergue pushed strongly for the implementation of land reform, and it took the offensive against its internal and external enemies.

Under the slogan of Red Terror, students were flushed out and murdered, exiled or imprisoned. Using Soviet weapons and Cuban military advisers, Ethiopia counter-attacked in the Ogaden; by 1978, Ethiopia had ravaged that area and had defeated the Somalis. In the north, an extensive air war against secessionists in Eritrea saw thousands killed and parts of Asmara leveled. By 1980, when Ethiopia regained control of Eritrea, violence had become a defining characteristic of the revolution; perhaps hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians had been killed; most of Ethiopia's enemies had been defeated; and the revolution and its government had been stabilized and legitimized. The violence, in large part brought about by the opposition of middle class students, an uncompromising secessionist movement, and a foreign state, was punishing and deadly, but it might be argued that it was defensive in nature and necessary for the survival of the revolution.

During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the government's attempts to implement its land reform program began to have both positive and negative effects. In 1977, the interior was obviously in turmoil. Land was nationalized; landowners were evicted; violence erupted in many places; there was very little organization and coherence; and production began to fall markedly. From 1973 to 1977, coffee production fell 50 percent. In the same period, the export of pulses and oilseeds dropped 25 percent and by 1981 these exports had decreased an additional 50 percent. Because of the increase in the price of oil, by 1981 fuel imports absorbed 46 percent of export proceeds; and the decline in commodity prices indicated that between 1979 and 1982 the price of exported animal skins had declined by 50 percent.³

In addition, between 1975 and 1982, consumer prices rose 133.6 percent, and the production of teff, a grain that comprises one-third of cereal production and occupies half the area allocated to cereal production in Ethiopia, was greatly affected by the chaotic state of land reform and fell by almost 60 percent.⁴ Thus, because of slumping productivity, plummeting commodity prices and skyrocketing petroleum costs, Ethiopia's economy was on the precipice of disaster. The subsequent drought after 1982 led to calamity.

Nonetheless, the land reform program was and continues to be extremely popular. It bound the peasantry to the Dergue, giving the government the legitimacy to carry

out its radical socialist program. But although the land policy was a marked political success, economically it played a role, at least in the near term, in the 1984 disaster. Nonetheless, it is possible, as Paul Baran maintained, that despite the consequences for the economy in the short run,

the establishment of a socialist planned economy is . . . indispensable . . . for the attainment of economic . . . progress. . . . Under conditions of socialism this . . . cannot be accomplished except by means of . . . collectivization of peasant farming.⁵

REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION

After 1981, agricultural production began to stabilize; output rose almost five percent over the preceding year. With the defeat of its external enemies and internal opponents in 1977-1978, the Dergue was able to concentrate on coordinating the land reform program and organizing and developing its political process.

Preparations for the establishment of a vanguard political party began in 1979, when the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was created. The Soviet Union and Cuba had been pushing the Dergue for greater orthodoxy. And Mengistu himself realized that for the sake of stability and coordination the innovative aspects of the revolution had to change. With help from Soviet political organizers, COPWE spent five years preparing the nation for the establishment of a one-party state. On September 10, 1984, the third congress of COPWE, which served as Ethiopia's first Constituent Congress, established the Worker's party of Ethiopia (WPE). Grigori Romanov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the congress and a member and secretary of the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) Central Committee maintained that:

The formation of the WPE is a major victory. . . . Aims can only achieve their goal through a party. . . . that will unwaveringly follow its basic line. That Ethiopia's progress . . . under the vanguard leadership of the party will be further secured is unquestionable.⁶

Mengistu said simply that the WPE "will serve us as a scientific guideline for our struggle in implementing the plan to hasten the construction of the new society."⁷

Although the creation of the WPE was a move in the direction of civilian participation in the ongoing socialist revolution, contradictions continue. Seven of the eleven members of the Politburo and 20 percent of the 136-member Central Committee are military officers. Although the WPE replaces COPWE, the Dergue remains in place, and Mengistu retains the leadership of that organization as well as being Secretary General of WPE. Thus, the Dergue will continue to play a major political role that may often overshadow the WPE. If the WPE were the vanguard political entity in Ethiopia, there would be no need to retain the Dergue.

There are 33 WPE organizations at regional levels, 70 at subregional levels, and 240 at district levels. To ad-

³International Monetary Fund, 1983.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Prometheus, 1957), pp. 261, 268.

⁶Addis Ababa domestic service (radio), September 7, 1984.

⁷Ibid., September 6, 1984.

vance the knowledge of the party, political training schools were established and Marxist political theory was incorporated into the educational curriculum throughout the system. The primary auxiliary organizations—the AEPA, the kebelles, the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), the Revolutionary Ethiopia's Women's Association (REWA), and the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA)—have been charged with advancing the goals and directives of the party. The WPE has between 30,000 and 50,000 members, with 14,000 full-time officials and a primary core of 2,000 representatives.

All elements of the party and the social and state apparatus advance the theory and practice of the party to the population of some 33.7 million. Both Cuban President Fidel Castro and Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko have argued that the Ethiopian revolution is of truly historic importance, implying that it is the only revolution based on Marxist values in Africa.⁸ Thus despite the maintenance of the Dergue and its bureaucracy, the creation of the WPE moves Ethiopia in the direction of Soviet socialist orthodoxy and Marxist-Leninist doctrine. It is a major political event for both Ethiopia and its patron, the Soviet Union.

FAMINE

As drought began to affect Ethiopia, first COPWE and then the WPE tried to alleviate its consequences. Together with their auxiliary organizations and Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, in 1983 the government began to distribute and redistribute available food to the affected areas, predominantly Tigre, Eritrea, Wollo, and Beghemdir and Semien regions (all in the north). Despite the United States assertion in 1984 that Ethiopia had done little to inform the world of the oncoming crisis, Mengistu and other Ethiopian leaders appealed for foreign aid in 1983. In 1983, also, Ethiopia did what it could, through its own political structures, to distribute food grown in Ethiopia or donated from abroad. This government response was unlike the Ethiopian response to famine in 1973, when Haile Selassie and international relief agencies tried to cover up the famine in order to preserve the Emperor's reputation.

In contrast, Mengistu acted promptly and publicly. But help from abroad was limited (the United States initially provided only \$9 million in food aid, the Soviet

Union even less). Consumption was growing at a 3.4 percent rate in 1983 while agricultural production was growing at only 0.9 percent.⁹ This, plus the lack of rainfall, the havoc generated by land reform, the emphasis on militarizing Ethiopia to protect it from its enemies, the lack of a Western response to Ethiopia's call for food aid, and decreasing commodity prices led to the famine of 1984.

Appeals from Ethiopia did not spark an international effort to combat famine. But in early fall, 1984, newsreel footage showing famine victims dying in Ethiopia was shown on major television networks in Great Britain and in the United States. The pictures drew millions of dollars in donations from the citizens of both countries and created a public uproar that forced the West to act. By the end of 1984, through its Agency for International Development (AID) the United States had provided \$165 million in food aid, while Western relief agencies had donated another \$150 million in food. Some West European states also contributed heavily.

While the Soviet Union provided Ethiopia with over \$3 billion in military equipment between 1977 and 1984, in 1984 it provided merely \$3 million in food aid. The Soviet response to the crisis was traditional; Soviet officials maintained that food aid ought to be provided from the West because third world economic dislocations are a heritage of colonial and imperial policies. In addition the Soviet Union must import food for its own people; it normally provides military and not economic aid. At the same time, the Soviet Union is already involved in Angola, Poland, Afghanistan and Cuba.

The Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian Red Cross have tried to work cooperatively with all international agencies and governments and the government tries to give priority to food shipments at its ports. Ethiopia's internal transportation network, together with the planes and trucks lent by the Soviet Union, trans-ship the donated food throughout the country. And while the Soviet Union has donated very little in terms of food aid, the East European states have contributed between \$20 million and \$30 million in food, with Bulgaria alone providing \$12.7-million worth.

The people of the two rebellious provinces, Eritrea and Tigre, have also received some food relief. Western relief agencies directly transport the food into the regions overland from the Sudan with the tacit permission of the Ethiopian government. Additional food aid comes through Ethiopia and is distributed in relief camps on the Wollo-Tigre border.*

In 1984, the secessionists in Eritrea and Tigre stepped up their attacks against Ethiopia. In response, the gov-

(Continued on page 227)

*Editor's note: By the end of February, 1985, there were conflicting reports on government relief efforts for the rebel-controlled provinces; relief agencies claimed that the government was not making a concerted effort to help famine victims in those areas. In January, the government confiscated grain on Australian and West German ships that was earmarked for refugees in the Sudan. See *The New York Times*, February 18, 1985, p. A8.

⁸See *Pravda*, September 11, 1984, and the conclusion in Peter Schwab, *Ethiopia, Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985).

⁹World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (Washington, D.C., 1984).

Peter Schwab is the author of several books and articles on Ethiopia. His most recently published book is *Ethiopia, Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

NORTH AFRICA. Edited by Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 283 pages, notes, and index, \$27.50.)

This collection of essays discusses the four core states of North Africa: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Each state's political and economic structure is detailed in separate chapters to provide a general survey of the domestic problems facing the region. W.W.F.

THE CONQUEST OF THE SAHARA. By Douglas Porch. (New York: Knopf, 1985. 332 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$18.95.)

Newsweek called Porch's *The Conquest of Morocco* "exotic and bravura popular history"; the same can be said of this work. Massacres, heroic deeds, exotic natives and power politics dominate Porch's story, which concentrates on France's efforts to conquer the Sahara during the nineteenth century. W.W.F.

ETHIOPIA: AN HERETICAL REVOLUTION? By René Lefort. (London: Zed Press, 1983. 301 pages, notes, chronology and index, \$31.95.)

THE STRUGGLE OVER ERITREA, 1962-1978. By Haggai Erlich. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 155 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$10.95.)

ETHIOPIA AT BAY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE HAILE SELASSIE YEARS. By John H. Spencer. (Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publications, 1984. 397 pages, notes, bibliography, photographs and index, \$24.95.)

According to René Lefort, Ethiopia's Marxist military rulers (the Dergue) face two critical questions: will they relinquish government control to a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party? Or will they continue to function as a military government? Only the former would validate the Ethiopian claim that a true socialist revolution has occurred; otherwise, the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie was only another military coup. Lefort seems to lean toward the view that the ruling Dergue is less interested in administering a Marxist-Leninist revolution, and more committed to consolidating its own power. He cites the "Red Terror" (the slaughtering of the civilian Marxist opposition in 1977-1978) and the government's preferred military solution to the problem of the Marxist Eritrean separatists as the reasons for his position.

Erlich's study is a tightly written examination of the Eritrean separatists; he argues that in 1977 the Eritreans lost their chance to win their struggle against the government when the Dergue mobilized the Ethiopian

people and defeated the Eritreans. He also discusses the neighboring Arab states' desire to see the predominantly Christian Eritreans fail, since their success would represent a radical Marxist threat—a threat less manageable than Marxist Ethiopia.

John H. Spencer was an adviser to the Ethiopian government during the reign of the Emperor Haile Selassie; his memoir is a personal history of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1974. Spencer knew Selassie well and he took part in many historical discussions and negotiations, including the 1955 agreement establishing the United States military bases at Kagnaw and Massawa. W.W.F.

THE MAKING OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1800. By Bill Freund. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. 357 pages, bibliography and index, \$19.50, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Bill Freund reexamines African history from what he calls a "materialist" viewpoint—the perspective of the ordinary cultivators and wage earners of Africa. He says he has broken "with most previous radical (and indeed liberal) writing on Africa in trying to consider nationalism in modern Africa critically, rather than taking automatically a nationalist point of view."

Freund believes that capitalism had a regressive as well as a progressive impact on African development. Although capitalism sought to extract wealth from Africa, it also tried to develop productive forces. "Materialist history cannot possibly be reduced to anticolonial polemic." The second half of the book is an examination of "the complex interrelationship between capitalism and colonialism."

Freund is a noted African scholar and his reexamination of African relations with colonial forces before and after independence challenges traditional views.

Virginia Curtin Knight
Consulting Editor, *Current History*

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: A HISTORY. By Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 450 pages, notes, bibliography, photographs and index, \$29.95.)

Duignan and Gann strive to present a balanced and objective narrative history of United States relations with Africa from the early seventeenth century to 1984. The chapters on the impact of slavery on the United States adopt a middle ground on how many slaves actually entered the United States and their economic value. Still, the authors are quick to point out that the slave trade "did more, perhaps, than any single form of

early modern enterprise to shape modern American enterprise."

Other chapters in the book detail business, military, diplomatic and cultural relations between the United States and Africa, and the contributions Africans have made to the United States. W.W.F.

THE WHITE TRIBE OF AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE. *By David Harrison.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 310 pages, map and index, \$8.95.)

This profile of the Afrikaner grew out of a film project undertaken by Harrison for the British Broadcasting Corporation. Harrison tells of the Afrikaners' struggles in British-dominated society, how they were treated as poor whites and their rise to political power. This is not a theoretical discussion but a one-on-one-account relating the personal stories and the intimate reactions of the individuals who seek to justify one of the world's most repressive societies. Harrison's book is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the complexities of South African society and the Afrikaner personality. V.C.K.

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION IN THE IVORY COAST: THE PROPHET HARRIS AND THE HARRIST CHURCH. *By Sheila S. Walker.* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. 168 pages, notes, references and index, \$29.95.)

The phenomenal religious movement created in 1913 by Liberian prophet William Wade Harris in the Ivory Coast flourishes there today. Conducting her own original research, Sheila Walker reexamines the development of the Harrist Church, exploring the possible reasons for its survival. She concludes that the Harrist movement endures because it is an independent, African adaptation of Christianity. Walker's account is straightforward and well focused; through her subject she shows the ongoing tensions between traditional African belief systems and Western concepts. V.C.K.

THE AFRICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY. *By Claude S. Phillips.* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1983. 300 pages, maps, tables, bibliography and index, \$30.00.)

This book is what its title says it is—a dictionary of more than 225 terms that pertain to African politics. The terms are arranged alphabetically and by subject. Each term is defined in its historical and contemporary context and each definition is followed by an explanatory paragraph. The tables are extremely informative, including a table on political instability that lists coups, attempted coups, communal instability and mass instability. Maps highlight religious and ethnic divisions, the historical uses of European languages, and major geographic subdivisions. Economic data is included in tables on per capita gross national product and population growth rates. V.C.K.

STRUGGLE FOR THE CITY: MIGRANT LABOR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE IN URBAN AFRICA. *Edited by Frederick Cooper.* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983. 319 pages, notes and references, \$29.95.)

In his introduction Frederick Cooper asks, "who shapes the city, in what image, by what means and against what resistance?" The discussions in this collection are Marxist-oriented; they range from an examination of the development of Africa's first mining town, Kimberley, to a reassessment of South Africa's migratory labor in the 1980's. There are also chapters on workers in the Gold Coast in 1947; in Mozambique after World War II; Africa's informal sector; prostitution in Nairobi; and work and migration in a town in western Nigeria. V.C.K.

PAN-AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT: 1776–1963. *By P. Olanwuche Esedebe.* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1983. 235 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$12.95, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

This book of Esedebe's, which grew out of his doctoral thesis, traces the idea of Pan-Africanism as it evolved from its inception to its present-day interpretation. He takes a scholarly approach to his subject. The book is well documented and Esedebe provides a detailed record of the development of a major political movement. V.C.K.

TRANSFORMATION AND RESILIENCY IN AFRICA. *Edited by Pearl T. Robinson and Elliott P. Skinner.* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1983. 269 pages, notes and index, \$14.95.)

Nine Afro-American scholars discuss change in traditional and modern African societies. The essays focus on transformations in Ethiopia's bureaucracy, African music, African self-perceptions as reflected in fiction, African educational institutions, Hausa society as a whole, Nigerian parastatals, rural-urban shifts in Kenya, and African religion. In his introduction, Elliott Skinner writes of the Afro-American scholar's changing view of himself and of Africans. Several of these essays stand out for their excellence; the book provides an interesting view of "modern" Africa. V.C.K.

MOZAMBIQUE: TOWARDS A PEOPLE'S HEALTH SERVICE. *Edited by Gillian Walt and Angela Melamed.* (London: Zed Press, 1984. 147 pages, notes, chronology and glossary, \$9.25, paper.)

Nine accounts written by British health workers who served in Mozambique during the flush of independence remind us of how fragile newly independent states are. Brought to its knees in the years since independence, Mozambique's hopes and aspirations have been crushed by the government's mistakes and by outside interference. This book is a document of dreams deferred. V.C.K. ■

LIBYA

(Continued from page 200)

regular army was used to support the failing regime of Idi Amin in Uganda and the efforts of former President Hissen Habre of Chad to regain his position. The regular Libyan military establishment includes about 65,000 soldiers, and another 45,000 Libyans have received training in the popular militia or People's Army. Ordinarily, however, Libyan nationals have not been sent abroad, both because there are relatively few of them and because the general population has been perceptibly unhappy with the causes to which they were committed. In this context, financial aid is cheap; genuine military support is very expensive, as the widespread anger in Libya at some 500 reported Libyan casualties in Uganda demonstrated. Chad was something of a special case, because of its longstanding historical and ethnic ties to southern Libya, but as the war dragged on its poor prosecution became the basis for another complaint against the regime.

Libyan nationals have appeared in one important arena of Qaddafi's foreign policy, as the personnel of the "hit squads" or assassination teams who were responsible for the death of well over a dozen exiled opponents of Qaddafi and who may have been involved in plots against other political figures, including United States President Ronald Reagan and the United States ambassador to Egypt. Terrorist activities, as well as Libyan sponsorship of non-Libyan radical causes, led the Reagan administration to brand the Qaddafi government a "terrorist state" in 1983 and created serious misgivings about the regime in the rest of the world as well.

FOREIGN BUSINESS INTERESTS

Nonetheless, as the Libyan opposition to the regime never tires of pointing out,⁶ it is the continued presence of foreign business interests in Libya that sustains the government and provides it with the funds to carry out its foreign policy. Indeed, despite the American prohibition on travel to Libya, perhaps as many as 1,000 Americans are among the foreign workers who make up 40 percent of the Libyan labor force in the mid-1980's. Although the Reagan administration banned oil imports from Libya and restricted high technology exports in 1982 to protest Qaddafi's failure to respect the norms of international law, American oil companies continue to bring up Libyan oil and major American construction contractors continue to find Libya a profitable place to do business.

Moreover, West European countries, particularly France and Italy, which are more dependent on Libyan oil and on Libyan business than the United States, have been reluctant to follow the American lead in efforts to isolate the Qaddafi regime. The West Europeans argue

that because American rhetorical outrage has not been accompanied by serious economic sanctions, they cannot be expected to risk their relatively greater investment for what is apparently a symbolic demonstration of disapproval of Libyan policy. The West Europeans are not alone in doing business with Libya; East Asian countries, including both the Koreans, Japan and the Philippines, have found lucrative markets for goods, laborers, and services in trade and construction.

Indeed, even the Soviet Union has been drawn by the lure of petrodollars. The Libyans became heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry in the mid-1970's, buying—with dollars—much more equipment than they could usefully deploy, and the Soviet Union also provided Libya with a nuclear research reactor and other technical and industrial aid. This dependence has apparently not made Qaddafi any more amenable to Soviet direction than his reliance on Western oil companies has made him attentive to Western interests. Qaddafi's opposition to the international status quo serves Soviet purposes without seriously endangering any Soviet interests, but apparently neither the Soviet Union nor Qaddafi believe that the relationship is much more than a marriage of convenience based on commerce and on shared enemies. Despite increasing contacts in the 1980's, Soviet leaders continue to refer to Qaddafi in unflattering terms—"a Muslim fanatic" was one such reference—and the two countries have not signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation that usually signals formal entrance into the Soviet camp.

Finally, because Qaddafi remains a source of funding and support for third world radical movements and states, however unreliable, and constitutes a symbol of independence from the industrial powers, he retains considerable leverage in conventional diplomacy. King Hassan's decision to approach Qaddafi with an offer of unity in the summer of 1984, for example, demonstrated the Libyan leader's continuing ability to exploit his position as an international pariah. The King apparently wished to cement Qaddafi's earlier promise to end his support of the Polisario in opposing Moroccan claims in the Western Sahara, to guarantee that Qaddafi would not aid the radical opponents of the Moroccan King himself, and to demonstrate to the world that Morocco is not a puppet of the United States. Closer ties with the Libyan leader appear to serve all these purposes, although the agreement is no more likely to be consummated in political unification than any of Libya's previous half dozen agreements with other Arab countries.

PROSPECTS

By the beginning of 1985, Qaddafi's 15 years in power demonstrated that he will remain his own man. Although he apparently regards the Western powers as more dangerous to his interests than the Soviet Union, his economic ties to the West and his military links to the Eastern bloc permit him to argue that his country is nonaligned. His access to the substantial financial re-

⁶Recently, for example, in the "Newsletter of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya," no. 34 (December, 1984). This is one of the principal opposition groups.

sources provided by his country's oil revenues free him from any genuine accountability to domestic groups or foreign patrons and make him virtually impervious to domestic or international pressure.

For many reasons, it appears likely that the Qaddafi regime will grow increasingly repressive at home. The luxurious days of the late 1970's, when a tight market boosted oil prices and revenues to record heights, are probably over for all oil-producing countries. Even if the oil markets should improve, however, Qaddafi is unlikely to recoup the support he has lost at home in recent years. The opposition now includes individuals who were prominent members of the regime as late as 1981, and it is unlikely that they can be persuaded to rejoin the government. Opposition activity is expected to grow, and although the domestic intelligence service and revolutionary committees are widely thought to be efficient, Qaddafi seems unlikely to die in bed.

While he remains in power he will continue to be a source of instability on the international scene. His opposition to the international status quo is an article of faith, not a response to domestic or international pressure, and he is likely to continue to support radical and revolutionary movements as long as he has the resources to do so. Because Qaddafi acts on principle rather than in response to pressure, the international community is hard pressed to find a way to change or control his activity effectively. Neither the European preference for providing incentives to change through maintaining diplomatic and business contacts, nor the Reagan administration's confrontational approach appear to have altered Qaddafi's commitment to radical change. ■

ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 223)

ernment struck back hard; at the same time, it began to remove thousands of northern famine victims to the south in an attempt to lessen popular support for the rebels.[†] The famine also sapped the strength of the rebels; many rebels and their supporters have left the area seeking food. Thus, contemporary Western news reports may overestimate the strength of the secessionist movement in 1985.

The irony of the vast international effort is that the famine was predictable and indeed was predicted both by the Ethiopian authorities and by those studying the effects of the land reform program. But in Western culture it is visual images rather than authoritative studies that matter. Thus television was the key variable in generating the relief effort. When the pictures stop appearing and notable personalities no longer go to Ethiopia to bear witness, it is probable that public attention will waver and food relief will be curtailed. Thereafter, until the land reform program becomes more efficient the government

will have to deal more or less on its own with a continuing and devastating famine.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Despite the famine, the revolutionary model established by Mengistu and his Marxist comrades will be emulated by other third world leaders. Ethiopia's action in establishing a military vanguard that is truly socialist in orientation and represents the peasantry of the country is an approach that has already attracted the attention of Castro and other leaders of the developing world. Virtually every third world country and every leftist political organization was represented at the September, 1984, constituent congress in Addis Ababa. The novelty of the military vanguard is that it was then used to introduce a political party whose goal is the development of an orthodox Marxist state. Such a model will continue to excite third world leaders, who are seeking a way out of the structure of dependency on the Western world.

At the same time, as long as Ethiopia is attacked by groups of the left, right and center, it will rely heavily on military aid from the Soviet Union; thus a different kind of dependency is being created. Yet despite the tremendous involvement of the Soviet Union in the political affairs of Ethiopia, Mengistu has maintained his political autonomy. Ethiopia is very much a Soviet client state, but it is certainly no puppet, in contrast to almost all the states in the East European bloc.

The WPE will most probably become the principal political unit in Ethiopia, and the Dergue may ultimately wither away. But until the WPE is legitimated, authoritative and strong, the Dergue will continue to play a role in determining its direction and policies. When that legitimation occurs, the military leaders will remove their uniforms, eliminate the Dergue and move fully into the politics and affairs of the WPE.

Although Ethiopia would like (and has already attempted) to develop economic relations with the United States and the West, it is more than likely that such overtures will meet only a limited response. West Europe and the United States have become far more conservative politically in recent years; thus they will limit their relations with this Marxist state, hoping to bring economic pressure to bear on it. Should this occur, Ethiopia will move closer to the socialist commonwealth. Certainly the conservative leaders of the United States, Great Britain and West Germany have little sympathy with Ethiopia's Marxist direction. Indeed, the United States is giving military aid to Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia's opponents around the Horn of Africa. Thus, future relations between Ethiopia and the West will be limited.

Famine and hunger will continue, at least until the land reform program is sufficiently coordinated to insure effective distribution and production. When the political and economic processes become stabilized, Ethiopia will be able to redirect its efforts from the military to the agricultural sphere. In fact, its 1980-1990 ten-year plan

[†]Editor's note: According to *The New York Times*, 1.5 million Ethiopians are to be resettled in the south in the course of the year. See *The New York Times*, January 7, 1985.

envisages such an effort. The development of hydroelectric power, irrigation schemes, extensive tree planting, and the deployment of human resources from the military to the agricultural sector can create circumstances under which the effects of a drought can be limited and controlled. Until that redirection occurs, however, Ethiopia will have to look to the international community to help feed its people. And despite its distaste for the Dergue and its Marxism, the West will have to provide food, even though continuing to send food to Ethiopia will help its Marxist government develop and find legitimacy.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia is a state to be watched both because of its political ingenuity and because of the collapse of its agricultural economy. The success or failure of its efforts to deal with the famine may indicate the eventual success or failure of the revolution itself. ■

ALGERIA

(Continued from page 204)

Republic (SADR) to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Algerian support for the Polisario's struggle against Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara is another legacy of the Boumedienne era. Benjedid has stood by this commitment; yet it is evident that he is eager to find an honorable solution to the conflict. Principle and interest dictate that he not abandon the cause of the Saharawis, but prudence counsels a negotiated settlement. It is largely to this end that Benjedid has rehabilitated the perennial theme of Maghrebian unity.

The 1982 episode was an attempt to jolt King Hassan of Morocco into a more accommodating attitude after the June, 1981, Nairobi agreement to allow an OAU Implementation Committee to open the way to a referendum in the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. After the Implementation Committee met twice without progress, Algeria backed a move by the OAU Secretary General to seat the SADR (which had been recognized by a majority of the OAU's members). Morocco registered the jolt but rebounded in the wrong direction, boycotting the OAU and taking roughly 20 supporters with it. The result was a paralysis of the organization that lasted into 1983.

In order to revive the diplomatic process, Benjedid and Hassan agreed to meet in February, 1983. Unannounced in advance, the meeting in the little-known socialist village of Akid Lotfi near the border took observers by surprise. The architect of this startling venture in summit diplomacy was Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim, considered to be a moderate on the issue of Saharan independence. He appeared to favor putting pressure on the Polisario (which was not invited to Akid Lotfi) to consider some form of political autonomy short of independence. Benjedid was willing to exercise personal diplomacy to break the long stalemate and to encourage some flexibility on the Moroccan side. Algeria stressed the fact that it

had no direct quarrel with Morocco but stood ready to work toward a solution "in conformity with the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence."⁷ This formulation was ambiguous; Algeria was trying to persuade the two parties to talk directly. Indeed, secret talks were arranged in Algiers the next month, but Moroccan flexibility was not forthcoming.

In this context, Benjedid mounted his Greater Maghreb campaign in further support of his Western Sahara policy. There was another consideration—the Libyan factor. Algeria was uneasy about Libyan policy in Chad and, more generally, about Libya's encouragement of dissidence in Tunisia, Niger and Mali—all neighbors of Algeria. Moreover, there is a lingering border disagreement between Algeria and Libya in the south. The Greater Maghreb theme was mobilized over an extended period throughout 1983. Several ministers visited Tunisia early in the year, culminating in a visit by Benjedid in March to sign a treaty of friendship and an accord that definitively demarcated the border between Algeria and Tunisia (in January a similar border treaty had been concluded between Algeria and Niger).

In mid-May, 1983, Prime Minister Abdelghani went to Tunisia to celebrate the inauguration of a new natural gas pipeline. At the end of the month, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba returned these visits amid a flurry of rumors about a regionwide summit gathering. The arrival in Algiers of Mauritania's President Khouna Ould Haidalla enlarged the circle on May 30, but the much-awaited entry of Morocco's King Hassan never occurred, presumably because Algeria was insisting that the Polisario participate in any regional summit. Despite the letdown, intense diplomatic contacts organized around the theme of building the Greater Maghreb continued through the summer, and Mauritania officially adhered to the Algerian-Tunisian Friendship Treaty in December. In January, 1984, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali called on Morocco to "envisage the destiny of the Saharawi people in the framework of the Arab Greater Maghreb."

All this activity deployed around the leitmotif of Greater Maghreb was essentially an appeal to Morocco to agree to some compromise arrangement with the Polisario. It was an invitation to some form of confederal arrangement that would allow the SADR to participate in a larger regional unit. The spectacle of treaties and summits was mounted largely to coax Morocco into greater flexibility. It was, in other words, an instrument to solve a problem (or two, factoring in the Libyan variable), not a Prussian bid to unify North Africa.

Morocco and Libya chose to pursue an alternate route.⁸ The Oujda treaty of August, 1984, was their response—still another demonstration that international politics can make strange bedfellows. This dramatic reversal of alliances rebuffed the Algerian strategy and led to further military and diplomatic pressure. Algeria sup-

⁷ *Le Monde*, March 1, 1983.

⁸ See the articles on Morocco and Libya in this issue.

ported a new round of Polisario attacks upon Moroccan installations, a campaign ironically baptized the "Greater Maghreb" offensive. It also returned to the 1982 tactic of SADR admission to the OAU, an operation duly effected in November, 1984. Even so, the conciliatory track has not been closed. Exchanges between Algerian and Moroccan officials took place at the end of 1984; in January, 1985, Algeria expressed its willingness to "reopen the dialogue" over the Greater Maghreb, and Tunisia also dispatched emissaries to both capitals.

Algerian foreign policy is not limited to the immediate regional environment. The country has continued to play an active role in the nonaligned movement and in North-South relations. Benjedid was one of the 23 world leaders to participate in the October, 1981, North-South summit in Cancún, Mexico. In 1982, he seemed concerned to shore up the center of the nonaligned grouping as he made state visits to Yugoslavia and India. Neither Cancún nor the subsequent nonaligned summit in 1983 did much to advance the cause of international economic reform that Algeria has championed. The era of Algerian leadership has waned as the role of OPEC has declined and the prospects for global negotiations have receded. In this context, Benjedid has increasingly turned to cultivate a smaller garden.

To make the Greater Maghreb bloom, Benjedid has sought to reassure his neighbors that Algeria's regional goals are moderate—that it seeks not to dominate but to cooperate with other regimes in the area. Algeria sees regional stability as conducive to the accomplishment of national goals, namely, to promote the modernist vision that still moves the Algerian elite. Aware of the social strains that have emerged, Benjedid has practiced a policy of reassurance plus reform, dismantling some of the statist structures that have proved inefficient. With the help of "Mr. Rigor," whose mandate is a more productive economy, "Mr. Reassurance" is promising more goods and opportunities—perhaps even more eggs "laid in Algeria." Benjedid is adjusting a model that has not yet proved itself. His appeal for confidence in the future is, in the final analysis, a commitment to Algeria's ambitious model. ■

TUNISIA

(Continued from page 220)

percent of merchandise exports, the loss of oil revenues will be a major blow. And because of diminishing employment opportunities for Tunisians in France and elsewhere, Tunisia will suffer reduced revenue and heightened unemployment. In addition, the Mzali government is initiating a program of military modernization that will divert revenues from development needs. Finally, though the plan projects increased revenue from tourism, phosphates and foreign investment, its goals are thus far unrealized.

Two questions hold the key to Tunisia's future. First,

who will lead the PSD and emerge as Bourguiba's heir? Second, what will be the relationship between the PSD and other political institutions?

A struggle for power within the PSD has been under way for several years. Mzali's opponents have been trying to diminish his influence and the Prime Minister, for his part, has sought to remove challengers from important positions. In 1983, Mzali managed to oust Mansour Moalla, the minister of planning and finance, and Tahar Belhodja, the minister of information. Both are political veterans.

The 1984 riots led to a major party struggle, principally between Mzali and Driss Guiga. Guiga, minister of the interior, was Mzali's most important rival, and was supported by Wassila Bourguiba. Although he claimed that Mzali and others were responsible for the decision to raise bread prices, Guiga lost the confrontation and was forced to resign. Later, having fled the country, he was tried in absentia for treason and was sentenced to prison.

During 1984, Mzali removed a number of officials who had been associated with Guiga. There were also several Cabinet shuffles. But despite all these changes, Mzali's position is far from secure. He has been unable to remove some of Guiga's former associates, including Defense Minister Slaheddine Baly, who is supported by Bourguiba's wife. The upper echelons of the PSD contain other challengers as well. One is Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, also aligned with the President's wife. Another is the President's son, Habib Bourguiba Jr., who serves in the Cabinet as a political adviser, although he has been politically inactive for many years. There is speculation that his ailing father may wish to see him as his successor.

Mzali's most important rival is Mohammed Sayah, former PSD executive secretary and Bourguiba protégé. Sayah's influence has declined in recent years and he was ambassador to Italy at the time of the 1984 riots. But he was brought back after the disturbances and, with access to the President and other friends in high places, his influence is considerable. Sayah has supported Mzali in some recent infighting, and has consolidated his own position. In the Cabinet shuffle of August, 1984, the ministries of housing and equipment were combined and given to Sayah.

The President has generally supported his Prime Minister, even against rivals backed by his wife. But Bourguiba was hospitalized late in 1984, and he may change his mind if he is required to choose a successor rather than an heir apparent. In any event, the struggle to control the PSD remains intense.

A second political issue concerns pluralism. Will moves toward pluralism continue and, if so, will they assume proportions capable of transforming political life? Guiga was staunchly opposed to multiparty politics; for this reason, advocates of political liberalism do not regret his demise. Sayah, whose fortunes are ascending, is also believed to favor PSD dominance. Mzali favors interpar-

ty competition but has not permitted serious challenges to PSD rule.

On the other hand, the future will not be determined by the PSD alone. The party's ideological élan is gone and its institutional structure has atrophied. Popular participation is limited and many grass-roots committees are controlled by conservative local notables. Out of touch with the masses, party leadership was unable either to anticipate public reaction or to prepare the populace for a price rise—thus the 1984 disturbances. Once the decision had been made, party cadres made no attempt to calm the public.

Equally significant, the number and strength of political rivals are increasing. The legal opposition includes the MDS, the PCT and MUP-2, although all three kept a low profile during 1984. MUP-1 is still banned, but there are rumors that Ben Salah may be granted amnesty and permitted to return to Tunisia. Several of his former associates occupy positions of influence within the PSD.

The most serious challenges come from labor and the MTI. UGTT was weakened in 1984 by a split leading to the formation of the National Union of Tunisian Workers (UNTT). Composed of white-collar workers and led by Abdelaziz Bouraoui, UNTT is pro-government in orientation. UGTT was further affected by a struggle between its president, Habib Achour, and its secretary general, Taieb Baccouche. At present, however, Achour is in the dominant position and, as in 1978, he is opposing the government on economic issues. UGTT is resisting Mzali's proposed austerity program, which it considers unfair to workers. Achour is also discussing the possibility of forming a Tunisian Labor party, which would operate in association with UGTT and would oppose the PSD.

The release of detained MTI members in 1984 brought speculation about a change in the status of the Islamic movement. Mzali has met with MTI leader Abdel Fateh Morou, and some reports indicate that he considered granting the MTI legal status and making Morou minister of religious affairs. But Bourguiba is said to have rejected the plan. Whether these reports are accurate or not, the government is clearly concerned about the Islamic movement's growing strength and the MTI, for its part, seeks to make its influence felt.

The military figures strongly in calculations about Tunisia's future. Though small and traditionally apolitical, the role of the military is changing.⁴ The military was politicized in the 1978 and 1984 disturbances. Some officers apparently resented being ordered to fire on their countrymen. The officer corps is changing. Professional soldiers educated before independence are retiring, and younger officers tend to be more politically conscious and ideological. Some have modest backgrounds and are highly sensitive to socioeconomic disparities. In the wake of challenges from Libya, the government has responded

to the military's call for a program of modernization. This increases the strength of the army, but also creates a dilemma for civilian politicians, who want to keep the military happy and upgrade its capabilities but who are reluctant to divert resources from other pressing needs. In view of these considerations, it is not clear whether the military will remain subservient to civilian authority.

All this leaves Tunisia facing an uncertain future. If the PSD remains moribund but continues to preside over a hollow pluralism, popular frustration will increase and one or several of the government's rivals may challenge it by extralegal means. Alternatively, if the PSD permits genuine competition for power, an effective multiparty system may gradually emerge. The PSD would then be one of several major parties. Or a rejuvenated PSD might continue to dominate, demonstrating its leadership ability.

How much time Tunisia has to resolve these matters will depend partly on the economy. In 1985, many Tunisians fear that their leaders are more interested in settling personal scores than in solving economic problems. They regard the confrontation between Mzali and Guiga after the 1984 riots as a shameful "nonresponse" to the nation's cry for help. No matter what steps the government takes, the economy will be troubled for some time. Nevertheless, the population will be patient if the government demonstrates a genuine commitment to the national welfare and, above all, a determination to share equitably whatever burdens cannot be avoided. Whether Mzali and the PSD will be able to demonstrate this determination to the satisfaction of the Tunisian people, and what kind of political system they will develop, are questions whose answers at present are not clear. ■

THE SUDAN

(Continued from page 208)

impose Shariah on non-Muslims. By late 1984, rebels controlled the entire south, and Juba itself was threatened.

The regime's response to the southern threat evolved from the use of force to the use of diplomacy. Wisely, Nimeiry never attempted to enforce Islamic laws in the south. Alcohol was always freely available, even from government stores. Perhaps hoping that the negotiating success of 1972 could be repeated, the government has offered rebel forces a general amnesty and unconditional negotiations. It is not surprising that the rebels have accepted neither, since they are in undisputed control of the south.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

Closely tied to the southern insurgency is the Sudan's increasingly hostile foreign policy toward its neighbors, Libya and Ethiopia. Qaddafi and Nimeiry have been enemies since Libya backed a coup attempt in the Sudan in 1976, and especially since Nimeiry refused to break with Egypt after the Camp David agreement. The Sudan

⁴See L.B. Ware, "The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post-Bourguiba Era," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter, 1985).

and Ethiopia have regarded each other with suspicion, each certain that the other is aiding anti-government rebel forces.

Relationships in the region have become progressively polarized. Ethiopia and Libya, linked by a mutual defense treaty and implicitly backed by the Soviet Union, are arrayed against Egypt and the Sudan, linked by a mutual defense treaty and explicitly backed by the United States. Because the region is so volatile, Nimeiry's allies are extremely uncomfortable about his Islamic program and the growing war in the south.

None have been more uncomfortable than Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who fear that the Sudan's Islamization program will strengthen fundamentalist elements within their borders. Because they are unable to oppose Islamization openly, they have expressed their concern to Nimeiry through private channels, and Egypt has hinted that its mutual defense treaty with the Sudan does not obligate it to protect Nimeiry from domestic unrest.

For its part, the United States faces a dilemma: it supports a dictator whose friendship is critical but whose policies are increasingly destabilizing and erratic. Nimeiry is valuable to the United States. The Sudanese-American "Bright Star" military exercises in 1983 and American access to the Sudan's Red Sea port facilities demonstrate Nimeiry's cooperation with United States security interests. Perhaps more important, he supported the deployment of United States Marines in Beirut; condemned Syrian involvement in Lebanon; backed Iraq against Iran; and pushed for the reestablishment of Arab ties with Egypt.

Consequently, Washington has supported the Sudan economically with a \$250-million aid program that is the largest in Africa except for Egypt, and militarily, with \$40 million in military aid and demonstrations of American force in the region.* After Libya's invasion of Chad, which Nimeiry alleged was the first step in an invasion of the Sudan, four American Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) were sent to Egypt in February, 1983, amid rumors of an impending Libyan airstrike on Khartoum. When the lone bomber struck in March, 1984, two more AWACS were sent to Khartoum, and American C-141 cargo planes ferried Egyptian troops to the Sudan.

However, the United States has shown growing uneasiness about the radical evolution of Islamization and the resulting stress on Sudanese stability. Prompted by congressional concern, the United States State Department has twice warned Nimeiry that certain Islamic punishments are "a clear violation of human rights" and, along with the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the United States has privately urged Nimeiry to slow the process of Islamization.

Nimeiry has reacted angrily to what he terms the "anti-Sudan" campaign in the Western press, often pointing to a "high rate of moral crime among foreigners" as justification for the penal code.

Nimeiry's requests for military aid to fight the southern rebels bring up an even more painful issue. According to Nimeiry the southern insurgency is a Communist attack, launched by foreign governments who manipulate southern emotions with the issue of Islamization. The issue was forced into the open when, after an arms-shopping trip to Washington in March, 1984, Vice President al-Tayeb announced that the United States had agreed to airlift arms into the Sudan. This confirmed southern suspicions that the United States was allied with Nimeiry against the south. The statement, apparently a crude attempt to force an agreement that had not been approved in Washington, caught the United States by surprise. After a weak statement that appeared to confirm al-Tayeb's claim, the State Department announced that it would not provide weapons for anti-guerrilla activities. Instead, it urged Nimeiry to try to reach a political settlement in the south. Nevertheless, an F-5 fighter that crashed near the Ethiopian border appears to have been flying anti-rebel missions.

ECONOMIC DECLINE

A decade ago, Sudan's potential as a grain and food producer attracted massive Arab investment. Today, the "breadbasket" of the Middle East is suffering from famine and an international debt of \$9 billion.

The great expectations of the 1970's were dampened in 1978 when it became apparent that the Sudan had borrowed too much and had invested unwisely, and that its exports, primarily from the huge irrigated cotton farm called the Gezira scheme, had dropped dramatically. Under the strict guidance of the International Monetary Fund and supported by a host of donors (especially the World Bank and the United States) who pumped billions of dollars into the country, the Sudan adopted a program of economic policy reform that more or less stabilized the economy by 1982.

Yet the Sudan's prospects are grim. The country's debt is equal to ten years of export earnings, and the Sudan has not even been able to meet interest payments. It has escaped default only through generous rescheduling. In 1983, for example, rescheduling reduced debt payments from \$1.1 billion to \$30 million, which the country struggled to pay.

Even this marginal position deteriorated in 1984. Three years of drought resulted in famine in the west, affecting perhaps four million Sudanese in mid-1984. The business community, frightened by Nimeiry's campaigns against "economic sabotage" and uncertain about the implications of Islamic legislation, has reduced its investments in industry. Capital flight is increasing. The worst blow is the delay in oil exports because of rebel action in the oil fields. Scheduled to begin in 1986 and to reach

*Editor's note: On February 17, 1985, *The New York Times* reported that the United States had frozen \$114 million in economic support funds for the current fiscal year to force Nimeiry to reform the Sudanese economy.

\$500 million a year by 1989, oil revenues are regarded as the country's major chance to stave off economic collapse.

RETRENCHMENT

Although these crises are rooted in separate circumstances, each of them has been worsened by and has become part of the Islamic program. Institutional opposition to the Islamic program first sprang, surprisingly, from the elected People's Assembly, which delayed indefinitely its vote on Nimeiry's constitutional amendments in July, 1984, fearing a full-scale civil war. Not surprisingly, most Sudanese remained unconvinced that their rather pedantic leader should derive his authority from the Koran.

The constitutional delay proved crucial, because it broke the momentum of the program. It was also reassuring, because it revealed a Sudanese pragmatism that worked to restrain Nimeiry's powers. In an abrupt change of tactics recalling his former skill, Nimeiry pledged to exempt the south from Islamic law and allow it to reunify. A week later, he dismantled the Islamic courts and promised further "radical changes."

The action was, however, too little and too late. The powerful forces behind the Sudan's religious and cultural diversity had found definition in the traumatic events of 1984. Despite his experience, it is doubtful that Nimeiry will be able to mend those cleavages. The year left Nimeiry weakened, his credibility damaged and his support seriously eroded both in the south and the north, among Muslims and non-Muslims. His execution of Taha in January, 1985, suggested that he would react with increasing violence to perceived threats.

Thus the Sudan's future is bleak. As long as Nimeiry retains the army's loyalty, he will stay in power. In any case, there is no obvious leader to take his place. The era of reconciliation has become the era of perpetual crisis, and the long-suffering Sudanese will have to endure until a new leader can begin the long, slow trek toward national unity. ■

CHAD

(Continued from page 212)

GUNT. Goukhouni's Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), consisting of Toubou followers from the days of the CCFAN, remain a key element. Goukhouni has been challenged frequently by Acheikh Ibn Oumar, the leader of the CDR. Considered closest to Libya, the CDR is also the strongest fighting unit. Finally, there is Mahamat Abba Said, whose First Army has become the Forces Populaires de la Liberation. There is little evidence that these groups will ever align with Habre. Mistrust runs too deep and Habre suspects that as long as they remain militarily beholden to Libyan backing these groups will be entirely subject to Qaddafi's shifting whims.

Habre must maneuver within the framework of southern politics. The south's cotton crop is Chad's financial lifeline. As long as Habre is denied direct access to the

cotton revenue of the south, he is deprived of revenue. Given the continuing disorder in the south, farmers do not deal directly with the cotton trading monopoly, Cotonchad; they prefer to sell produce to individual traders traveling from Cameroon or the Central African Republic. Southern administrators are essential to the running of the country. With almost 60 percent of the budget devoted to defense, the government is desperate to resolve its southern problem.

There is a double pressure because famine has struck much of the country. Not only is Chad wracked by famine but many who are affected cannot be reached with relief. Sufferers do not move toward the capital to seek assistance; they migrate to the east to Sudan and to the southern prefectures, reflecting Chad's historic economic patterns.

During Chad's civil war, there has been almost no action on economic recovery. The premise that economic assistance—without which Chad can barely rebuild itself—must be predicated on a political settlement has proved singularly inappropriate. A major program of economic assistance, equitably distributed and designed to restore public services and to centralize commercial activity, would be a major incentive for cooperation. The United Nations appealed for \$250 million in 1982 for the rehabilitation of Chad. The response was negligible, and there has been little effort since to promote such a program. Thus the government lives, in effect, from hand to mouth, dependent partly on excise taxes raised on local trade near the capital and on insufficient foreign assistance from donors like the United States and France. Meanwhile, the solution to Chad's crisis is as distant as ever. ■

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 196)

when Libya organized an armed attack against the Tunisian mining town of Gafsa to spark an uprising against the government. Tunisian leaders had been trying for several years to improve the defensive capabilities of their country's 28,000-man military force, and in 1980–1981 they turned to the United States for help. The Reagan administration responded with about \$100 million in military aid annually from 1982 to 1984; these funds went toward the purchase of American-made M-60 tanks, a squadron of F-5 jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles, a radar system, coastal patrol boats, helicopters and armored personnel carriers. The American response was intended to boost the Tunisian military in the face of the Libyan threat. There were grounds for criticizing the nature of the arms acquired, which were poorly suited to deal with internal subversion, but the choice of weapon systems came from Tunis, not Washington.

Washington responded once again to Tunisia's appeal for help after nine days of violent bread riots swept the country at the end of 1983 and during the first week of

1984. The Reagan administration dispatched General Walters to Tunis; Walters took with him a pledge of an additional \$5 million in Public Law 480 food assistance. Congress increased Economic Support Funds for the country from \$1.5 million in fiscal year 1984 to \$20 million in fiscal year 1985. At the same time, the United States Agency for International Development (AID) made a decision in mid-1984 to continue economic assistance to Tunisia. This reversed a decision in 1981 to phase out the AID program in Tunisia over five years on the grounds that the country had reached a level of economic development—\$1,400 annual per capita income—that no longer justified American aid.

Military aid, meanwhile, was reduced to about \$67 million for fiscal year 1985 and probably will be reduced further in the coming years. Although the current military aid figure was reduced considerably from the \$111-million level of the previous year, more of this year's assistance is either grant aid or aid at concessional rates. The total economic and military aid for Tunisia declined from \$125 million in fiscal year 1984 to \$91.7 million in fiscal year 1985.

Several key members of Congress believe that Tunisia, a moderate Arab nation threatened by Libya, deserves firm American support. President Bourguiba's health problems in the fall of 1984 underlined the possibility—some would say probability—of a succession crisis in the 1980's. A prolonged crisis would tempt Libya to intervene. United States policymakers would like to contribute to an orderly succession that will preserve Tunisia's independence and its moderate orientation.

LIBYA

United States relations with Libya have been unfriendly for at least five years and, short of a change of government in Tripoli, are unlikely to improve dramatically. The source of friction has little to do with what happens inside Libya, where American business personnel and their families are treated very well. The problems stem, in Washington's eyes, from the destructive and destabilizing nature of Qaddafi's actions on the international scene.

Throughout the 1970's, successive American administrations declined to improve relations with Libya for two reasons: the Qaddafi regime's support of international terrorist activities and its opposition to a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Richard Nixon's administration reduced American diplomatic representation in Tripoli to the level of *chargé* following the departure of the United States ambassador in late 1972. For the next several years, Washington refused to approve delivery of eight C-130 military transport planes that Tripoli had purchased from Lockheed for \$48 million. In December, 1979, the Libyan government stood by when the American embassy in Tripoli was attacked and badly damaged. Following this attack, the Carter administration withdrew all American diplomatic per-

sonnel, closed the embassy, and reduced diplomatic relations to the lowest level. In May, 1981, the Reagan administration ordered the Libyan diplomatic mission in Washington to leave the country because of its involvement in acts of violence. For the last several years, Belgium has represented American interests in Tripoli, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has represented Libyan interests in Washington.

The Reagan administration has raised American opposition to Libya to the level of active confrontation. Secretary of State Alexander Haig singled out Libya for its interventionist activities, and Vice President Bush called Qaddafi "the world's principal terrorist and trainer of terrorists." In August, 1981, the United States directly challenged Libya's claim that the entire Gulf of Sidra is Libyan territorial waters by holding well-publicized naval maneuvers within the gulf. A clash ensued when two American F-14's from the U.S.S. *Nimitz* shot down two Soviet-made SU-22's piloted by Libyans after the Libyans opened fire. Tensions between the two countries increased further in the fall of 1981, when the White House revealed reports that a Libyan hit squad planned to enter the country to assassinate President Reagan. In December, the President asked all Americans to leave Libya as soon as possible, and the government soon announced that American passports would no longer be valid for travel to Libya. Not all Americans living and working in Libya heeded this call: but in the two years that followed their number fell from about 2,000 to an estimated 600.

Before 1982, poor American-Libyan relations had not interfered with the flourishing trade between the two countries. In March, 1982, however, the Reagan administration imposed a boycott on the importation of petroleum products from Libya and established a license requirement for most American exports to that country. The boycott reduced the total value of Libyan products exported to the United States dramatically, from a high of \$8.6 billion in 1980 to only \$824,000 in 1983. Licensing caused American exports to Libya to fall from a high of \$813 million in 1981 to \$200 million in 1984. Still, there is continuing American business involvement in two major construction projects in Libya, the "Great Manmade River"—a 1,300-mile pipeline to bring subterranean water from the Sahara to the coastal area of Libya for irrigation and urban use—and an oil refinery at Ras Lanuf. In March, 1984, however, President Reagan announced that there would be no more American exports for the Ras Lanuf project.

The ongoing opposition of the Reagan administration to the Libyan government derives from four main factors. One is Qaddafi's support of international terrorism, including the Irish Republican Army, Corsican and Basque separatists, and the infamous Venezuelan terrorist "Carlos." Tripoli has established a series of camps where training in terrorist tactics is given to foreign revolutionaries, and Libyan hit squads have assassinated a

number of exiled opponents of the regime in several foreign countries. In late 1981, the Qaddafi regime attempted to plant explosives in the American Embassy Club in Khartoum. And in November, 1984, the Egyptian security service foiled and publicly unmasked an assassination attempt by Qaddafi's agents against former Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Bakoush.

A second factor is Libya's implacable hostility to Israel and to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1978, Qaddafi pushed for the creation of the radical Arab Steadfastness Front, which rejected Egypt's separate peace with Israel. In 1983, Libya actively joined Syria to promote a rebel faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that challenged the moderate leadership of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.

Third, Libya has attempted repeatedly to undermine the stability of moderate African states. In February, 1983, Qaddafi tried to organize a coup to overthrow the government of the Sudan. The prompt deployment of American AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft and Egyptian F-5's blocked the coup. Libya has also blatantly intervened in Chad, Niger, Tunisia and Somalia, either with direct military force or by supplying arms and money to insurgent groups. On the other hand, Libya has provided generous assistance to Ethiopia, Benin and Ghana because they are close to countries Libya wants to destabilize: Ivory Coast, Togo, Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Niger and Nigeria.

Finally, the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the guerrilla war in El Salvador have encouraged an activist Libyan involvement in America's own backyard. Qaddafi made clear his objective of undermining the American position in Central America in a speech in September, 1983, on the fourteenth anniversary of the Libyan Revolution:

When we ally ourselves with revolution in Latin America, and particularly Central America, we are defending ourselves. This satan [the United States] must be clipped and we must take war to the American borders just as America is taking threats to the Gulf of Sidra.²

Since 1981, Libya has provided large amounts of arms, money, and training to Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí movement in El Salvador, and important economic aid to Cuba. The Reagan administration has been especially annoyed with Libya's growing supply of arms to Nicaragua. Smaller amounts of Libyan assistance have gone to a variety of leftist groups elsewhere in Latin America.³

Still, Libya remains interested in improving relations with the United States. Because of improved bilateral

economic ties with the nations of Italy and Greece and the union with Morocco, Libya feels less isolated and more confident than it did a year or two ago. Since the Reagan administration's conditions for better relations are unlikely to be met, poor American-Libyan relations will continue, along with American efforts to rally European and African states to oppose and isolate the Qaddafi regime. A more effective way of dealing with Qaddafi, however, may be simply to ignore him while protecting his threatened victims.

CHAD

The Reagan administration has taken more notice of poor, landlocked Chad because direct Libyan intervention in Chad's long civil war has threatened neighboring areas of strategic interest to the United States, namely, Egypt and the Sudan. In 1983, President Reagan referred to Chad as an area in which the French, for historical reasons, have the primary responsibility. Some friction in American-French relations developed in the fall of 1984 when Washington's information on Libyan troops remaining in Chad in violation of a French-Libyan mutual troop withdrawal agreement turned out to be correct. This incident embarrassed the government of French President François Mitterrand and led to the replacement of his foreign minister, Claude Cheysson. The Reagan administration has strongly backed the government of President Hissen Habre in its ongoing conflict with the Libyan-supported forces of Goukouni Oueddei.

In response to Chad's severe drought, in fiscal year 1985, the United States is providing Chad with more than 50,000 metric tons of food, valued at about \$30 million, through Public Law (PL) 480, Title II; this is nearly four times the 14,000 metric tons provided the previous year and is comparable, proportionately, to the massive food assistance the United States is providing to drought-stricken Ethiopia.⁴ In addition, Washington is providing Chad with modest amounts of military and development assistance and Economic Support Funds, totaling about \$19 million for fiscal 1985.

CONCLUSION

Strategic and political interests are most important to Washington in its relations with the Arab states of North Africa because the Reagan administration gives a very high priority to the global-strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus Washington will continue a policy of close cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia because their governments support Western interests. The administration is likely to improve relations with Algeria to the degree that the Algerians distance themselves from the Soviet Union and play a positive and constructive role in the international arena. At the same time, Washington will continue to oppose Libya, because of the Qaddafi regime's strident anti-Western orientation and its penchant for foreign and destabilizing interventions. ■

²Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa*, September 2, 1983.

³See United States, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *The Libyan Problem*, Special Report No. 111 (Washington, D.C., October, 1983).

⁴In fiscal year 1985, Washington has approved, under PL 480, Title II, 290,000 metric tons of food for Ethiopia, valued at \$153 million (including shipping).

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1985, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 4—Australia and the U.S. agree to postpone future meetings of the alliance.

Arms Control

Mar. 9—U.S. arms control negotiators arrive in Geneva; Max M. Kampelman, the chief U.S. negotiator, says that the talks are a bridge to "the elimination of nuclear weapons."

Mar. 11—Viktor P. Karpov, the Soviet Union's chief arms negotiator, arrives in Geneva; he tells reporters that the talks will prevent an arms race in space and terminate the one on earth.

Mar. 12—For the 1st time in 15 months, U.S. and Soviet negotiators begin arms control talks; strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and space weapons will be discussed.

Contadora Group

Mar. 16—The member nations of the group—Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama—announce that they will resume talks with the 5 nations of Central America about negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Central American conflicts.

European Economic Community (EEC)

Mar. 29—The Common Market votes to allow Spain and Portugal to enter the EEC.

Mar. 30—Greece agrees not to veto the admission of Spain and Portugal to the market after the EEC agrees to pay Greece \$1.4 billion in agricultural subsidies Greece had demanded.

Iran-Iraq War

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 7—The official Iranian press agency reports that Iraqi artillery and missile fire hit 3 towns yesterday, killing 14 people and wounding 123; Iraqi radio reports Iranian artillery attacks on 3 Iraqi towns.

Mar. 11—Iran says at least 10 people were killed when Iraqi planes bombed 2 Iranian cities; Iranian planes bomb areas outside Baghdad, killing 12 people.

Mar. 13—The Iranian government accuses Iraq of using chemical weapons; last year the UN confirmed that Iraq had used poison gas on Iranian troops.

Mar. 14—An Iranian surface-to-surface missile destroys the government-owned central bank in Baghdad; Iraqi planes later attack the Iranian cities of Tabriz and Teheran, killing 17 people.

Mar. 16—The official Iranian news agency reports that 71 people were killed in today's Iraqi air raids on 6 Iranian cities.

Mar. 17—Iraq warns all commercial airlines to stay out of Iranian airspace after it declares the area a war zone.

Mar. 19—U.S. officials say that the recent Iranian ground offensive against Iraq has been crushed; many of the 30,000 to 50,000 Iranian soldiers who took part have been killed, wounded or captured by the Iraqis.

Mar. 20—Iraqi planes bomb 6 Iranian cities and attack a ship

near Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal. Eighteen people have been killed in Iraqi attacks in the last 2 days.

Mar. 28—Iran reports that 36 people were killed today in Iraqi air raids on 6 Iranian cities; Iraq says it will continue the attacks until Iran holds peace talks.

Middle East

(See also *Egypt; Jordan*)

Mar. 2—Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat says the U.S. does not "wish to arrive at a peace settlement" in the Middle East; he says he is firmly committed to the joint peace agreement worked out with Jordan's King Hussein last month.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Mar. 27—A 2-day session of NATO ministers ends; U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger invites the NATO nations to take part in the research on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

United Nations (UN)

Mar. 12—The U.S. vetoes what it terms an "unbalanced" Security Council resolution that condemns Israel's actions in Lebanon.

ALBANIA

Mar. 4—The Communist party newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* says that Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu was "liquidated" as a "secret agent" in 1981; Shehu's death was previously reported as a suicide.

ARGENTINA

Mar. 4—Armed Forces Chief of Staff Julio Fernandez Torres resigns to protest the government's proposed cuts in the military budget.

Mar. 14—The Senate approves the Beagle Channel treaty with Chile, ending a 100-year-old boundary dispute.

Mar. 20—Before a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress in Washington, D.C., President Raúl Alfonsín says that the debt crisis facing Latin America threatens the stability of the entire Western Hemisphere.

AUSTRALIA

(See *Intl, ANZUS*)

BANGLADESH

Mar. 1—President H. M. Ershad reimposes martial law; all political activity is banned; the universities are closed; and the capital is placed under curfew. Parliamentary elections scheduled for April are canceled.

BARBADOS

Mar. 12—Prime Minister Tom Adams dies; Deputy Prime Minister Bernard St. John is appointed head of the government by the island's governor general.

BELGIUM

Mar. 20—Parliament votes to approve the deployment of 48 cruise missiles under a NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) agreement.

BOLIVIA

Mar. 20—President Hernán Siles Zuazo orders troops and riot police into La Paz to maintain order; both government and private workers have been striking for 13 days, demanding wage increases to offset the 50,000 percent annual inflation rate.

BRAZIL

(See also *Nicaragua*)

Mar. 15—Tancredo Neves's running mate, José Sarney, is sworn in as interim President when Neves is unable to attend the inauguration because of emergency surgery for diverticulitis; Sarney is the 1st civilian to rule Brazil since the military took power in 1964.

CANADA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 12—Three Armenian terrorists kill a security guard and take the Turkish ambassador hostage in Ottawa; police capture the terrorists and rescue the ambassador.

Mar. 19—Parliament defeats a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Brian Mulroney; the New Democratic party introduced the motion following Mulroney's meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

CHILE

(See also *Argentina*)

Mar. 26—2 soldiers are killed in a bomb blast in Concepción, and a bomb explodes outside the building housing the Santiago newspaper *La Nación*.

Mar. 27—Two car bombs explode in Santiago, wounding 11 people. Bombs are also exploded in 2 other cities.

CHINA

Mar. 5—The government announces that 47,000 officers in the armed forces will be retired by the end of 1986.

Mar. 8—Chairman of the Military Commission and de facto leader of China Deng Xiaoping says the economic changes taking place in China will enhance socialism with the "ultimate goal of attaining Communism."

Mar. 9—The State Statistical Board reports that total economic output grew by 13 percent in 1984.

Mar. 27—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang tells the National People's Congress that some bureaucratic controls that were removed as part of the economic modernization program will be reimposed because of greed and corruption.

COMORO ISLANDS

Mar. 14—Minister to the President Ali Bazi Selim says that an attempted coup on March 8 was crushed.

DENMARK

Mar. 24—Over 300,000 union members go on strike after private industry officials reject union demands for a shorter workweek and increased wages.

EGYPT

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 9—President Hosni Mubarak arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with President Reagan on increasing military and economic aid to Egypt; Mubarak asks the President to take a more active role in the Middle East.

EL SALVADOR

Mar. 29—President José Napoleón Duarte says he will resume peace talks with leftist guerrillas after the elections.

Mar. 31—Elections for municipal councils and the National Assembly are held today; exit polls support the Christian Democratic party's claim that it has won an upset victory.

ETHIOPIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 14—Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Berhanu Bayeh says that reports about the government's use of force to resettle famine victims in the south are based on misunderstandings between the government and relief workers and rumors spread by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

FRANCE

(See also *Lebanon*)

Mar. 29—Twenty people are wounded when a bomb explodes at a Paris theater showing Jewish films.

GERMANY, EAST

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 24—U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicholson Jr., a member of the U.S. military liaison mission in East Germany, is shot to death by a Soviet guard near a Soviet military site near Ludwigslust; the Soviet Union says Nicholson ignored warning shots that were fired by the guard. The U.S. says the shooting is unjustified.

GERMANY, WEST

Mar. 4—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher meets in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Mar. 27—The government says the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative can be justified only as a "long-term research effort."

GREECE

(See also *Intl, EEC*)

Mar. 10—President Constantine Caramanlis resigns after Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his Socialist party decide to nominate their own presidential candidate rather than reelect Caramanlis.

Mar. 29—Christos Sartzetakis is elected President in a close parliamentary vote.

GRENADA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

HONDURAS

Mar. 28—Military authorities order troops to surround the National Congress and Supreme Court after Congress calls for the expulsion of the Court's chief justice.

Mar. 30—The new Supreme Court Chief Justice, Ramón Valladares Soto, is arrested and charged with treason by President Roberto Suazo Córdoba; he was elected by the Congress yesterday.

HUNGARY

Mar. 20—The Hungarian Communist party ends a 4-day congress after it reelects Janos Kadar as party leader.

INDIA

Mar. 7—Preliminary results from the state elections that began March 2 show that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress party has won most of the contests; at least 70 people were killed in the 3 weeks of the campaign.

Mar. 8—The Indian consulate in New York says that a U.S.

law firm has been chosen to allow India to file suit in the U.S. on behalf of all the victims of the poisonous gas leak at the U.S.-owned Union Carbide plant in Bhopal in December, 1984; over 2,000 people were killed and 200,000 were injured by the leak.

Mar. 19—Troops are ordered into the city of Ahmadabad; 12 people have been killed in the last week in fighting between caste groups.

Mar. 20—Union Carbide releases its report on the Bhopal accident; the report says that operating errors and procedural violations at the plant led to the leak and that the Indian subsidiary is responsible for any damages.

Mar. 21—A Soviet diplomat is shot and killed by an unknown gunman in New Delhi.

Mar. 27—Parliament votes to extend direct federal rule over the state of Punjab for another 6 months.

INDONESIA

(See *Vietnam*)

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

Mar. 15—A suicide bomber kills himself and 5 others in an assassination attempt against President Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei.

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, UN; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 3—The Cabinet approves the 2nd phase of the Israeli troop withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Israeli troops will move out of the Bekaa Valley, where they have been facing Syrian troops occupying eastern Lebanon.

Israeli military authorities close for a week the Palestinian-run Bir Zeit University on the occupied West Bank; the military arrests 50 people and confiscates "inciting material" at the campus.

Mar. 15—The government announces that inflation rose by 13.5 percent last month; the annual inflation rate is 405.9 percent.

Mar. 26—Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin say that the Israeli troop withdrawal from southern Lebanon is being accelerated.

Mar. 31—Former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti releases a Ford and Rockefeller Foundations-funded study showing that Israel has used questionable legal tactics to gain permanent control of 52 percent of the occupied West Bank.

ITALY

Mar. 27—The Red Brigades terrorist group takes responsibility for today's killing of Professor Ezio Tarantelli, a labor federation economist.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 29—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone orders his Cabinet to draft a "basic policy to open [Japan's] markets to the United States."

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Mar. 15—In a newspaper interview, King Hussein says he can make no further moves toward peace negotiations in the Middle East until the U.S. agrees to meet with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian group.

KAMPUCHEA

(See *Thailand*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Mar. 2—The head of the military government, President Chun Doo Hwan, offers a special amnesty to 2,821 common criminals to mark the 4th anniversary of his coup.

Mar. 6—The government announces that it is removing 14 opposition leaders from a blacklist.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, UN; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 2—As part of its self-described "iron fist" policy to protect its withdrawal, Israeli troops raid the Shiite village of Marakah; 1 Lebanese civilian is killed "evading capture."

Mar. 4—Fifteen people are killed in a bomb explosion in a Shiite mosque in Marakah; the Lebanese government blames Israel for the bombing.

Mar. 8—A car bomb outside the Beirut home of a Shiite clergyman kills 62 people and wounds 200; the clergyman, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, is not hurt. Fadlallah is the spiritual leader of the Party of God, a Shiite fundamentalist group.

Mar. 10—A suicide bomber crashes into an Israeli army convoy in southern Lebanon, killing 12 soldiers.

Mar. 11—Israeli troops attack the Lebanese village of Zrariyah, killing 24 people described by the Israelis as "terrorists."

Mar. 13—The Lebanese Forces, a private Christian army, revolt against President Amin Gemayel, a Maronite Christian. Dissident factions take control of most of the Christian-populated areas near the port of Junieh and mountains north of Beirut.

Mar. 16—Terry Anderson, a correspondent for the Associated Press, is kidnapped in West Beirut.

Mar. 19—Christian and Muslim militiamen clash in southern Lebanon; 4 people are reported killed.

Mar. 21—Israeli troops kill 21 people in attacks on a group of Shiite villages in southern Lebanon; 2 newsmen for the U.S.-based CBS News organization are killed by a shell from an Israeli tank.

Mar. 25—A British journalist working for the UN and a French official in Tripoli are kidnapped; they are the 7th and 8th Westerners to be kidnapped in Lebanon in the last 12 days.

Mar. 30—The government reports that Christian militiamen killed 40 people today in artillery bombardments of Palestinian refugee camps and Muslim militia positions in Sidon.

MEXICO

Mar. 14—Attorney General Enrique Camarena Salazar says 13 people, including 7 policemen, have been arrested in connection with the killing of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency official who was kidnapped in February.

MOZAMBIQUE

(See *South Africa*)

NEW ZEALAND

(See *Intl, ANZUS; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

NICARAGUA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 1—Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado says Nicaragua might make more concessions to the U.S. if the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to resume direct negotiations.

Mar. 5—Americas Watch, a private U.S. human rights group, charges both the Nicaraguan army and right-wing guerrillas backed by the U.S. with human rights abuses; the guerrillas

are charged with the widespread killing of civilians.

Mar. 7—The government bans the return of opposition leader Arturo Cruz.

Mar. 23—President Daniel Ortega Saavedra says that Ecuador and Brazil will provide fuel oil and gasohol to help Nicaragua alleviate an oil shortage.

PHILIPPINES

Mar. 4—Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino is dismissed by President Ferdinand Marcos because Tolentino criticized some of Marco's diplomatic appointments.

Mar. 5—Labor Minister Blas Ople resigns; he was rebuked by Marcos yesterday for commenting publicly on political patronage appointments.

POLAND

Mar. 4—The government increases the prices of various foods between 30 and 75 percent.

Mar. 9—Lech Walesa, the head of the banned trade union Solidarity and the winner of the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, is questioned by government prosecutors and told not to leave Gdansk.

PORTUGAL

Mar. 16—Thousands of workers demonstrate in Lisbon and other cities against the government's economic policies; the demonstrators call for the resignation of the Socialist government.

SINGAPORE

Mar. 28—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announces that President C. V. Devan resigned yesterday because of "alcohol dependency."

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 6—40,000 black students throughout the country boycott classes; police use rubber bullets and tear gas to break up crowds of students.

Mar. 9—Three blacks are reported killed in riots near Uitenhage; at least 200 people, all but 1 of them black, have been killed in the last year because of political unrest.

Mar. 14—Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan fly to Maputo, Mozambique, for talks on the nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique.

Mar. 19—Defense Minister Malan tells Parliament that South Africa is building a wall of barbed wire and electric wire across 9 miles of the South Africa-Zimbabwe border.

Mar. 21—Police kill 18 blacks during a march to a funeral service for 3 blacks killed by police; the government says the police were attacked but eyewitnesses claim that the police fired without provocation.

Mar. 22—The government orders a judicial inquiry into yesterday's killings.

Mar. 23—Seven blacks accused of being government "stooges" are killed by black protesters.

Mar. 26—200 anti-apartheid supporters, including the Reverend Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and the Reverend Beyers Naude, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, are arrested for marching near the Parliament in Cape Town.

Mar. 27—President P.W. Botha warns demonstrators that he will not tolerate violent dissent.

Mar. 29—The government bans 29 opposition groups from holding meetings, including the largest non-parliamentary opposition group, the United Democratic Front.

THE SUDAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 6—U.S. and international relief authorities in Khartoum report that at least one-third of the Sudan's population faces starvation; a regional drought and refugees from famine-struck Ethiopia have worsened the situation.

Mar. 11—The government says security police have arrested over 100 Muslim activists belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood; the activists are accused of plotting the overthrow of the government.

Mar. 29—Riots in Khartoum over food price increases end; between 500 and 1,500 people were arrested and 3 were killed in the 3 days of rioting.

Mar. 31—Doctors call for a general strike to unseat President Gafaar Nimeiry; the doctors started a work stoppage yesterday to protest economic conditions.

TAIWAN

Mar. 20—Chen Chi-li tells a pretrial hearing that he killed Chinese-American journalist Henry Liu in the U.S. in October, 1984, under orders from the chief of Taiwanese military intelligence.

Mar. 26—The former head of military intelligence and 2 of his deputies are indicted for their involvement in the murder of Liu.

THAILAND

Mar. 6—The army reports that Thai units attacked Vietnamese troops who crossed the Thai-Kampuchean border in recent fighting against Kampuchean guerrillas.

Mar. 11—The last Kampuchean guerrilla camp is overrun by the Vietnamese; the guerrillas accuse the Vietnamese of using chemical weapons.

TURKEY

(See *Canada*)

UGANDA

Mar. 2—The state radio reports that President Milton Obote announced February 27 that general elections will be held later this year.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control; Germany, East; Germany, West; India; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 11—The government announces that President of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Communist party Konstantin U. Chernenko died last night; Politburo member Mikhail S. Gorbachev is named by the Politburo to succeed Chernenko as General Secretary; the post of President is not filled.

Mar. 13—Chernenko is buried in Red Square; in his eulogy, Gorbachev says that "socialism will prove its advantages not by force of arms but by force of example. . . ."

Mar. 22—Gorbachev calls for a freeze on the deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclear missiles in return for a freeze on Warsaw Pact "countermeasures" to the missiles.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Mar. 3—The National Union of Mineworkers votes to return to work after an almost yearlong strike.

Mar. 15—Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe gives a speech questioning some of the assumptions of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative; Howe says a defensive system must not become the "new Maginot Line of the 21st century."

Northern Ireland

Mar. 3—The Irish Republican Army claims responsibility for the killing of a Catholic policeman in Enniskillen; he is the 10th policeman to be killed by the IRA in 4 days.

Turks and Caicos Islands

Mar. 22—Chief Minister Norman Saunders resigns; he was arrested 17 days ago at Miami (Florida) International Airport after he accepted money to smuggle drugs into the U.S. from an undercover FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) agent.

Mar. 28—Former Deputy Chief Minister Nathaniel Francis is named Chief Minister.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Mar. 1—The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fines the Union Carbide Company \$3.9 million for its failure to report the testing of diethyl sulfate in 1976–1978; the company denies any guilt and plans further discussions with the EPA about the matter.

Mar. 4—The EPA reports that it is considering rules requiring the removal of 90 percent of lead in gasoline by the end of 1985 and a complete prohibition on its use by 1988.

In New York, resigned U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Paul Thayer pleads guilty to a charge of giving false information to the Securities and Exchange Commission while it was investigating some of his insider stock tradings.

Mar. 10—The Agriculture Department reports that in 1985 about one-third of family-sized commercial farms will suffer financial difficulties and that 13.7 percent of these farms will be near insolvency; President Ronald Reagan, in a recent speech, said that only 4 percent or fewer U.S. farmers needed help.

Mar. 11—Doctors at the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md., report that President Reagan's annual physical examination shows him to be in excellent health although he has a small nonmalignant intestinal polyp.

Mar. 15—Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan resigns; he was indicted for trial in New York today on fraud and larceny charges. Donovan is the 1st sitting Cabinet member ever to be indicted.

Mar. 20—President Reagan selects U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock to succeed Donovan as labor secretary.

Economy

Mar. 1—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 blue-chip stocks reaches a record high of 1299.36.

Mar. 8—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell slightly to 7.2 percent in February.

Mar. 15—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index declined 0.1 percent in February.

Ohio Governor Richard Celeste orders the closing of 71 state-chartered and privately insured savings and loan institutions for a 3-day period in an attempt to halt runs on their deposits; the runs started after the closing of the Home State Savings Bank, which threatened the stability and assets of the private deposit insurance on all the banks.

Mar. 18—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for 1984 was \$101.6 billion.

Mar. 21—In a "flash" estimate for the 1st quarter of 1985, the Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) rose at a slow 2.1 percent annual rate.

Mar. 22—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.3 percent in February.

Mar. 23—Some 46 savings and loans institutions in Ohio are permitted to reopen.

Mar. 28—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's foreign trade deficit for February was \$11.4 billion.

Mar. 29—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.7 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, ANZUS, Arms Control, Middle East, NATO, UN; Canada; Egypt; Ethiopia; Germany, East; Germany, West; Jordan; Mexico; Nicaragua; U.S.S.R.; U.K., Great Britain, Turks and Caicos Islands; Vietnam*)

Mar. 1—Speaking to the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington, D.C., President Reagan calls the Nicaraguan rebels (contras) covertly supported by the U.S. the "moral equal of our Founding Fathers . . . and we owe them our help."

President Reagan says that he will not ask Japan for further quotas on Japanese cars exported to the U.S. when the present "voluntary" curbs set by the Japanese in 1981 expire on March 31.

Mar. 2—Secretary of State George Shultz meets with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra in Montevideo, Uruguay, where both men are attending the inaugural of Uruguay's new civilian President, Julio María Sanguinetti.

Mar. 4—Vice President George Bush arrives in the Sudan on the start of a 7-day trip through some of the drought-ridden areas of Africa.

President Reagan asks Congress to release funds for 21 more MX missiles expected to cost \$1.5 billion.

Mar. 6—President Reagan tells the new New Zealand ambassador to the U.S., Sir Wallace Rowling, that the U.S. "regrets" the New Zealand decision to change "the operational character of our previous cooperation under the ANZUS alliance."

The State Department opposes a possible congressional decision to approve \$2.6 billion in economic aid to Israel, charging that it would "disappear quickly" because of Israel's inability to cope with its fiscal problems.

The body of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar, missing since February 7, is recovered near Guadalajara, Mexico.

Mar. 10—In a speech to a special conference on famine meeting in Geneva, Vice President Bush calls for worldwide cooperation to overcome African famine.

Mar. 12—President Reagan rejects Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's Middle East peace plan because it asks the U.S. to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Mar. 13—Vice President Bush meets in Moscow with new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Bush is in Moscow for the funeral of President Konstantin Chernenko.

Mar. 14—In Grenada, Vice President Bush tells the islanders that the U.S. "would not leave you unprotected."

On a temporary basis, the State Department withdraws an undisclosed number of its Embassy staff from Beirut because of the worsening security situation there.

Mar. 16—Vice President Bush visits Honduras.

Mar. 17—President Reagan arrives in Quebec for conferences with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney; they agree to study the acid rain problem through a joint team.

Mar. 18—In Quebec, President Reagan says that he hopes the incoming Soviet leadership "will open up new possibilities" for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Mar. 19—President Reagan confers at the White House with Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín; the President again attacks the Nicaraguan government while the Argentine President calls for "dialogue."

Mar. 21—President Reagan says that it is "high time" for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to hold a summit meeting.

Secretary of State Shultz says that the police killing of 17 black demonstrators in South Africa "only underlines how evil and unacceptable that system [South Africa's] is."

Mar. 23—In a secret operation, the U.S. Air Force flies some 800 Ethiopian Jews out of the Sudan to Israel over a 3-day period.

Mar. 25—The State Department says that U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicholson Jr., fatally wounded by a Soviet guard while on a military liaison mission in East Germany under a 1947 mandate, was not in a restricted area and terms his killing "totally unjustified." The U.S. mission in West Berlin lodges "a strong protest" with the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin.

The State Department avoids charging Iraq directly with the use of mustard gas to repulse recent Iranian attacks but indicates that the U.S. has evidence of such use.

Mar. 27—Army and State Department officials say that Major Nicholson was killed after he took photographs through a window of the interior of a military building that had been in an East German zone restricted until February 20.

Mar. 30—The State Department announces that U.S. and Soviet military leaders will hold talks to insure "that there will be no repetition" of the type of incident in which Major Nicholson was killed; Secretary of State Shultz meets with the Soviet ambassador to discuss the matter.

Mar. 31—Presidential trade envoy Gaston Sigur meets in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone to discuss the opening of Japanese trade markets to U.S. goods.

Labor and Industry

(See also *India*)

Mar. 25—The General Dynamics Corporation announces that it is dropping \$23 million of the \$63 million in overhead charges on its 1979–1982 government contracts being questioned by the Defense Department.

Mar. 26—In a 108-count indictment, a federal grand jury in Philadelphia charges the General Electric Company with defrauding the government of at least \$800,000 between January, 1980 and April, 1983, by falsifying claims and lying to government officials about its work on nuclear warheads; the company denies any wrongdoing.

Mar. 28—Air Force Secretary Verne Orr announces the General Electric Company's temporary suspension from Defense Department contracts.

The Air Force also requests the return of \$208 million in excess profits on engine parts from General Electric and Pratt and Whitney.

Legislation

Mar. 5—In a voice vote, the Senate passes a House version of a highway bill releasing some \$7.2 billion in federal funds for road construction in the states; the House voted 392 to 4 to pass the bill last week.

The House votes 255 to 168 to approve a farm credit bill passed in the Senate last week; it is expected that President Reagan will veto the measure.

Mar. 6—Calling attention to the U.S. budget deficit, President Reagan vetoes the emergency farm credit legislation, which was attached to a \$175-million aid bill for African disaster relief.

Mar. 19—In 2 identical votes of 55 to 43, the Senate authorizes and appropriates \$1.5 billion for the purchase of 21 more MX missiles.

Mar. 26—Voting 219-213, the House votes to authorize \$1.5 billion for the purchase of 21 more MX missiles. The House must also vote to appropriate the money.

Mar. 28—The House completes congressional action on the 21 MX missiles, voting 217 to 210 to appropriate \$1.5 billion.

Voting 92 to 0, the Senate passes a nonbinding resolution calling Japan's trade practices "unfair," and calling on the President to retaliate with protective measures.

Military

Mar. 1—The Defense Department releases a 17-page report, "The Potential Effects of Nuclear War on the Climate," which accepts as valid the theory that nuclear war could cause a "nuclear winter."

Mar. 12—Defense Department spokesman Michael Burch says that military contractors will be required to affirm, under penalty of perjury, that they have not charged the Defense Department for public relations, lobbying or overhead expenses not specifically allowed by their contracts.

Supreme Court

Mar. 4—The Supreme Court rules 8 to 1 to uphold lower court decisions that a state may not exclude nonresidents from practicing law in its state although a state may require a lawyer to pass its bar examinations and educational and character requirements.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court upholds a lower court decision which ruled that Oneida and Madison Counties of New York State were liable for damages to 3 Oneida Indian tribes for an unlawful seizure of some 900 acres of land claimed by the Indians.

Mar. 18—In a 7-2 decision, the Court upholds a lower court and rules that Congress's establishment of the \$1,000 ceiling on spending by political action committees (PAC's) violates the First Amendment.

Mar. 19—The Court rules 7 to 2 to uphold a lower court ruling that the government did not violate the Constitution by singling out for prosecution only avowed draft resisters.

Mar. 26—Because of a 4-4 tie vote, the Court automatically upholds a lower Oklahoma court decision which ruled that Oklahoma could not constitutionally dismiss public school teachers for "advocating" or "encouraging" homosexuality.

Mar. 27—In a 6-3 decision, the Court upholds a lower court decision that the Constitution forbids police from using deadly force against a fleeing criminal suspect who is neither armed nor dangerous.

Because of a 4-4 tie vote, the Court automatically affirms a lower court ruling which apparently prevents a local government from banning privately sponsored religious scenes on public land.

URUGUAY

Mar. 1—Julio María Sanguinetti is inaugurated President; he is the 1st civilian President in 12 years.

VIETNAM

(See also *Thailand*)


Mar. 19—Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja says Vietnam is preparing to normalize relations with the U.S. as a 1st step to peace talks on Kampuchea; Mochtar returned from Vietnam yesterday.

ZIMBABWE

(See also *South Africa*)

Mar. 3—Opposition leader Joshua Nkomo says the government is trying to "dehumanize" his followers; yesterday 4,000 police and soldiers sealed off townships around Bulawayo, where Nkomo lives.

Mar. 7—Church officials and opposition spokesmen say that since mid-January, at least 56 political supporters of Nkomo have been kidnapped and presumably killed. ■



Reprinted by permission from The Christian Science Monitor © 1984 The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

North Africa

Current History

SPECIAL DISCOUNTS FOR BULK PURCHASE

Save One Third!

Current History is now offering special discounts for orders of 10 or more copies of the same issue, and for 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address.

Academic Year 1985-1986

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa South of the Sahara (4/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Central and South America, 1986 (1/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> North Africa (5/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1986 (2/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1985 (9/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> India and South Asia (3/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1985 (10/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> East Asia (4/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> East Europe (11/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1986 (5/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Japan (12/85) | |

Still Available

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central America and the Caribbean (3/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1984 (1/84) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> South America (2/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico (12/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1985 (1/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Japan (11/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia (12/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1983 (10/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1984 (10/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1983 (9/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1984 (9/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet-American Arms Race (5/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Canada (5/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia (4/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (4/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1983 (3/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa South of the Sahara (3/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (12/82) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1984 (2/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> East Europe (11/82) |

Quantity Discount Price: 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$1.95 per copy—savings of one-third (single copy price, \$2.95).

Copies more than two years old: \$3.75 per copy.

Quantity Subscription Price: 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address: \$18.50 per 1-year subscription.

One-year subscription: \$21.00 **Two-year subscription:** \$41.50 **Three-year subscription:** \$62.00

CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hardcover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

- ☐ 1 year \$21.00
☐ 2 years \$41.50
☐ 3 years \$62.00
☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated in the quantities I have marked.

☐ Current History Binders at \$7.95

Name

Address

City

State

Zip Code

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add \$2.00 per year for Canada; \$2.00 per year for foreign.

All these offers are good only on new orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

Property of
 AMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIBRARY
 Big Sandy, Texas

AMBASSA D00 1 C 114 R 0885
 AMBASSADOR COLL LIBR
 PO BOX 111

BIG SANDY TX 75755